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Nehru was an eye witness to the destruction brought about by two world 
wars and was thus impatient to find ways and means which could bring about a 
climate of understanding and tolerance among the different nations with a view 
to settling differences without resort to the horrors of war. Thus the future that 
took shape in his mind was one of intimate cooperation, politically, 
economically and culturally between India and other countries of the world. 
But it was different for Nehru to conceive of an effective World Organization 
at that time because there were forces and powerful nations which were bent on 
following contrary policies. However, a faint glimpse of this world 
cooperation came to President Wilson and he sought to realize it. Nehru 
appreciated President Wilson for his statesmanship towards realizing this world 
order. Thus the foundation of the League of Nations in the year 1918 by was 
the first attempt to create machinery for world wide International Government, 
constitute a remarkable landmark in the world history. 
But the League inspite of its pious principles and useful purposes, failed 
miserably. During that time India was under the foreign yoke and Nehru was 
involved in a struggle for independence at home, critically watched its 
activities and behaviour, could not repose her faith and confidence in it. 
However it was felt necessary to fmd out another alternative which could pave 
the way to restore peace. For the implementation of this proposal, Roosevelt, 
Stalin and Churchill during the Yalta Conference decided to find out the 
possibilities of maintaining peace on stable lines, which later on led to the 
establishment of the United Nations Organization in 1945. 
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India thus became the founding member of the United Nations since its 
founding at San Francisco in 1945 and there was hardly a statesman in the 
world that displayed greater faith in and allegiance to the UN Charter than 
Nehru. Thus the activities of the Indian Government under his leadership were 
guided by the ideals of conduct embodied in one of the "Directive Principles of 
State Policy" provided in the Indian Constitution. 
Nevertheless India being one of the original signatories of the UN 
Charter is a firm adherent to the principles enshrined in it. Among, others, the 
UN Charter emphasized maintenance and promotion of International peace and 
security, preventing the occurrence of wars and aggression and threats to peace, 
solving international disputes by pacific means and maintenance of 
international peace and security, solving problems of an international character 
by cooperation, promoting better standards of living, and social progress. 
These inspiring aims and objectives of the United Nations as enshrined in the 
UN Charter constitute an integral part of the Nehruvian ideology pervading his 
perception of the new global order. 
Nehru repeatedly pointed out India's attitude towards this august body 
as that of whole-hearted cooperation and unreserved adherence, in both spirit 
and letter to the Charter governing it. To that end, India will participate fully in 
its various activities and endeavour to play that role in its council to which her 
geographical position, population and her urge for contribution towards 
peaceful progress entitled her. 
It was Nehru's profound sense of history and idealism, which made him 
a firm supporter of the United Nations. The circumstances under which the UN 
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was bom and the purpose for which it stood for compelled Nehru more than 
anything else its support firmly and sincerely the UN and its role in the 
international sphere. Thus after independence, Nehru made it one of the Chief 
comer-stones of India's foreign policy to support and work within the UN and 
to mediate whenever possible and desirable Nehru once said. "But looking at 
the broad picture, I think we can definitely say that the United Nations has 
amply justified its existence and repeatedly prevented the recurrent crises from 
developing into war. It has played a great role, and its is a little difficult now to 
think of this troubled world without the UN of it had defects they lay in the 
world situation itself which inevitably it mirrored". 
Nehru had a vision to transform the United Nations into a world 
government therefore he resisted all attempts to reduce the world body into a 
forum to serve the interests of the big powers. Keeping this in mind he 
repeatedly stressed that the UN in order to be an effective world body should 
be universal in character and all the countries big or small should be 
represented in it. The League had its demise because it was a limited 
Organization right fi"om the beginning and he did not want the same to happen 
with the UN Keeping this in mind he brought the issue of Chinese 
representation in the UN as he believed that it was improper for a great country 
consisting of 450 million to remain unrepresented because it would have an 
urgent bearing on the major issues of the world such as disarmament and 
without which the UN is incomplete. 
India under Nehm had been a passionate and constant advocate of the 
principle of racial equality. He even mobilized the world opinion against the 
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policy of apartheid in South Africa and considered discrimination on ground of 
race, as the violation of the UN Charter and a menace for world peace. 
Nehru equally laid great stress on the specialized agencies of the UN as 
they could provide economic and social aid to the underdeveloped countries. 
In this respect he realized that as long as the enemies of mankind in the form of 
grinding and abysmal poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, backwardness and 
equality continued to prevail it would be impossible for the UN to play its role 
in an effective manner for accomphshing its objectives and goals. 
India very often criticized the UN for its structure and for some of its 
activities because the structure of the UN, when it started was weighted in 
favour of Europe and America and did not seem fair to the Afro-Asian 
countries. However, with the growth of the UN and more countries coming in, 
its structure today has become still more unbalanced. Though Nehru was 
aware of certain structural defects which existed in the Organization but he 
warned the nations of the world to proceed slowly with agreement and not to 
press for an immediate amendment of the Charter because that might lead to 
raising of heated controversies. 
The frequent use of Veto by the USSR compelled other members to find 
an alternative to the UN as it leads to the most dangerous development in the 
form of military pacts, aggression and the threat to territorial integrity. But 
according to Nehru, the presence of the USA and the USSR in the UN was a 
matter of added prestige which League lacked. Moreover, Nehru felt that 
however undemocratic the Veto might be in theory it should not be abolished 
from the Charter because the voting right given to the big powers reflected the 
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reality of the power politics and if any change is made in the Charter without 
the consent of all the big powers it would only increase tensions and confusion. 
However Nehru stuck to the presence of Veto, because in his view what was 
needed was not to restrict the area of Veto but to regulate its use and that was a 
matter for the big five to consider themselves. 
However Nehru's contribution in the field of political activities within 
the world Organization is of immense value. 
Nehru was very vocal on issue of Palestine and elaborated his points in 
the following words that "You caimot solve this problem by trying to crush the 
Arab people. Secondly that it will not be settled by British imperialism, but by 
the two main parties coming together and agreeing to terms". 
Nehru while addressing the Constituent Assembly in 1947 suggested, 
"A federal state with naturally an Arab majority in charge of the federal state 
but with autonomy for the other region of the Jewish region", as the solution to 
the problem. According to him this was not only a fair and equitable solution of 
the problem, but the only real solution to the problem. Any other solution 
would have meant fighting and conflict. Though India's proposal was included 
in the Palestine Committee, it did not find favour with most people in the 
United Nations. When partition of Palestine became inevitable it was realized 
that the Indian solution was probably the best but it was too late to realize. 
Partition of Palestine thus brought permanent trouble in West Asia, 
which at present is explosive and might lead to the possibility of World War 
III. Had Nehru's plan been accepted the problem perhaps might have been 
solved much earlier. 
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Even during the Korean crises Nehru devoted his utmost energy in 
bringing about peace on honourable terms to the troubled spot of South-East 
Asia. Nehru directly appealed to Stalin and Dean Acheson for admission of the 
People's Republic of China to the UN and for a conference between the USA 
the USSR and China with a view to achieving a solution of the Korean crises 
and even desiring to implement the Security Council Resolution through some 
positive aid, sent to Korea a medical mission which earned high praise for its 
work. Some of the published letters of Nehru to the then representative at the 
UN clearly reflect Nehru's wisdom and caution in dealing with the problem 
within the framework of the UN Charter. 
India's policy under Nehru during this phase of Vietnamese crises was 
also the same i.e. her concern for peace and stability in Indo-China, appeal for 
political solution through a Geneva type Conference to end the crises for good 
and security for Vietnamese. 
In this Asian drama Nehru played very effective roles to solve the 
problems. Regarding India's attitude towards Vietnam issue Nehru said that it 
was a positive attitude because we do not want to make the situation difficult 
for Indo Chinese fight for Independence thus India followed a policy of 
neutrality in Vietnam in order to help facilitate the solution of the problem. 
The Congo crises was another major issue which had plunged the United 
Nations into serious crises with Soviet Union threatening to withdraw from the 
United Nations and it looked, as though a split in the United Nations was 
inevitable. Here again the efforts made by Nehru are worth appreciating and 
the role played by him in defusing the United Nations crises assumes vital 
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historical significance. It was the "greatest peace mission" of Nehru which 
ultimately helped in resolving the UN crises and the United Nations literally 
received a new lease of life. 
Thus in all these major International crises, each one having potentiality 
of escalating into yet another world war. Nehru's role of mediation became 
very effective and successful. In all these crises, India's role of conciliation 
helped in averting global war. It demonstrated one fundamental truth that the 
powers pursuing Cold War politics needed an outsider and a new comer to the 
arena of International politics to exert its moral authority in the cause of peace. 
It demonstrated yet another fact that the conduct of international relations 
needed some ethics. Sheer force and military power caimot win war. It further 
revealed that the role of mediation by genuinely peace loving and non-aligned 
nation could be acceptable to both the hostile camps. Specially when the 
nations are suspicious and distrustful of one another, they need someone to act 
as a bridge and Nehru perfectly fitted himself into this picture and played 
important role in world affairs. 
But we feel sorry to see the current picture of India in the International 
affairs which is completely different to what it was during Nehruvian era. At 
that time Nehru showed the guts of taking over the most delicate task in the 
International affairs. But now our leaders prefer silence to major International 
incidents which is not a healthy sign and would definitely blur India's image in 
the eye of the world. 
The aim of my work is to examine critically and objectively Nehru's 
contribution toward the international Organization and the UN. By 
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understanding Nehru can we regain our past legacy of actively participating in 
world affairs. 
The methodology that has been used, is analytical based on empirical 
facts and published data including primary and secondary sources. 
The data collected has been used to evaluate and interpret the 
hypothesis. An historical approach has also been taken up to explore the 
background of the study. 
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Preface 
Jawaharlal Nehru became a legendary figure in his own life time. He 
was devoted to promoting world peace, security and to save the future 
generations from the scourge of another world war. He was ready to pay 
every price for peace for without peace all our dreams of prosperous world 
would have died. According to him the major problem of the age was the 
question of Cold War rather than the lingering continuation of colonialism 
which was an age old phenomenon. Like other peace loving statesman of 
the world, he also shared the same opinion that in the present situation 
which involved the danger of war, every country should direct its efforts to 
the easing of international tensions. 
Thus the future that took shape in his mind was one of intimate 
cooperation, politically, economically and culturally between India and 
other countries of the world. Intelligent opinion all over the world and vast 
number of people were eager and anxious for this to happen, but 
government vested interests and groups came in the way. 
However, a faint glimpse of this world cooperation came to President 
Wilson and he sought to realize it. Nehru appreciated President Wilson for 
his statesmanship towards realizing this World Order. Thus the foundation 
of the League of Nations in the year 1918 by Wilson was the first attempt to 
create machinery for world wide International Government. No doubt 
Nehru fully appreciated the idea of the League but he felt sad to see the 
functioning of the League and said that the Organization was coming out 
but it had its set backs and one day it would die out as it contained the seeds 
of death within it. Thus the League inspite of its pious principles and useful 
purposes failed miserably. However, its failure and drawbacks provided 
sufficient material for those who were sincerely thinking in terms of 
establishing a more lasting world Organization. 
For carrying out this proposal Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill during 
the Yalta Conference decided to find out the possibilities of maintaining 
peace on stable lines, which later on led to the establishment of the United 
Nations in 1945. There was hardly a Statesman in the world that displayed 
greater faith and allegiance to the United Nations Charter than Nehru and 
repeatedly pointed out that India's attitude towards this august body as that 
of whole-hearted cooperation and unreserved adherence, in both spirit and 
letter to the Charter governing it. To that end, India will participate fully in 
its various activities and endeavour to play that role in its council to which 
her geographical position, population and her urge for contribution towards 
peaceful progress entitled her. Thus after independence Nehru made it one 
of the chief comer-stones of India's foreign policy to support and work 
within the United Nations, and to mediate whenever possible and desirable. 
Nevertheless his supreme faith in the United Nations did not make 
him blind to the conspicuous defects in the United Nations Charter. 
Though he realized that certain structural defects existed in the 
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Organization, he appreciated the difficulties of the situation and warned the 
nations of the world to proceed slowly and with agreement and not to press 
for any change. As it would involve an immediate amendment of the 
Charter and the raising of heated controversies and it might lead to the 
downfall of the United Nation for which he was not ready because 
according to him the United Nations inspite of its so many shortcomings 
had been a formidable instrument in bringing about peace and harmony in 
the world. Not to have it or to do away with it would be a tragedy for the 
world. 
Therefore he wanted his countrymen to extend whole-hearted 
support to the United Nations irrespective of differences of ideologies and 
cultures because if the United Nation is denied its rightful place in the eyes 
of the world, the only alternative to co-existence is co-destruction. 
My study consists of five Chapters besides Conclusion. In the first 
chapter an attempt has been made to access Nehru's contribution to world 
peace and disarmament. It discusses his concept of world peace and ideal 
of One World. Moreover, an attempt has been made to describe the 
circumstances which led to the formation of World Organizations like the 
League of Nations and the United Nations. It further deals with the Nehru's 
perception of the role of the United Nations in contemporary world. 
The Second Chapter evaluates Nehru's role in resolving the 
Palestinian issue in the United Nations. An attempt has also been made to 
IV 
provide the readers with the proposal made by Nehru in resolving the 
Palestinian issue in the United Nations. Had Nehru's proposal been 
accepted the Palestine problem would have been solved much earlier. 
The Third Chapter deals with the Korean crises and evaluates the 
role of mediation played by Jawaharlal Nehru in resolving the Korean 
crises. 
The Fourth Chapter deals with the Vietnam issue and the role played 
by India under Nehru's leadership in providing a solution of the problem. 
In the Fifth Chapter an attempt has been made to provide a brief 
summary of Indo-African relations and describes how Nehru averted major 
crises in the world Organization's history during the Congo crises of 1960. 
The present study tries to analyse the role played by Nehru in the 
United Nations at a time when the world was divided into two hostile 
camps. In retrospect one might say that it was a crucial stage of world 
history when there was intensive Cold War, threatening to break into a 
shooting war. Inspite of so much criticism Nehru was thus successful in 
playing a role assigned to him by history. 
CHAPTER - 1 
INTRODUCTORY 
CHAPTER -1 
INTRODUCTORY 
Nehru Attitude towards World Organization: 
Jawaharlal Nehru had a genuine passion to solve world problems 
and a keen concern for peace in the world. He had jumped into the 
nationalist struggle of India with a clear vision of Indian problems but 
as he advanced in it he gradually began to express concern with world 
problems also.' His concept of nationalism was very wide and 
cosmopolitan. It was this distinctive aspect of his perception of 
> 
nationalism that lent colour and meaning to his perception of 
internationalism. ^His implicit faith in, and scrupulous adherence to 
cosmopolitanism and internationalism influenced considerably his 
perception of nationalism. It was evident in his approach to Indian 
nationalism and the freedom struggle. He was among the very 
nationalist leaders in India and abroad to view nationalism in the wider 
context of internationalism. No doubt the Indian nationalist movement 
began long before the advent of Nehru on the Indian political stage, but 
it is a curious fact that until the late nineteen twenties, it was hardly 
aware of the outside world with the exception of Britain and possibly of 
Japan. It was Nehru who gave the Indian nationalist movement a 
worldview in the nineteenth, twenties and thirties. 
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Nehru had seen something of Europe as a student and read a good 
deal of world history and politics, but the crucial event in the moulding 
of his outlook was his visit to Europe in 1926-27. 
The visit of Nehru to the Brussels Conference was an eye-opener 
for him because he came across a brilliant cross-section of leaders from 
different parts of the world. In the words of Michael Brecher "The 
Brussels Congress proved to be a milestone in the development of 
Nehru's political thought...".^ His visit to Brussels widened his horizon 
and brought him in touch with nationalist and socialist politicians of 
four Continents. During the Brussels Conference he represented India on 
behalf of the Indian National Congress. The need for some action 
between oppressed nations inter se against imperialism in their struggle 
for freedom was the dominant idea behind the Brussels Congress. The 
colonial and foreign offices of Imperialist countries looked upon the 
deliberations of the Brussels Congress with dismay. It had far reaching 
impact on Nehru and on his future activities. "The Brussels Congress," 
he said, "as well as the subsequent committee meetings of the League, 
which were held in various places from time to time, helped me to 
understand some of the problems of colonial and dependent countries". ^ 
Moreover it enabled him to connect the struggle for political liberation 
in India with similar struggles in other countries of Asia and Africa, and 
gave a radical edge to his politics which was sharpened by a four day 
visit to Soviet Union in November 1927. 
It was from 1928 Nehru's criticism of imperialism, capitalism and 
Fascism became strident. His nature rebelled against Fascism in Italy 
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and Nazism in Germany. He severely criticized the pro-Fascist and 
appeasement policy of the British Government. Ever since the invasion 
of Manchuria, Ethiopia and Spain he saw with pain and anguish how the 
appetite of the two dictators proved insatiable and how country after 
country were being betrayed in this notorious policy of appeasement and 
how the lamps of liberty were put out. 
Nehru was an eyewitness to the two world wars. The horrors, the 
ruthless destruction, the mass annihilation and economic ruination which 
were the terrible consequences of these two world wars, caused and left 
acute panic in his mind. Thus the terrible experience of wars and his 
close observation and clear understanding of international affairs, casted 
him in the mould of an uncompromising champion of international 
peace. Thus it was during this period Nehru imbibed in him the ideology 
of peace. Thus being a man of great vision he was in search for a 
strategy of peace. 
Nehru was ready to pay every price for peace for without peace 
all our dreams of prosperous world would die out. He believed that the 
major problem of the age was the question of Cold War rather than the 
lingering continuation of colonialism, which was historically a past 
phenomenon. Like other peace loving statesmen of the world Nehru also 
shared the same opinion that in the present situation which involved the 
danger of war, every country should direct its efforts to the easing of 
international tensions and to prevent the situation from deteriorating 
further, he warned the bigger nations on several occasions that mere 
glory of wealth or show of arms would not take them anywhere. Thus in 
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order to achieve real glory as well as material prosperity, we should 
develop our character and personality. Nehru's main emphasis was on 
the proper cultivation of mind in the right direction because wars arise 
in the minds of men and it was mind that required proper training so as 
to rule out the possibility of malice, rancor and jealousy in individual, 
national and international spheres. Thus his ideal was a peaceful world 
and his life mission was to save the succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war. 
The future that took shape in his mind was one of intimate 
cooperation, politically, economically and culturally between India and 
other countries of the world. Nehru realized that the days of isolated 
nation's existence were gone beyond recall and the only alternative to 
world cooperation was world disruption, war and continuous conflicts 
between nations till they were all involved in common ruin. But it was 
difficult for Nehru to conceive of an effective world Organization at that 
time because there were forces and powerful nation, which were bent on 
following a contrary policy. However he felt it desirable to lay the 
foundation of such cooperation and understanding. Intelligent opinion 
all over the world and vast number of people were eager and anxious for 
this to happen, but government vested interests and group came in the 
way. 
However, a faint glimpse of this world cooperation came to 
President Wilson and he sought to realize it. Nehru appreciated 
President Wilson for his statesmanship towards realizing this world 
order. Thus the foundation of the League of Nations in the year 1918 by 
5 
Introductory 
Woodrow Wilson, was the first attempt to create machinery for world 
wide International government, constitute a remarkable landmark in the 
world history, signifying the emergence of a new period that the United 
Nations now re-emphasize. 
Both Nehru and President Wilson war an eyewitness to the evil 
designs of Nazism and Fascism. They had seen how the obnoxious 
Treaty of Versailles was imposed on the poor Germans. This treaty 
however was the monopoly of the victorious powers. It was naturally an 
eye sore for the poor Germans. Great injustice was done on the poor 
Germans under the peace settlement and the Covenant of the League was 
conjoin with it. Poor Germans were also called upon to disarm and were 
allowed to keep only a small army for police purposes. Moreover they 
had to pay a huge amount of war indemnity. This was called 
repatriation. Germany being conquered and ruined country at that time 
faced vast problems to make both ends meet for domestic purposes. In 
addition to this to have to shoulder the burden of the allies was an 
impossible task. Moreover the allies were full of hatred and the spirit of 
revenge and wanted not only their "pound of flesh" but also the last drop 
of blood from Germans prostrate blood. The whole purpose of all these 
clauses of the treaty was to tie up Germany in every possible way, to 
disable her, to prevent her from becoming strong again. The obvious 
lesson of history that it is impossible to tie up a great people for long 
period in this way did not strike the wise super statesmen who laid the 
foundation of this peace of Vengeance at Versailles for which they had 
to repent later on and the great pile of the League of Nations "rises 
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mournfully today in Geneva like a mausoleum, enshrining the dead body 
of great hope... Its cry for peace meant the continuation of unjust status 
quo all over the world; its democracy was a cloak for the subjection of 
many peoples and nations. It had to die because it was not brave enough 
to live. There can be no resurrection of the idea that the League 
enshrined, not in the limited, twisted and perverse way that took shape 
in Paris and Geneva, but in a manner fuller, more powerful and organic 
and based on collective peace freedom and democracy". '* 
During this time Nehru was looking at the international scenario 
from a distance. He was a Persona-Non Grata and people were not 
listening to him because India had not yet attained its, independence and 
was under the imperial domination. No doubt Nehru fully appreciated 
the idea of the League. But he felt sad to see the functioning of the 
League. He said that the Organization is coming out but it has its set 
backs and so this was shocking development and one day it will die out 
as it contains the seed of death within it. Nehru believed that the first 
thing, which led to the failure of the League of Nations, was that it did 
not get the congenial atmosphere to survive. But he could not give it the 
required support for certain obvious reasons. Firstly Nehru was not 
happy to see how India was represented in the League but he had to 
remain a silent spectator because back to 1919 when India signed the 
Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations. She 
had become a state in international law for external purposes. But the 
British power represented. A typical comment on the Issue of India's 
representation in the League was. "India may be an original member of 
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the League of Nations, but all the world knows that this means an 
additional voice and vote for the British foreign office. The people of 
India have no say in the matter and the British Government nominates 
their so-called representative. And so, inevitably the subject country 
concentrates on achieving national independence before it can think of 
playing an effective part in international affairs".^ 
2).Secondly the League lacked unanimity. Thus if one member state 
voted against a proposition, it fell through thus there was to be no 
coercion by a majority vote. Moreover, the national sovereignties 
remained as independent and almost as irresponsible as before and the 
League did not become a kind of super state over them. According to 
Nehru it was this provision, which weakened the League greatly and 
made it practically an advisory body. 
3) Thirdly Nehru was sad to see that the League was being dominated by 
the great powers and they used it whenever it served their purpose to do 
so, and ignored it when this was found more convenient. In the year 
1933, Nehru expressed his impressions about the League in the 
following words "there can be no doubt that the League has been a tool 
in the hands of the great powers. Its very basic function is the 
maintenance of the status quo that is the existing order. It talks of 
justice and honour between nations, but it does not enquire whether the 
existing relationships are based on justice and honour... The 
dependencies of an imperialist power are domestic matter for it. So that, 
as far as, the League is concerned, it looks forward to a perpetual 
dominance by these powers over their empires". ^ 
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4) According to Nehru the greatest cause of the downfall of the 
League of Nations lay in the deflection of the United States inspite of 
the fact that whose President had been its principal architect was not 
allowed to join the League, because the United States Senate refused to 
ratify the Covenant of the League. Influenced by both isolationist and 
Utopian tendencies, the United States Senate refused to approve the 
Treaty of Versailles which the Senators feared would mean 
abandonment of the time honoured United States principle of non-
involvement in European affairs. Thus the most important major power 
never joined the system of collective security.* 
5) Nehru as a student of history realized how the lack of 
universalism in the membership of the League was responsible for its 
failure and consequently untimely demise. From the initial stage the 
League lacked universality of membership. When it was founded it was 
assumed that all states in the world would joint it that is, its membership 
would be universal. But four countries i.e. Germany, Australia, Turkey 
and Russia were excluded and it was laid down that these countries 
might join later on under certain conditions. From Africa, Ethiopia and 
Liberia were members and China, India and Japan from Asia. But 
basically it was a European Organization. 
6) Thus due to these various shortcomings the League on several 
occasions displayed its helplessness in maintaining peace and security. 
During 1931, the League failed to prevent Japanese aggression against 
China in Manchuria, the League, no doubt condemned the violation of 
the obligations of the Covenant and kept mum. Afterwards, Italy 
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invaded Abyssinia that country appealed to the League to save her from 
Italian aggression. No doubt the League took preventive action by 
restoring economic and financial sanctions against it, but the action of 
the League to enforce the sanctions upon the aggressor failed. 
Thereafter Italy left the League and it could not proceed with military 
sanctions. Therefore Nehru felt that military sanctions perhaps might be 
necessary and unavoidable on particular occasions but they involved war 
and remedy might be as bad as the disease. Keeping in view the 
disastrous consequences of military action, Nehru pleaded for economic 
sanctions, which were more powerful and on the whole peaceful, though 
their effect, might not be immediate.^ Similarly, Germany violated the 
Charter of the League in very different manner and reoccupied 
Rhineland in 1936 and Austria was also annexed in 1938 
Despite the Munich appeasement, the League could not oppose 
Czechoslovakia in 1939. This was a very big joke that the League stood 
helpless while Russia invaded Finland in 1939. Thus from the Polish Seizure 
of Vienna to the German invasion of Czechoslovakia there was an almost 
unbroken crescendo of lawlessness. This dismal failure of the League in 
securing peace to the irmumerable people all over the world resulted in the 
reversion of nations to the old policy of pacts, alliances and blocks with a view 
to maintaining the balance of power, instead of placing reliance on the League. 
However, Nehru was shocked to see that the leaders of the member countries, 
who had olrganized the League for the peace and security, violated the Charter 
of this Organization on their own accord for their own selfish interest, which 
damaged its fundamental object, which remained unsuccessful in preventing 
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aggression. Thus the League inspite of its pious principles and useful purposes, 
failed miserably. India was under the foreign yoke and Nehru was involved in 
a struggle for independence at home though critically watched its activities and 
behaviour, but could not repose her faith and confidence in it. However, its 
failure and drawbacks provided sufficient material for those who were 
sincerely thinking in terms of establishing a more lasting world Organization. 
At that time there were two schools of thought, which had their own opinion. 
There, some of the statesmen desired to give life to the League, which had 
ahnost become a defunct body while the others wanted to give birth to a new 
Organization. 
For carrying out this proposal the United States President, 
Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Mr. Churchill held a meeting 
in the year 1941 to find out the possibilities of maintaining peace on 
stable line, which condemned the use of force and territorial 
aggrandizement and envisaged security from government to the people it 
was affirmed that after the final destruction of Navy tyranny, they hoped 
to established peace which provide assurances that all men in all the 
lands might live out their lives in freedom from any fear and want and 
they believed that all the nations of the world, for spiritual as well as 
realistic reasons whatever it may be, must come to the abandonment of 
the use of force which was named at Atlantic Charter. Then, later on it 
was followed by the United Nation Declaration signed by the 
representatives of 26 States on T* January 1942 at Washington which 
was subscribed to the principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter, each 
nation pledging itself to employ its full resources against the enemy. 
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And each government promised to cooperate with the government 
signatory there to and not make a separate armistice with the enemies. 
This led to the establishment of the United Nations Organization in 
1945. There was hardly a statesman in the world that displayed greater 
faith in and allegiance to the United Nations Charter than Nehru. 
Nehru thought that this dream of one world or a federation of 
world nations was possible of realization in our own lifetime if we set 
about it in the right way. With this objective he gave his whole-hearted 
support to the ideals of the United Nations since its founding at San 
Francisco on October 24, 1945. Nehru did not forget the fact that the 
League of Nations and all that it stood for met with an ignominious 
doom of frustration and failure within two decade of its birth. But being 
an optimistic by nature and one who had unlimited faith in man and his 
destiny, he thought that the inauguration of the United Nations was a 
step rightly taken to join the nations of the world in their common 
efforts and endeavours to bring peace and happiness to all people. 
India, being one of the original signatories of the United Nations 
Charter at San Francisco in 1945 is a firm adherent to the principles 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Among others, the United 
Nations Charter emphasized in maintenance and promotion of 
international peace and security, preventing the occurrence of wars and 
aggression and threats to peace, solving international disputes by pacific 
means and maintenance of international peace and security, solving 
problems of an international character by cooperation, promoting better 
standards of living, and social progress. The inspiring aims and 
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objectives of the United Nations, as enshrined in the United Nations 
Charter, constitute an integral part of the Nehruvian ideology pervading 
his perception of the new global order. 
Nehru repeatedly pointed out India's attitude towards this august 
body as that of whole-hearted cooperation and unreserved adherence, in 
both spirit and letter to the Charter governing it. To that end, India will 
participate fully in its various activities and endeavour to play that role 
in its council to which her geographical position, population and her 
urge for contribution towards peaceful progress entitled her.'° 
It was Nehru's profound sense of history and idealism, which 
made him a firm supporter of the United Nations. The circumstances 
under which the United Nations was born and the purpose for which it 
stood compelled Nehru more than anything else to support firmly and 
sincerely the United Nations and its role in the international sphere. 
Thus after independence, he made it one of the chief corner stones of 
India's foreign policy to support and work within the United Nations, 
and to mediate whenever possible and desirable. Nehru once said, "But 
looking at the broad picture, I think we can definitely say that the 
United Nations has amply justified its existence and repeatedly 
prevented the recurrent crises from developing into war. It has played a 
great role and it is a little difficult now to think of this troubled world 
without the United Nations. If it had defects they lay in the world 
situation itself that inevitably it mirrored".''Thus he found in the United 
Nations the last hope of mankind for survival progress and onward 
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march. In the absence of the United Nations, Nehru found as a 
discerning statesman, the alternative before mankind was war. 
Nevertheless his supreme faith in the United Nations and its 
underlying aims, objectives and purposes did not make him blind to the 
conspicuous defects in the United Nations Charter. However, these 
defects in the United Nations Charter did not prevent him from 
supporting the United Nations-a fragile and important instrument. 
Nehru being an eyewitness to the formation of the League of 
Nations realized how the lack of universalism in the membership of the 
League of Nations was responsible for its early demise. It was natural 
in the light of this experience that he stood for making the United 
Nations a truly universal Organization by enlarging its membership. 
Thus when the United Nations came into being in 1945 Nehru realized 
that though the United Nations was in many respects a great 
improvement on the League of Nations, yet the United Nations lacked 
universalism. This was for two very strong and unassailable reasons: 
Firstly the United Nations as it existed in 1945 was dominated by 
member-countries mostly that belonged to the non-Western world. 
Secondly a very large part of the Afro-Asian countries were under 
imperial and colonial domination of Western powers as Britain, France, 
Portugal, Belgium and Holland. Thus, in view of the conspicuous 
absence of countries and territorial regions belonging to the non-
Western world prompted Nehru to emphasize repeatedly on the question 
of making the United Nations a truly universal Organization; because 
Nehru was fully convinced that unless the United Nations became truly 
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universal in character and composition it would meet the same kind of 
fate as the League of Nations. Thus his profound conviction of making 
the United Nations a truly universal Organization prompted him to 
support and champion the cause of admitting as many countries as 
possible into the fold of the United Nations. Therefore Nehru spared no 
efforts in championing and supporting the freedom struggle in several 
parts of the Afro-Asian world as well as the applications of peace loving 
countries to become members of the United Nations. In emphasizing the 
universal character of the United Nations, Nehru was convinced that a 
truly international Organization like the United Nations comprising all 
the eligible peace loving countries of the world would go a long way in 
making it a powerful instrument in serving the cause of peace and 
security and promoting friendly relations among nations. Thus it would 
be no exaggeration to say that his emphasis on universalizing 
membership of the United Nations was in consonance with his 
perception of the new global order. 
Thus Nehru not only supported the freedom struggle of the people 
concerned in several areas of these Continents, but also supported very 
strongly their request for membership of the United Nations as and when 
they became free and sought membership of the United Nations in 
taking up this cause. Nehru was fully convinced that as long as 
membership of the United Nations was confined to a small number of 
nations and consequently a large number of countries remaining outside 
its ranks would make this Organization a very ineffective instrument for 
attaining its lofty objectives and ideals. 
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Since it was Nehru's vision to transform the United Nations into 
World Government of some sort, he resisted all attempts to reduce the 
world body into a forum to serve the interest of the power blocs. In the 
initial stage of the United Nations, some Western powers wanted to limit 
the United Nations by the exclusion of some Communist nations. This 
had surprised Nehru greatly and he very firmly stood for bringing 
Communist China into the fold of the United Nations. As the United 
Nations stood in the immediate aftermath of its birth, Communist China 
was not a member of the United Nations. This was the result of the 
power politics that prevailed in the international sphere and also the 
most vehement opposition of USA to bring Communist China into the 
United Nations. The government represented by Chiang Kai-Shek in 
Formosa Island continued to be seated in the United Nations as the 
genuine accredited and legitimate representative of China. The new 
regime on the mainland of China represented a population of more than 
500 millions but unfortunately it was not allowed to take its seat in the 
United Nations mainly because of strong opposition mustered and 
maintained by the United States much against the naked political 
realities. Recognizing the causes that influenced the policy of America 
which led to the continuous exclusion of the new regime of Communist 
China from the United Nations, Nehru took the position that it was 
unrealistic, unjust and illegal to keep a country like China-representing 
a population of more than half a billion from the United Nations. He 
was convinced that for very effective and purposeful functioning of the 
United Nations and making it really universal in character, it was 
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unavoidable and inevitable to bring Communist China into the fold of 
the United Nations. Thus he continued to champion the cause of seating 
Communist China in the United Nations. He even directed the then 
representative to the United Nations. Sir B.N. Rao to plead for Chinas 
failed because of United States opposition. The USA suggested to India 
to accept a permanent seat in the Security Council ousting China. Nehru 
reacted very sharply against this offer and felt that it would do little goal 
and it would bring a great deal of trouble in its train. '^  
Nehru very often asked the General Assembly to consider the question 
regarding proper representation of China and warned that it was improper for 
that great and powerful country consisting of over 450 million to remain 
unrepresented as it had an urgent bearing on the major issues of the world like 
disarmament etc and without which the United Nations is incomplete. 
Moreover by keeping out some countries whether it is Ceylon or China. It is in 
a sense denying itself the moral right to deal with that country. For that 
country, it is a simple reply "since you do not recognize us for this purpose, 
therefore we have nothing to do with you". The United Nations there by puts 
itself in a wrong position. If you cannot deal with a country within the forum 
of the United Nations, then the only alternative to deal with it outside, 
ultimately by force of arms. Nehru was fully convinced that had China been in 
the United Nations there would have been no Korean crises and it would have 
been much easier to deal with China across the Conference table than on the 
battlefield. '^  Thus the basic principle of universality has been abandoned by 
the United Nations. This is a return to the attitude that caused the League of 
Nations to fail, which is not a healthy sign. 
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Though Nehru found in the United Nations a very formidable 
instrument for promoting peace and security in the world solving 
international problems by cooperation and ensuring friendly relations 
among nations, but he was well aware of the various formidable 
obstacles that stood in the way of the working of the United Nations. 
Among them, he rightly emphasized the impact of Cold War, Super 
Power rivalries, indiscriminate use of Veto powers by the permanent 
members of the United Nations, and lacks of cooperation between the 
Super Power in particular and permanent members of the Security 
Council in general in the Nehruvian perception, was absolutely 
necessary for the satisfactory working of the United Nations. Nehru was 
well aware of the fact that as long as these formidable obstacles stood in 
the way of the working of the United Nations, it would not be possible 
for the United Nations to function very effectively and meaningfully. 
Jawaharlal Nehru was also very much dissatisfied with the dubious role 
played by the Security Council in preventing aggression and removing 
the causes of aggression. According to the objectives laid down in the 
Charter the primary responsibility of maintaining and promoting 
international peace and security and preventing war and aggression was 
laid on the Security Council but it could not live up to this cherished 
objective. For this failure in Jawaharlal Nehru's opinion the United 
Nations was not responsible, but the behaviour and actions of the so-
called five permanent members to use Roosevelt's phrase the five 
policemen of the United Nations were responsible for e.g. The role 
played by USSR and USA in Korean war, France and Britain in collision 
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with Israel in the case of the Suez attack, France in the case of the 
Vietnam war will go a long way in justifying eloquently how the 
behaviour and actions of the so-called permanent members of the 
Security Council stood in the way of the working of the Security 
Council. 
The emergence of the USA and the USSR as the mighty world 
powers and their intentions to make use of the United Nations had 
decisive effect on the prestige of this body. These Super Power rivalries 
were in a sense a logical by product of a very strange situation brought 
by the World War II. Though in the beginning it was assumed that there 
would be close understanding and cooperation between the USA and 
USSR in tackling the problems of peace and security and creating a 
stable world order, this did not come about in any reasonable measure. 
Cold War and the Super Power rivalries caused, among others by the 
ideological rivalries and fear psychosis came to affect very adversely the 
working of the United Nations and especially the Security Council. 
Nehru was very much distressed by these ugly and unpleasant 
developments in the international sphere. He very well knew that as 
long as these ugly developments continued to prevail on the world 
scene, it would be impossible for the United Nations in general and the 
Security Council in particular to play their role effectively in 
accomplishing the avowed goals and objectives of the United Nations. 
Consequently, Nehru spared no words in criticizing bluntly the actions 
and behaviour of the Super Power whose rivalries were responsible for 
jeopardizing the working of the United Nations. 
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Nehru was fully aware of the utter failure of the United Nations in 
solving political disputes but on this ground he was not prepared to 
brand the United Nations as a failure because in the constructive, social 
and economic spheres the United Nations played a very impressive and 
positive role. India under Nehru had been a champion of disarmament 
and also being the member of the 18 Nation Disarmament Committee 
Nehru believed that just as military pacts undermine the process of 
peace, militarization only leads to tensions and conflicts. Therefore in 
order to achieve general and complete disarmament all nations must 
therefore follow a policy of demilitarization. Consequently, Nehru 
through his speeches and appeals made an important contribution to the 
process of demilitarization. According to him disarmament is imperative 
if world is to survive. Therefore one of the important tasks for the 
United Nations was to ensure an effective machinery to achieve 
disarmament, because it was absolutely necessary for maintaining and 
preserving lasting peace. This convinced him to support the United 
Nations whole-heartedly in tackling the problem relating to 
disarmament. But the 'Super Power' rivalries far reaching effect of Cold 
War and fear-psychosis prevented the United Nations from 
accomplishing what it was required to do in regard to disarmament. 
Inspite of this sordid failure and dismal record he continued to support 
the United Nations because he was quite convinced how difficult it 
would be to think of the world without United Nations. 
Nehru was not only an admirer of the United Nations but he also 
put in efforts to make the United Nations system a very formidable, 
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positive and dynamic instrument of the modern era. As Nehru continued 
to believe firmly in the continuance of the United Nations and its 
necessity for creating a new global order of his perception, he was 
prompted to do so as the existing trouble torn world was in no way 
congenial either for accomplishing the ends of international peace and 
security or for reconstructing the new global order of his perception on 
enduring lines. So, the deteriorating international sphere and ominous 
developments which precipitated war and aggression forced Nehru to 
make sincere, sustained and selfless efforts by supporting the United 
Nations and its role in maintaining international peace and security. In 
view of the prevailing situation in the world, Nehru realized, unless the 
United Nations was strengthened through dedicated, coordinated and 
sustained efforts it would be difficult to maintain international peace 
and security. He knew the Charter assigned well that notwithstanding 
the most avowed and admirable objectives, aims and goals enshrined in 
the Charter, the United Nations had become a very fragile and weak 
instrument and unless these defects were removed it would not be 
possible for the United Nations to play the role assigned by the Charter. 
Nehru being a very enlightened and mature statesman was well 
aware of the fact that as long as the forces of imperialism, colonialism 
and racialism continued to exist in the world it would not be possible for 
the United Nations to grow from strength to strength and function 
effectively in accomplishing its objectives and goals of getting rid of 
exploitation, oppression, injustice in the stricken and under developed 
countries of the world. 
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Nehru in the light of his experience realized that as long as India 
continued to be under British domination it would not be possible for 
Indian humanity to progress in the direction of liberal democracy and 
fulfill its cherished goals of liberty, equality, justice and development of 
enduring lines. However, Nehru came to the conclusion that as long as 
these enemies of mankind manifested in the form of imperial and 
colonial domination and racial hatred continued it would prove to be a 
hurdle for the people in colonial areas to come up and progress on 
enduring lines. Thus he whole-heartedly supported the cause of freedom 
struggle waged by the suppressed people in several colonial territories 
of Asia and Africa and also mobilized world opinion against the policy 
of racial apartheid pursued by the white minority government of South 
Africa. He even opposed South African refusal to place South-West 
Africa under the Trusteeship Council, and also insisted upon the 
principle of self-determination for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia etc. 
Thus his own experience as a charismatic leader convinced him about 
the dangers inherent in these inimical forces. So he opposed tooth and 
nail the continuance of these forces, as they constituted the negation of 
the very noble causes, aims and objectives of the United Nations. Thus, 
with the object of strengthening the moral, social and political 
foundations of the United Nations and making it a very dynamic and 
powerful instrument of a new global order in which the forces of 
imperialism, colonialism and racialism would be eliminated. 
Nehru equally laid great stress on the specialized agencies of the 
United Nations as they could provide economic and social aid to the 
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under developed countries. Hence Nehru played a very effective role in 
these agencies and raised its voice against unduly onerous charges with 
regard to loans advanced by the world banks. Moreover it was felt by 
him that to enable under-developed countries to make use of the bank 
loans, these charges should be reduced to a reasonable level. Nehru was 
of the opinion that peace in the world consisted of two dimensions 
socio-economic and political. One was as important as the other "And so 
UNESCO came into being to represent something that was vital to 
human existence and progress". "* As, the General Assembly represented 
the mind of the world community and desire for peace. If the General 
Assembly mainly faced the political problems of the world, its 
specialized agencies were charged with work of equal importance in the 
field of economic, educational, scientific and cultural spheres. 
Nehru very much appreciated and quoted the preamble of the 
constitution of UNESCO which stated that war begins in the mind, so 
the defence of peace should be built in the minds and hearts of the 
people and felt that it was undoubtedly a step towards changing the 
mind of the man by providing social, economic, educational and cultural 
relief. In this respect he also realized that as long as the enemies of 
mankind in the form of grinding and abysmal poverty, hunger, disease, 
illiteracy, backwardness and equality continued to prevail it would be 
impossible for the United Nations to play its role in a very effective 
manner for accomplishing its objectives and goals. He was of the view 
that the danger posed by these ugly forces was much more severe than 
war and aggression to the cause of peace and progress in the world. So 
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the need to combat these forces was as important and urgent as the 
imperative necessity of combating war and aggression. So, his fight 
against these ugly forces was very strongly motivated by his perception 
of peace and development and to need to remove such forces inimical to 
peace, progress and development etc. 
The United Nations was founded on a note of high idealism 
embodied in the noble wording of the Charter. There was also 
realization of the state of the post world war and thus provision was 
made in the structure of the Organization to balance certain conflicting 
urges. There were permanent members of the Security Council and 
there was provision for unanimity among the great powers. All this 
India considered being very illogical. However in view of the 
emergence of many independent Afro-Asian countries, a new dimension 
is being added. Therefore India pleaded for their representation in the 
United Nations. India very often criticized the United Nations for its 
structure and for some of its activities. These criticisms have had some 
justification behind them because the structure of the United Nations, 
when it started was weighed in favour of Europe and Americas and did 
not seem fair to the Afro-Asian countries. However, with the growth of 
the United Nations and more countries coming in, its structure today has 
become still more unbalanced. Even then, Nehru took into account the 
broad picture and thought that the United Nations had amply justified its 
existence and had repeatedly prevented the recurrent crises from 
developing into war. Though he realized that certain structure defects 
exist in the Organization but he appreciated the difficulties of the 
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situation and warned the nations of the world to proceed slowly and with 
agreement and not to press for any change which would involve an 
immediate amendment of the Charter and the raising of heated 
controversies? '^  
Another biggest headache, which was a matter of heated 
controversy and its surest undoing, if no timely steps had been taken to 
remedy it, was the 'Veto'. The provision that the Security Council 
cannot arrive at any binding decision unless the big five were unanimous 
over it has tragically undermined the strength or usefulness of the 
United Nations Organization. The frequented use of 'Veto' by the 
USSR compelled other members to find an alternative to the United 
Nations as it would leads to the most dangerous developments in the 
form of military pacts aggression and the threat to territorial integrity. 
Moreover the abuse of the right of unanimity has prevented the Security 
Council from fulfilling its true function. But Nehru viewed the situation 
from a different angle. He thought that the presence of the USA and the 
USSR in the United Nations was a matter of added prestige, which the 
League of Nations lacked. Even the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution 
which recognized that the failure of the Security Council to exercise its 
responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security did not 
deprive the General Assembly of its right or relive it of its 
responsibilities under the Charter.'^ 
Nevertheless, Nehru felt that no matter how undemocratic the 
Veto might be in theory it should not be abolished from the Charter 
because the voting right given to the big powers reflected the reality of 
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international power politics. Moreover, if any radical change would be 
made in the Charter without the prior consent of all big powers It would 
have only led to increase in tension and confusion and the downfall of 
the United Nations for which he was not ready because the United 
Nations inspite of its so many shortcomings had been a formidable 
instrument in bringing about peace and harmony in the world. Nehru 
however, stuck to the presence of Veto, but in his view what was needed 
was not to restrict the area of Veto but to regulate its use and that was a 
matter for the big five to consider. However Nehru was of the view that 
if the present tendency of Vetoing important matter continued, the 
United Nations could hardly face the realities of the world and would 
come closer to the fate of the League of Nations. Merely transferring 
the principle of unanimity from the General Assembly to the Security 
Council would not help solve the problems. 
Thus Nehru's faith in the United Nations was complete. He 
wanted India to play a role of "peace maker" in the United Nations and 
for this he wanted Indian delegates in the United Nations to adopt such 
an attitude that it did not lead to any discord and suspicion in the bipolar 
world. As the head of the Foreign Department in the Interim 
Government, Nehru in his note of September 7, 1947 to the Foreign 
Secretary, advised Indian diplomats abroad that their attitude in the 
world body should be "one of bringing together different powers and not 
one of adding to their ill feeling for each and not to support any action 
which might lead to ill feeling". Thus as an instrument designed to 
promote good-will among the nations of the world; the Organization 
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received all the support and encouragement from India, who firmly 
believed that by positive contributions to the success of the 
Organizations ideals it should be allowed to develop into some kind of 
world order. It was in view of this belief that, when Russia boycotted 
the United Nations. Nehru termed the decision taken by Russia as 
"unfortunate". 
To sum up Nehru's attitude regarding this august body in his own 
words is as follows "Apart from theory or idealism, the practical choice 
offered to the world is to cooperate or perish. The choice is of peaceful 
co-existence or non-existence at all. I would respect that the future of 
the world depends so much on the continuance of the United Nations. 
Without it perhaps the future itself would end".'^ 
Thus the need of the hour is to make the United Nations as strong 
as possible. Till now it has not yet provided sanctions for those who 
violate international rules and regulations it has been an utter failure in 
providing a compromise formula on the issue of disarmament, which is the 
major cause of all problems. However, according to Nehru "The United 
Nations admittedly has numerous shortcomings. The government of a country 
representing a larger part of a world's population is still not subject to the 
discipline and responsibilities that memberships in world Organization would 
impose. Often however, the judgment and activities of the United Nations have 
been swayed or inhibited by the passion and prejudices of the Cold War. 
Nonetheless, the United Nations is the chief repository of our hopes for closer 
and more effective international cooperation for security as well as welfare". °^ 
Lord Glandwyan has rightly met the criticism against the United Nations for 
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not bringing required peace to the world when he said, "United Nations is a 
mirror of the world we live in, and if the reflection is ugly, it is not the mirror 
which is to be blamed". '^ Beardsley Ruml rightly commented in the year 1950. 
"At the end of five years you will think the United Nations is the greater 
vision ever realized by man? At the end of ten years you will find doubts 
within yourself and all through the world. At the end of fifteen years you will 
believe the United Nations cannot succeed. You will be certain that all the odds 
are against its ultimate life and success. It will only be when the United Nations 
is twenty years old that.... We will know that the United Nations is then only 
alternative to the demolition of the world". 
Nehru beheved the United Nations inspite of its many faults, and very 
often having deviated from its aim somewhat, is nevertheless a basic and 
fundamental thing in the structure of world today. Not to have it or to do away 
with it would be a tragedy for the world. Therefore he wanted his countrymen 
to extend whole-hearted support to the United Nations irrespective of 
difference of ideologies, and cultures because if the United Nations is denied 
its due place in the eyes of the world, the only alternative to co-existence is co-
destruction. Moreover its work should not be hampered by the pressures and 
passions of the big powers. It is dedicated to peace, freedom and justice-
noble ideals which embody the aspiration of all mankind and it may yet lead us 
out of this fear and strife ridden age into a more settled fiiture when the full 
potentialities of science and technology could be well appHed to the well being 
of all people.^ '* Nehru rightly said, we shall have to go through terrible 
experiences and face disasters again before we return to something which 
offers a forum for all nations, even though they differ from one another. The 
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whole conception of one world, however distant that one world may be, 
involves an Organization like the United Nations. To imagine that strict 
conformity to a single doctrine or approach can solve the problems of the world 
is to forget the lessons of history and to ignore the realities of today.^ ^ 
However, today the United Nations is at the cross road with the 
dramatic end of the crucial Cold War era and the disintegration of 
Soviet Union. Another serious development, which the world is 
witnessing, is the United States hegemony within and outside the United 
Nations. The post Cold War world is experiencing a strong unilateral 
unidirectional pull of the United States. The United States is the pre 
eminent power and plays a decisive role in any conflict in any part of 
the world it chooses to involve itself.^' Thus the United States dominance 
of the world has resulted in the sidelining the United Nations as happened 
in the case of Iraq, Kuwait etc. which is a serious development. 
Moreover we see big powers dominance continues to enshrine in the 
United Nations in the form of Veto. Most of its member nations are not 
democracies and the United Nations is not governed by any rule of law. 
What Justice can we expect from the United Nations in such 
circumstances? Had Nehru been alive he would have been the saddest 
person on this earth to see such a deteriorating condition of the United 
Nations. Thus with the change in international scenario the United Nations 
and its role should be critically assessed and analyzed and it needs 
structural changes to get the real feel of the existing international 
environment. 
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Thus Nehru's vision of just and honourable international order is 
to be taken seriously and sincerely if the world is to survive and it 
should be the responsibility of the United Nations to make the world safe 
not only for the present but for the future generations too. 
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INDIA AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE 
Importance of West Asia 
The term "Near East" and "Middle East" have had different 
connotations at various times and places. The old and for centuries the 
prevailing term had been that of "Near East", taken from the geographical view 
point of the Western European countries, particularly those bordering on the 
Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean Sea, such as Great Britain, Portugal, 
Spain, Holland, France and Italian city states dealing commercially and 
politically with the Near East. 
In fact the term Middle East reminds us of the days when Western 
Europe, especially Great Britain, dominated the world scene. In the words of 
J.K. Banerji "such expressions as Middle East, Far East and Near East were 
naturally in reference to Western Europe.' But today, the Middle East is being 
described more and more in Asian countries as West Asia. In the words of 
Wint and Calvocoressi "Today Nehru is setting the fashion of calling it West 
Asia in its most restricted sense it includes the Arab lands of Asia together with 
Egypt".' 
West Asia as a Region of Politics Since Camp David: 
Geopolitically, it a region of contemporary world politics, and is 
composed of that part of geographic Asia falling West to the Indian Sub-
Continent, South to the USSR, East of the Mediterranean Sea and North-West 
to the Arabian Sea and almost the whole of the Northern part of geographic 
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Africa. Politically it consists of 22 sovereign states namely Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, Yemen, Arab Republic and Peoples Democratic Republic of 
Yemen. Palestine will be the 23''' state if it emerges.^  
Geo-Strategic Value of West Asia: 
Of pivotal geo-strategic significance is the fact that the Epicentiic sea-
lane separating the African Rimland from the Eurasean and connecting the 
Atlantic with the Indian Ocean, and thus the two hemispheres and the four 
Continents, is flanked considerably by West Asia. The Mediterranean Sea to 
its 60% and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to their 100% are best Asian 
lakes. This makes West Asia strategically vitally important for powers with 
global canvass, especially in a politics charged with bipolarity, when it is in 
geographic contiguity with one of the two superpowers and faces from across 
the sea West Europe, the most advanced sector of world politics.'' 
The strategic value of the region and the endemic occurrence of crises 
there, as regards both the global setting and local physical characteristics, is the 
result of that determining force, which Napoleon in his two fold capacity as 
statesmen and strategist called geography "the mother of politics". ^ 
The geo-strategic concept of the Middle East was articulated by both 
Peter The Great and Napoleon in almost similar terms, when they proclaimed 
that whoever controls The Middle East can rule the world. Even President 
Eisinhower pointed out that if the Mediterranean Sea should be closed to the 
United States, the latter would be close to war. Previously, the United States 
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Government hinted out that the independence of the Middle East nations was 
essential to American security. By the aegis of 1940 the center of the old world 
had become in the words of Roosevelt, "The new world center of gravity" 
because, the Mediterranean Sea as a bridge between the Pacific and the 
Atlantic became for the United States almost as requisite as the Panama Canal 
and the Caribbean Sea. 
Thus, to a large extent the countries of the Middle East exercise control 
over trade, transportation and communications in time of peace as well as war. 
Naturally, therefore, the political orientation of the people of the Middle East is 
a matter of utmost concern to the powers, which seek to establish world 
hegemony. According to most of the renowned historians "History is also 
geography in motion". The geographical factor in Middle Eastern history is of 
great purport since no other region is as strategically located as the middle land, 
where the three Continents meet and amalgamate along the Middle Sea and the 
Mediterranean Sea, which connects the three Oceans. 
The geographical and geo-strategical legacy of the Middle East has been 
shared by every nation of that area from the early epoch when the Trojan War 
was fought for the control of the Dardanelles and where the first "Suez Canal" 
was built. 
It is not only the land link between Asia, Europe and Africa through 
which run the routes via the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf that connects the 
Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean but it is also the crossroads of many 
of the major international airlines and the locale of a large proportion of the 
world oil supphes. According to J.K. Banerji, "Besides being the meeting 
36 
India and the Palestinian Issue 
place of three Continents and lying athwart vital land, sea and air 
communication the importance of Middle East has increased because of its 
possession of about more than half (nearly 60%) of the world's known oil 
reserves. In an age where petroleum has become the very lifeline of 
civilizations, there is greater concern and contest going on among the major 
power alignments to protect their vitally important oil resources in the Middle 
East. 
Importance of West Asia on Account of oil: 
The oil age has turned the Middle East into that "inter Continental and 
"inter Oceanic center of air communications without which a round the world 
and all wealthier air route is possible". ^ The invention of atom bomb has 
further led to the increase in demand for the liquid fuel; indeed the prize on air 
transport is higher than the ships. Thus the latest addition of air power to the 
old issue of land and sea communications has further heightened the geo-
strategic uniqueness of the Middle East as a new center now studded with 
American and British air bases around the Mediterranean Sea from the Atlantic 
to the Indian Ocean. It is possible to fly over most of the three Continental 
expansions from these bases a position, which has the particular aspect of 
immediate closeness to the Russian neighbour and his oil potentials. 
It is also obvious that whoever controls the still untapped oil fields of 
the Middle East will have the power to make peace or war. King Ibn-Saud 
expressed this idea before President Roosevelt, when they met in 1945. 
American oil geologists have described the Middle East as the "Center and the 
heart of the internal oil production, the world's greatest reserves of oil vast 
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beyond imagination, with unparallel abundance". The "potential biggest 
development of natural resources ever undertaken by American investments", 
includes the vast network of pipelines from Arab land's to the Mediterranean 
Sea. Ibn- Saud's statement to Roosevelt is but a re-statement of Clemenceau's 
characterization of oil as "the powerful last world in matters of peace and 
war".^  
Importance of West Asia for Super Power: 
West Asia had been a cradle of attraction for the major powers like UK, 
France, Russia and USA. But soon after the World War II it became a center 
of rivalry between the two major powers as per their interests and 
requirements. 
During the 18"" and the 19"^  century the United States took only sporadic 
interest and got slightly involved in the Mediterranean Sea, Syria and Saudi 
Arabia for its economic interest. Not only this, the United States reputation 
was of only missionary appeal and social work, trade continued but not at large 
scale. The United States did not announce war against, Ottoman Empire nor 
did it support the Treaty of 'Sevres' and 'Laussane' of 1920 and 1923 
respectively. Moreover the United States President Mr. Wilson had already 
approved the Balfour Declaration of 1917 that gave boost to the Zionist 
Movement, which henceforth struggled Arab resistance to make Palestine a 
Q 
Jewish state. 
Furthermore, the post war challenges and the feeble position provided 
difficulty for Great Britain to sustain its economic and military commitment to 
the Arab countries.* It was the growing power of Soviet Union, which 
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challenged this weakness and forced the United States to assume its 
responsibility in the area. The United States realized its responsibility and role 
assigned to it as a guardian of Western interests in the Arab world and 
subsequently to build up a deterrence against it 'Soviet Union'.^ 
The United States Interests in the Arab World are as follows: 
1. The petroleum in West Asia is a major source of power for the West 
European economy and is an essential source of global defence. Therefore 
United States always keeps an eye on it and likes to exploit this resource as 
much as possible. 
2. To keep an upper hand on Jewish interest.'° 
The oil in West Asia became apparent and of significant wealth 
especially since 1945 when its value was realized during the war period. 
Inspite of the lack of adequate transportation, refining and production facilities 
by 1996, the crude output of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arab and Bahrain was estimated 
to be 194,000,000 barrels." 
At the same time Soviet Union became a major actor in West Asia. This 
region has a strategic juxtaposition with Soviet Union and Soviet Union took 
interest in her since long time back specially in Northern frontier area and 
warm water stream. After the World War II, Soviet policy towards West Asia 
became blimpish due to the United States interest in the region. For instance 
after the arrival of Shah of Iran during the early fifties. United States interests 
found their expression by exploiting out oil whereas Soviet Union always 
sought to use Afghanistan, Iran, Baltics and Transcaucasian for its defence and 
political purpose. 
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During the initial period the soviet interests were strategic and 
defensive'^  but during the later stage it flourished on two grounds mainly 
political and strategic. 
1. As far as USSR's strategic interest is concerned it promoted its influence 
in the region to provide a corridor for direct challenge to United States navy in 
Indian Ocean and to keep a watch on United States activities of submarines in 
the West Asian region and in the Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean). 
Another aspect of strategic interest of USSR in West Asia was to keep 
away West i.e. the United States and its allies from exploiting fabulous amount 
of oil. According to him this precious asset should not go into the hands of its 
enemy (i.e. Western Europe, United States and its allies) but to its friends 
(Eastern Europe). The Communist Soviet Union has always been active in 
denying the use of oil by Britain, United States or any other anti-Soviet regime. 
Secondly as far as pohtical interest is concerned the former USSR very 
diplomatically projected a picture of new perception of Western colonization in 
the Arab world and later on tried to gain favour of Arabs, the Third world 
countries and the Socialist countries. The Soviet stated that inspite of being 
Communist they were not against Pan Arabism and Arab cause specially 
sponsored by Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. It got good relations 
with Syria, Algeria, Iraq and Libya including Egypt. Economic and military 
aids were promoted by USSR. Moreover the other side of the political interest 
was to play a card through the fervour of Arab nationalism to keep off United 
States and its Zionist moves in West Asia. Automatically Soviet Union carved 
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out a clear image among Socialist Arab regime as particularly in Iraq and in 
Syria. 
Apparently, the United States policy characterized on the above grounds 
except its oil interest and United States foreign policy towards West Asia is 
based on following three major interests. 
1. To exploit fabulous amount of Petroleum of West Asia. 
2. To keep off Soviet influence and to oppose Communist tendencies. 
3. To buff up a permanent ally 'Israel' to maintain Jewish lobby in 
Congress for keeping an eye over the Arabs resurgence and activities. 
Importance of West Asia Due to Suez Canal: 
One of the important international waterways of the Middle East is the 
modem Suez Canal, which was completed in the year 1869. The Suez Canal 
base has no equal, and in view of many strategists, can have no counterpart in 
arrangements for the defence of the free world. The base would lose much of 
its importance as the world's most highly developed military position if it 
comes under the control of a minor power deficient in military science. 
Furthermore, the adjoining maritime canal is of immense value, even in matters 
of defence. The Suez Canal passes a large amount of petroleum so much 
necessary for the military establishment of the NATO nations and supplies and 
equipment required not only for the Canal Zone base but also for East Africa, 
Persian Gulf area, in parts of South Asia and in the antipodean Commonwealth. 
Hence, the problem of control of the Suez Canal involves the security interest 
of the entire free world. 
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This accounts for the great power rivahy in the area and interest in the 
Arab-Israel conflict. In a world divided into warning camps, the relatively 
weaker nations of the Middle East occupy a peculiarly strategic and exposed 
position. Both power alignments are vying with each other in order to win 
friendship and to establish control over the Arab states and to ensure the 
protection of regular flow of oil and free passage of the Suez Canal, which is 
the shortest route to India. The polarization of the global conflict and the 
proximity of the Soviet Union, which fringes, the North to the area of conflict 
has clearly lent greater urgency to the problem. Although the present conflict 
has ideological overtones, it remains basically the conflict of national interests 
of the great powers. The clash of interests among the world powers, whether 
regarding oil, communications or world hegemony increases the local conflicts 
and tensions. The challenge of Arab nationalism and Arab-Israeli conflict, 
conversely intensify the conflict among the big powers. 
In the words of Morrison: 
"At the first sight the Middle East presents a confusing picture of unrest 
and tension. Its problems are so compUcated and so charged with emotional 
feelings that there is a strong temptation to abandon hope for any solution". ''' 
Yet the understanding and tackling of these problems is of immense 
importance not only for the stability, progress and prosperity of the area itself, 
but also for the peace of the world. Every Middle East problem has its 
international facet and every event in this region is liable to worldwide 
repercussions. The expert military opinion predicted that the Middle East 
might well witness the next round in the struggle between the Western powers 
and the Soviet group, as well as between Western democracy and Communism. 
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Lastly, Israel the child of imperialist strategy, has introduced into the 
Middle East scene as the explosive factor of racial antagonism between the 
Arabs and the Jews. Apparently this irreconcilable conflict between Israel and 
her Arab neighbom s^ influences and sharpens the big power rivalry in the area. 
Thus the geo-strategic uniqueness of the Middle East is based on the 
twin pillars, one of which represents the old center of world communications 
and the other, the newly developed natural power-oil vital for peace or war. 
"Together strategic position and petroleum resources make of the Middle East 
an area whose attitude and outlook may well exercise a decisive influence on 
the shape of things to come". '^  
Palestinian Issue: 
Palestine lies between the Mediterranean in the West, Lebanon in the 
North, Syria and the Jordan River in the East and the Red Sea and Sinai in the 
South and South-West.'^  
Palestine as a geographical and cultural unit has occupied a prominent 
place in human armals at all periods in history. In terms of cultural origins, it 
was among the most ancient center of civilization. With regards to modem 
17 
political phenomena, it is the seat of one of the youngest nation states. This 
being a small country attracts a great deal of attention because of its old history 
and association. For it is a holy land for Jews, Christians and the Muslims. 
It is this geographical position, which has made, Palestine, throughout 
history a passage and a stepping stone for a large number of countries and 
succeeding civilizations. The prominence of Palestine prevailed until the Arab 
conquest (from the Arabian Peninsula) in the 17^ century A.D., which formed 
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a decisive turning point in the history of Arab. Since the middle of the l?"* 
century until the middle of the 20*** century, Palestine lived for thirteenth 
successive and uninterrupted centuries, as part of the Arab nations, its 
language, culture and destiny.'^ 
Moreover the unique historical and culture position of Palestine gives it 
a very special political significance both at the Arab and international level. On 
one hand, it forms the heart of the Arab world for it connects it with Asia and 
Africa and acts as a major link in the unification process of the Arab nations. 
Secondly it forms a major meeting and a take off point on the bridge that 
stretches across the three Continents of Africa, Asia and Europe. In the words 
of Hoskins "It is the bridge across which have passed the caravans of trade, the 
armies of war and the influences of contrasting cultures". '^  Due to its unique 
geographical position it had been subjected continually to the ambitions and 
plans of world imperialism. 
Why and how did the Palestine Problem Arise: 
The Palestine issue has once again focused world attention on the 
unresolved conflict between the Arab nationalism and Zionism which has 
dominated the course of events in that area for the past 50 years. This conflict 
has affected the peace and security of the Arab world, has claimed countless 
innocent lives, caused bloodshed, hatred enmity and drew the world to the 
brink of war, ever since the establishing of the state of Israel, and the 
subsequent uprooting of the innocent people from their own land has resulted 
in several important varied and complex dimensions.^' 
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Ace. to Hurewitz: Palestine as a modem geographic and political unit 
was the creation of World War II and its peace settlement.^ ^ 
Before the break-up of the Ottoman Turkish Empire, Palestine had been 
a heaven of peace, where the followers of different religion lived in peace and 
harmony. All of them enjoyed complete freedom of religion, freedom of 
speech, freedom of trade irrespective of religious affiliation and or racial 
origins. There was no discrimination against the Jews. It is both relevant and 
interesting to recall that there was no "Jewish problem" in any part of the far-
flung Turkish Empire, much less in Palestine.^ ^ This conflict had its origin 
from the Balfour Declaration of 2"^ November, 1917, whereby the British 
Government promised to create a 'National Home' for the Jews in Palestine. '^ 
The demand for the homeland did not come from the Jewish community 
within Palestine or the Ottoman Empire, but from the Zionist Movement from 
abroad and which went hand in hand with imperialists. The British war cabinet, 
for instance received a not from Weizman. 
"In submitting our Resolution we had entrusted our national and Zionist 
destiny to the Foreign office and the imperial war cabinet, in the hope that the 
problem would be considered in the light of imperial interests and the 
principles for which the entente stands". A Jewish state under the guardianship 
of the British according to Winston Churchill would be in harmony with the 
interests of the British Empire. That is how and why the 'Imperialist serpent' 
got itself smuggled into the "Garden of Peace i.e. Palestine" under the apparel 
of a mandatory power, and since then there has been no end to the toil troubles 
and suffering of the Palestinian-Arab Muslims and Christians. 
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The Palestine issue is neither religious nor racial. It is a struggle against 
the foreign rule and exploitation meted out to the Palestinians the children of 
the soil, against settler-colonialism. It is a conflict between nationalism, the 
Jewish nationalism, which is religious and the Palestine nationalism, which is 
secular and democratic. Probably it is due to this reason, which has made the 
peaceful settlement of the conflict all the more difficult. 
History of Palestine: - The Palestine conflict had its origin from the Balfour 
Declaration of 2"'' November 1917 whereby the British Government promised 
to create a national home for the Jews in Palestine. Before the Balfour 
Declaration there was no Palestine problem. The European Jews mooted the 
idea of Jewish state. In the beginning of the 19* century, Jewish interests in 
Palestine were basically religious and humanitarian. Anyhow, in the latter part 
of the 19* century, some European Jews evinced a political interest in 
Palestine. However, it was Theodore Herzl, who expounded the concept of a 
Jewish state and later he provided political Zionism with its most effective 
leadership.^^ The first Zionist Congress in 1897 passed a Resolution favouring 
a Jewish home in Palestine. It was in 1903 when Herzl sought the aid of the 
British Government in acquiring a Homeland. Dr. Chaim Weizmann led the 
Zionist effort to achieve Zionist goal and it was in 1917 that the British govt. 
rewarded him with the Balfour Declaration. 
The Reality behind the Balfour Declaration: 
Prior to World War I, Palestine was imder the Turkish occupation as a 
part of the Ottoman Empire. In return for a British promise of complete 
national independence for the Arabs, the Palestinians helped in overthrowing 
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the Turkish hegemony. The Ottoman Empire had as its basis the religious 
sanctions of Islam. But the Arabs rose against its tyranny and tutelage because 
they wanted independence in return, for the help in the war against the Turks of 
the Arab armies. Britain promised that once the Turkish occupies were driven 
out, all Palestine plus Iraq, Transjordan and most of the Syria would be free 
and independent. Simultaneously, unknown to the Arabs, Britain and France 
secretly agreed to carve up Syria, Lebanon and Iraq and parcel out these 
territories among themselves as virtual colonies. Once the Turks had been 
defeated Palestine was to be governed by some unspecified international 
regime. Yet hardly was the ink dry on this agreement when the British 
Government began a series of maneuvers in League with Dr.Chaim 
Weizmaim's Zionist Federation, designed to gain Jewish support for the allies 
in the war against Germany. The result was the Balfour Declaration of 
November 2, 1917 in which the British fully sympathized with the Jewish 
Zionist aspiration and declared that it was their intentions to establish a Jewish 
national home in Palestine and second, the granting to Britain by the League of 
Nations of the mandate over Palestine in 1922. The Balfour Declaration was 
made to win the goodwill of the International Jewry and was welcomed by the 
Jews. This was not, however a promise that Palestine was to become a national 
home of the Jews. It also agreed to facilitate growth of the Jewish community 
through immigration. The declaration also included an important safeguarding 
clause, which promised. Nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil 
and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. This 
Provision was self-contradictory and nullified the declaration. Furthermore, 
Britain had no authority then to barter away Palestine as it was still under the 
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control of the Turks. A Jew named Arthur Koestler, characterized this 
declaration as document in which "one nation promised to a second nation the 
country of a third . Palestine was not only a barren land. It was already 
somebody else's home. So that this generous gesture of the British was really 
at the expense of these people living there including Arabs, non-Arab Muslims, 
Christians and in fact everybody who was not a Jew protested strongly at the 
declaration. These people felt insecure, they felt alien in their own land 
because under the mandate Palestine was ruled like a British Colony. The 
Aiabs were not even allowed to participate in their own land and the British 
were providing the Jews with a helping hand at the expense of the Palestinians. 
It was a time when the British were increasing their hold in India and 
Africa with the protection of all vital roads leading to them. At that time 
competition within the world colonialist movement was increasing. New areas, 
which were suitable for colonization, began to appear in the Arab East because 
of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the early signs of the 
rise of national liberation in Asia and Africa began to appear on the horizon. 
British imperialism, after a thorough survey of the situation arrived at a 
conclusion which emphasized the utmost importance that Palestine represented 
in the new conditions and the new role which it could play because of its 
position in the future of British imperialism. 
The British motivation behind this important decision was a curious 
mixture of stark self-interest and an acute desire to do good to the Jews at some 
one else's expense. This declaration, which was motivated by the purely 
imperialist interests of Britain, had two fold objectives. 
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1. Firstly Palestine was considered to be of great importance for the 
protection of the Sinai and Suez Canal that is the road to India and Africa a 
very important route for British imperialism at that time. Moreover, Palestine 
constituted for the British point where the three Continents meet, and a vital 
center for controlling the Western and Eastern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea, 
the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. It also formed the springboard from which 
any further expansionist plans (into Syria, Jordan, Iraq and the Arabian 
Peninsula) could be launched following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
2. Secondly the military necessity to counter French imperialist ambitions 
in Greater Syria. Britain was also moved by the desire to keep Russia and 
America in the World War by pacifying the Jews. 
Colonel Richard Mienertrahagen wrote to Lloyd George in (March 25, 
1919.) "We are very wise in allowing the Jews to establish their national home 
in Palestine.... we caimot befriend both Jews and Arabs. My proposal is based 
on befriending the people who are more likely to be loyal friends the Jews". 
Although the Balfour Declaration had no legal binding, but it imdoubtedly 
strengthened the Zionist cause and the Balfour Declaration has been rightly 
characterized as the "Original foundation stone of the Jewish state now 
constituted in Palestine". ^' 
Palestine after World War I: 
After the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire in April 1920 the 
Principal allied gave the mandatory responsibility to Britain. The League of 
Nations ratified the mandate in 1922 and the USA not being a member of the 
League extended recognition till December 1924.^ ° But since Great Britain had 
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made contradictory promises to Jews and the Arabs, through vague 
undertakings the question of Palestine posed a great problem. The British 
efforts to carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration met with stiff 
Arab opposition from the very beginning. Their argument was that the Arabs 
were not responsible for the oppression of the Jews in Europe. Besides 
Palestine, with its limited resources could not cope up with large scale Jewish 
immigration. Finally, the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine would most 
certainly exterminate its Arab national and cultural entity. 
Under the mandate Palestine was ruled like a British colony. Jewish and 
British officials occupied all senior posts and the Arabs were not allowed to 
participate in the administration of the country. Moreover, the British decision 
to throw open the gates of Palestine to Jewish immigration resulted in the 
increase in percentage of the Jewish population from 7% in 1918 to 33% in 
1947. At the same time the proportion of Arabs dropped from 93% to 67%. 
The immigrant Jews were also helped to seize Arabs land at the expense of 
Arabs. Thus the percentage of Jewish owned land rose steadily from less than 
2 % in 1918 to 6% by 1947. The British also allowed the formation of Zionist 
military squads. A number of terrorist Organizations of the Zionists were 
helped to seit up. On the other hand, the Arabs had been totally disarmed. 
Many Arab youths were condenmed to death and executed for carrying arms 
and ammunition. This inflamed the political minded urban Arabs and the result 
was the Arab-Jewish riots of 1921 and 1929.^ ' 
In 1929, the British appointed two Commissions. These Commissions 
urged strict restrictions on Jewish immigration, land purchases and warned 
against the exclusion of Arab labour from Zionist agricultural settlements and 
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industries, which embittered Arab-Jewish relations.^ ^ By the end of the twenties 
the Palestine problem had taken serious shape but it still did not appear utterly 
intractable. After all, in 1927, there were more Jews leaving the national home 
than entering it, and net immigration stood at 3,503. But the rise of Hitler in 
Germany extinguished all hopes of peace in Palestine. This influx further 
increased when Hitler started the policy of killing the Jews in Germany. By the 
end of 1934 the number of Jews in Palestine had reached 300,000. This was 
intolerable for the Arabs and they resorted to non-cooperation with Britain. 
Another Commission appointed in 1936 suggested that to ensure peace 
the mandate should be put to an end and the country should be divided into two 
separate Jewish and Arab states, with Britain having control over several 
enclaves in order to ensure uninterrupted access for all the holy places. To put 
the plan into action Britain in 1938 invited both Jews and the Arabs to discuss a 
mutually acceptable solution. But the conference ended in failure.^ '^  
By the end of 1934-45 wars, the Palestine-Arabs found themselves 
facing a powerful front composed of vested interests in Britain, America and 
the Zionist international, all aiming at transforming Palestine into a Jewish 
state. In 1946 a mixed Anglo-American Commission was sent to Palestine 'to 
study the question'.^ '* The Commission recommended that Palestine be thrown 
open to Jewish immigration and that 100,000 more Jews be admitted at once. 
But these recommendations failed to satisfy the Jews as well as the Arabs. 
Opinion shared by different Countries: 
Those countries which were in power in the United States, afraid of 
displeasing the Jews within the country, were in support of partition and a 
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viable Jewish state with complete autonomy in regard to economic and 
immigration policies. The USSR agreed with the principle of granting 
independence to Palestine without delay, but supported the creation of a 
separate Jewish state. India, along with Arab states, opposed partition, and 
suggested a federal Palestine instead of a unitary state. In March 1947, having 
become weary of anti-British agitation and terrorist activities of the Zionists 
the British Govenraient decided to take the question of the Palestine before the 
United Nations in the hope that they could succeed where it could not. 
The Problem of Palestine and the United Nations: 
No sooner the problem was referred to the United Nations. The 
Palestinian crises began to move rapidly towards its tragic ending. The United 
Nations after having considered the issue established a special committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP), "to ascertain and record facts and to investigate all 
questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine". ^^ The Committee in 
its session held between April 28 and May 15, 1947 presented a report 
containing two proposals, a majority plan recommended by the representatives 
of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and 
Uruguay, which proposed that Palestine should be divided into an Arab State a 
Jewish State and an international city of Jerusalem.^ ^ The three to be linked in 
an economic union. The representatives from India, Iran and Yugoslavia, 
proposed a minority plan which suggested that an independent federal state of 
Palestine should be created this state would comprise an Arab state and a 
Jewish state and Jerusalem would be its capital. There would thus be a single 
Palestinian nationality and citizenship.^' 
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The Partition Plan: 
At its regular session, after an intense long debate, the General 
Assembly, on 29 November 1947, adopted a Resolution 181(11) approving with 
minor changes the plan of partition with Economic union as proposed by the 
majority in the special committee on Palestine. The partition plan provided for 
the termination of the mandate, the progressive withdrawal of British armed 
forces and the delineation of boundaries between the two states and Jerusalem. 
It called for the creation of Arabs and Jewish state not latter than T* October 
1948. Palestine was to be divided into 8 parts three parts were allotted to the 
Jewish state and three to the Arab state, the seventh, the town of Jaffa was to 
form an Arab enclave within Jewish territory, and the international regime for 
Jerusalem, the eight division, would be administered by the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council. 
The Plan also set out the steps to be taken prior to independence, dealing 
with citizenship, transit, the economic union and a declaration to be made by 
the provisional government of each proposed state regarding access to holy 
places and religious and minority rights. By Resolution 181(11) the assembly 
also set up the United Nations Palestine Commission to carry out its 
recommendations and requested the Security Council to take the necessary 
measures to implement the partition plan. 
The Jewish agency accepted the Resolution despite its dissatisfaction 
over such matters as Jewish immigration from Europe and the territorial limits 
set on the proposed Jewish state. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian-
Arabs and Arab states, on the grounds that it violated the provisions of the 
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United Nations Charter, which granted people the right to decide their own 
destiny. They said that the Assembly had endorsed the plan under 
circumstances unworthy of the United Nations and that the Arabs of Palestine 
would oppose any scheme which provide partition of the country or which gave 
preferential rights and status to a minority. Hence, civil war broke out in 
Palestine and a number of British soldiers were killed. As violence and 
disorder were increasing in the country a Truce Commission composed of 
representatives of those members of the Security Council, which, have 
Consular offices in Jerusalem, was established on 24 Feb 1948. Thus Belgium, 
France and the United States (Syria being exempted as it was directly involved 
in the issue) formed the United Nations Truce Commission. 
In an effort to achieve a political solution acceptable to Arabs and Jews 
the General Assembly on 27* May 1948 appointed a United Nations mediator, 
Count Folke Bemadotte of Sweden, to use his good offices with the local and 
community authorities in Palestine for a political settlement of this difficult 
problem. 
The importance of a mediator became increasingly clear as the conflict 
grew in intensity when the Jewish agency accepted the Partition plan and 
insisted upon the implementation of the plan without modification whereas the 
Arab High Committee rejected any solution on partition and insisted that the 
only acceptable solution was the formation of one independent state for the 
•JO 
whole of Palestine. 
The big Powers were too preoccupied with their own bloc politics to pay 
heed to the cries for truth and justice. When the partition Resolution was 
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passed, the total population of Palestine was estimated to be 2,115000 of this 
2/3"^  were Mushms and Christian Arabs; 1/3"* was Jews and 35,000 others. 
Jewish land ownership in the whole of Palestine had risen to 6%. 
Nevertheless, the proposed Jewish state was allotted 56.47% of the area 
of the country and the Arab state only 42.88% of the area and the International 
Zone of Jerusalem about 0.65 percent. How, in effect Israel had grabbed even 
a larger slice of territory and went on adding to it periodically. 
Meanwhile Britain declared its intention to withdraw from Palestine on 
May 15, 1948 and from the port of Haifa in August 1948 when the mandate 
would expire. The partition decision and the announcement of the British 
intention were a signal to Zionist tenorist gangs to start a systematic policy of 
arson, massacre and pillage. 
By May 15, 1948 when Britain withdraws from Palestine, the Zionist 
had ah-eady occupied most of the towns and had seized lands which were not 
included even in the iniquitous partition Resolution then followed the 
proclamation of the state of Israel. 
Formation of Israel State: 
The creation of the state Israel in May 1948 and its subsequent 
admission to the United Nations aggravated rather than resolve the basic 
conflict underlying the Palestine problem. A million or more of the Palestinian-
Arabs were evicted from their ancestral home land just as Hitler tyranny had 
uprooted many Jews from their homes, Israeli's forcibly occupied large areas 
that had been originally assigned to the Palestinians by the United Nations 
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Resolutions of November 29, 1947 and resolved to retain them on the plea of 
security. Partition also inducted a new ingredient in the situation.^ ^ 
The partition plan immediately led to armed confrontation between the 
new bom state of Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries. Arab forces 
entered Palestine with the avowed purpose of filling 'the vacuum created by the 
termination of the 'Mandate' but it met with stiff resistance put up by the 
Israeli army which resulted in the first Arab-Israeli war.*° 
In such a desperate situation the Arab states decided to intervene and 
defend themselves. The aim of their action was to stop the continuing flight of 
the Arabs from Israeli territory, prevent Israel firom overrunning the rest of 
Palestine and to check Zionist acts of terrorism. The next day regular troops of 
the Arab state entered to assist the Palestinian-Arab. The Arab forces consisting 
of units from Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt and a token force 
from Saudi Arabia were actually not much larger than the Israeli army. But 
what eventually gave the Israelis an upper hand in the battle field was the 
superior Organization, resourcefulness and unity of purpose. The Arabs on the 
other hand, entered the fi-ay without a joint command or coordinated field 
action. For a brief moment at the start of the war, the Arabs gained the upper 
hand. The Western powers than called for a truce, which was accepted by both 
sides. The truce went into effect on (11 June to 7 July 1948) and was 
supervised by the United Nations mediator with the assistance of a group of 
international military observers. Which came to be known as the United 
Nations Truce Supervisions Organization (UNTSO)? Despite the efforts of 
mediator, no agreement could be reached on an extension of the truce and 
fighting broke out again on 8 July. 
•A 
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The Israeli made good use of the interval to stock up with modem 
weapons from the Soviet bloc where as they had been denied any such 
provisions by the West. The result was that the condition of the Palestinian 
Arabs became worse than ever. They lost about half of the area allotted to 
them under the United Nations partition scheme and were left with an area 
roughly 100 miles long and 40 miles wide which we know today as the 'West 
Bank' comprising the old city of Jerusalem, the Judean Hills and the Jordan 
Valley. This area being totally unviable as an independent state was attached 
to Transjordan, which became the king of Jordan"" and the Gaza strip went 
under Egyptian control. It was in this climate of military defeat and political 
demoralization that the various Arab state concluded armistice agreements with 
Israel. A precarious peace was estabHshed in West Asia. But the causes of 
conflict remained intact, while the Israeli jealously guarded their exploits and 
looked upon the Arabs passionately nursed the desire to avenge the injustice 
done to their Palestine brethem. 
The New Delhi Weekly Mainstream of June 17 said in the Course of an 
editorial entitled "Abiding Peace". The very first thing that has to be 
understood in relation to the West Asian crises is that the conflict is not 
between 'tiny Israel' and the Arab nations 'surrounding' it. Like South Korea 
and Taiwan, Israel is a bastion of imperialism. The very purpose of its creation 
in the teeth of opposition from the people of Palestine was to establish a firm 
foothold in West Asia from which the Anglo-Saxon Powers could subvert and 
destroy Arab Movements and regimes opposed to imperialist domination and 
exploitation. 
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Ramification of Israel State: 
Since the end of the World War II the West Asian region has been a 
center of sanguinary conflicts of increasing intensity. All these conflicts, center 
on the problem of miUions of Palestinian people driven off their native land to 
create the state of Israel. 
No doubt that the Jewish people have a long and tortured history of 
suffering, persecution including campaigns of extermination at the hands of the 
states and peoples who vow in the name of Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, the idea 
that the solution to the Jewish problem would lie in creating the state of Israel 
has been among the most troublesome.''^  
The nature and scope of the Arab-Israeh conflict over the last two 
decade is reflected in the legacy left behind by the destructive birth of Israel. 
I. This brutal war has driven nearly around one million Arabs out of their 
homeland. This plight was partly due to the fear of Jewish retaliation and 
partly due to the urging of the Arab political leaders to vacate probable battle 
areas. The refugees fled to the surrounding Arab countries or to the Arab 
occupied parts of Palestine. In the spring of 1949 the number of Arab 
displaced persons eligible for relief was officially estimated at 940,000.'''' As 
the war began there were around 1,320,000 Arabs and 640,000 Jew in 
Palestine. The creation of Israel resulted in the displacement of nearly 70 
percent of the Arab population, which the Israeli government refused to 
readmit."*^  
All this resulted in the birth of what might be termed as 'Arab Zionism', 
which is as passionately dedicated to its ultimate goal, namely returns to the 
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homeland, as the Jewish Zionism of the earlier decades. Like, the Zionist the 
Arab refugees also refused to be settled anywhere except Palestine. 
This catastrophic refugee problem has indeed remained the biggest 
source of Arab-Israeli tensions. No doubt, the United Nations Relief and work 
agency has done a commendable job to relieve the sufferings of the homeless 
Palestinians. But as far as lasting solution of the problem is concerned the 
Arabs contend that the refugees have the right to return to their homeland or in 
case they don't opt to return them in that case they should receive 
compensation as laid down by the United Nations Resolution of 11"' December 
1948. They also insist on activating the United Nations Conciliation 
Commission set up in the year 1949 to implement this Resolution. The Israel 
case is that it cannot repatriate the refugees from security point of view and 
because of its own growing population and that in any case the issue cannot be 
considered until a peace settlement is concluded. With regards to 
compensation, Israel notified the United Nations Conciliation Commission in 
March 1956 that it would not take up this issue until the Arab States ended the 
economic boycott. 
Secondly the war led to an increase in cruelties and violation of 
International law. Jewish settlements were better defended than the Arab 
villages. "Scores of Arab villages deemed uninhabited, had been razed [by the 
Jews] as insurance against their owner's return". '*^  The Jews slaughtered all the 
Arab civilian population in the villages of Deir Yasin in April 1948. 
Thirdly in importance to the refugee problem was the Arab fear of 
Zionist expansion. The armistice agreement of 1949 left Israel in actual control 
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of the entire territory given to it by the United Nations Resolution added with 
sizeable portion of areas originally assigned to the proposed Arab states and a 
part of the city of Jerusalem which was to be placed under United Nations 
supervision. Moreover, the Arabs fear regarding Israel being an intrinsically an 
expansionist state. In May 1948, the Jewish population was less than a million. 
Over the next twelve years Israel took a million Jews from abroad. The 
philosophy of Zionism implies that Israel is the perspective home of the entire 
world Jewry numbering some twelve million people.'*'' Nahum Goldman the 
President of tlie Twenty-sixtli World Zionist Congress, stated in 1964 that the 
job of the Zionist movement was 'to make use of the Jewish state as a means of 
securing the future of the Jewish people throughout the world'. 
Moreover, the Arabs fear of Israeli expansion was further enhanced by 
the latter close links with the Western powers. Israel's conflict with Britain 
and France in the Suez war of 1956 further confirmed the Arab suspicion that 
Israel was the outpost of the West in the Arab East. 
The policy of mistrust and hostility followed by the Arabs towards Israel 
was governed by these considerations. The Arabs refused to extend recognition 
to Israeli. They even barred economic intercourse with Israel and banned the 
passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal on grounds of continued 
belligerency. Arab leaders also talked of their determination to revoke the 
partition of Palestine. That such loose talks were primarily destined to 
domestic consumption which was evident from the fact that the Israeli 
themselves never took it at its face value. Nasser, a responsible Arab statesman 
said that a settlement is possible, provided the refugee problem and the 
expansionist threat could be tackled satisfactorily. 
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Fourthly by the Middle of the sixties, failure to resolve any of the 
outstanding issues together with Israel's unilateral decision to divert the water 
of the Jordan River once again revitalized the danger of an armed 
confrontation. The Arab leaders working under the pressure of Arab public 
opinion blessed the creation of a Palestine liberation Organization in order to 
revive the political entity of Palestine out of its scattered fragments. The more 
extremist among the Palestinians were attracted by the rival Organization 
called Al Falah (victory) and Al-Asifah (Storm). It rekindled the hope of 
rejuvenating Palestine to its rightftil owners. As Palestinian commandos set out 
to operate along the Arab-Israeli border, Israel reacted with sharp reprisals. 
The stage was thus ready for the second round of the Arab Israeli conflict. 
Nehru's Policy towards the Issue of Palestine: 
The advent of India's pro-West Asia policy and the Indian-
response to the Palestinian issue can be traced back to the post-world 
war I period. During this period India was under the British imperialism 
and the Indian national leaders like the leaders of most of countries of 
West Asia were busy in their common struggle against imperialism, 
hence it resulted in a doing feeling of affinity and solidarity among 
these people. 
Right from the beginning, various pressures have been exerted on 
India to influence its policy towards West Asia in general and the Arab-
Israeli conflict in particular. But India has displayed a sense of 
continuity and consistency in its support of the Arabs a heritage that 
everyone should cherish."' 
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The Indian National Congress and its most eminent mentors 
Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru voiced India's concern for Palestine. Nehru 
was equally conscious of British imperialist designs for maintaining 
colonialism in the Arab countries. To intensify India's struggle for 
independence, he became the spokesmen for the Independence of the 
Arab countries too. According to Nehru the Balfour Declaration of 1917 
was a betrayal of Arabs by the British. 
From the 1920s onwards Nehru utilized the Foreign Department 
of the Indian National Congress as an agency to oppose British rule in 
India and abroad including that in West Asia. Though Jawaharlal Nehru 
was sympathetic towards the Jews he believed that the Arabs were 
fighting British imperialism in Palestine. Moreover he was of the 
opinion that the Jews should not rely on British support but should reach 
an agreement with the Arabs to safeguard their position in an 
independent Arab country. To Nehru, the British appeared to be 
exploiting, the differences between the Jews and the Arabs in the same 
way as they were promoting communal tensions in India. °^ 
According to Nehru's point of view Palestine "attracts a great deal 
of attention because of its old history and associations," and also 
because of its being a holy place for the Jews, Christians and the 
Muslims. The root cause of all problems in Palestine according to him, 
lie in the "British policy which has created a special minority problem 
here that of the Jews, and the Jews side with the British and oppose the 
freedom of Palestine, as they fear that this would mean Arab rule. The 
two pull different ways and conflicts necessarily occur. On the Arab 
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side are numbers, on the other side great financial resources and the 
worldwide Organization of Jewry. So England pits Jewish religious 
nationalism and makes it appear that their presence is necessary to act as 
an arbitrator and to keep the peace between the two. It is the same old 
game, which we have seen in other countries under imperialist 
domination". '^ 
According to Nehru, the Palestinian issue should not be viewed in 
isolation but should be considered as a part of international 
phenomenon. In his Presidential Address at the AICC session at Faizpur 
on 27 December 1936, Nehru said, "The Arab struggle against British 
imperialism in Palestine is as much part of this great world conflict as 
India's struggle for freedom". " 
In 1936, the All India Congress Committee conveyed its greetings 
and sympathy to the Arabs in their struggle for freedom." The Indian 
National Congress observed September 27, 1936, as Palestine day by 
holding meetings and demonstrations throughout the country supporting 
the Arab cause.^ '* Speaking on the occasion, Nehru observed that in 
Palestine the problem consist of the Arabs and the Jews but it was never 
a religious problem as some of the Indian Muslims thought it to be. It 
was a problem of growing nationalism desiring freedom from the 
clutches of imperialism. He even appreciated the Arabs for putting up a 
valiant fight in the cause of national independence. Expressing his 
heartiest sympathy with the Arabs Nehru declared, "Our sympathies and 
good wishes must go out to the people of Palestine in this hour of their 
distress. The crushing of their movement is a blow to our nationalist 
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struggle as well as to theirs. We hang together in this world struggle for 
freedom".^^ Nehru in his message to the provincial conference held at 
Allahabad on July 18, 1936 further remarked, "and even on the narrow 
grounds of self interest we in India should support and sympathize with 
the Arabs. I trust that Arab struggle in Palestine will help us to see our 
struggle in a proper perspective and make us forget our internal 
divisions in the face of common adversity". ^^ 
It was perhaps the Muslim League, Which tried to add a religious 
tinge to the Palestinian affair. But Nehru always decried the attempts 
made by various Organizations to give the Palestinian issue a communal 
touch. According to Nehru the problem of Palestine was a nationalist 
one, for the Arabs were fighting against imperialist control. It was 
therefore a pity that instead of aligning themselves with that struggles 
against imperialism, Nehru pointed out that the Jews of Palestine had 
taken the side of British imperialism and desired its protection against 
the natives of the country. 
No doubt Nehru was sensitive towards the plight and sufferings of the 
Jews. But inspite of siding with the Arabs on the Palestine issue, he maintained 
that few could withhold their deep sympathy from the Jews who had undergone 
centuries of oppression and who were undergoing a very severe trial in 
Germany. Yet, he made it very clear that no one could sympathize with the 
Zionist movement aiming at the establishment of a Jewish national home in 
Palestine under the protection of British imperiahsm. Nehru regarded the 
Balfour Declaration as a gross betrayed of Arabs by British imperialism. 
Admitting that the Jews had right to visit Jerusalem as a holy place, he stated 
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that Palestine was a holy land for the Jews, Muslims and Christians as well 
who had been the sons of the soil for the last thirteen hundred years or more. It 
was possible for some Jews to go to Palestine and settle there in a friendly 
manner but if they desired to go there with the object of dominating the country 
and establishing their stronghold there, they should not expect to be welcomed 
with open arms by the Arabs. In an emotional letter written to Albert Einstein 
on July 11, 1947, Nehru recognized the achievements made by the Jews and 
the miseries they had to face through ages of persecution. Yet, he tries to 
reason out with Albert Einstein that the Jewish approach towards Arabs in 
Palestine was wrong and that an amicable solution should be found to the 
problem without the use of force. 
Nehru while raising the issue of Palestine admits: "(it) is 
extraordinarily difficult and intricate. Where rights come into conflict it 
is not an easy matter to decide. With all our sympathy for the Jews we 
must and do feel that the rights futures of the Arabs are involved in this 
question: you have yourself framed the question: 'Can Jewish need, no 
matter how acute, be met without the infringement of the vital rights of 
others? Your answer to this question is in the affirmative ....I do not 
myself see how this problem can be resolved by violence and conflict on 
one side or the other I do earnestly hope that some kind of an 
agreement might be arrived at between the Arabs and the Jews....I know 
that the Jews have done a wonderful piece of work in Palestine and have 
raised the standards of the people there, but one question troubles me. 
After all these remarkable achievements, why have they failed to gain 
the goodwill of the Arabs? Why do they want to compel the Arabs to 
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submit against their will certain demands? The way of approach has 
been one, which does not lead to a settlement, but rather to the 
continuation of the conflict. I have no doubt that the fault is not 
confined to one party that all have erred. I think also that the chief 
difficulty has been the continuation of British rule in Palestine. We 
know to our cost that when a third party dominates, it is exceedingly 
difficult for others to settle their differences even when that third party 
has good intentions and third parties seldom have such intentions. " 
India after independence consistently supported the cause of 
Palestine in the United Nations and was against the partition of Palestine 
from the very beginning. Later on when India was elected to represent 
Asia on the 11 members United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
Nehru while addressing the constituent assembly in 1947 said, "To give 
the House and instance of how we acted, take the Palestine affair which 
has given rise to a great deal of trouble. We took up a certain attitude in 
regard to it, which was really a federal state with autonomous parts. It 
was opposed to both the other attitude, which was before the United 
Nations. One was partition which has been adopted the other was a 
unitary state. We suggested a federal state with, naturally an Arab 
majority in charge, of the federal state but with autonomy for the other 
region the Jewish regions". ^^  For Nehru this was "not only a fair and 
equitable solution". ^^  Any other solution would have meant fighting and 
conflict. Though India's proposal was included in the Palestine 
Committee, it did not find favour with most people in the United 
Nations. When partition of Palestine became inevitable, it was realized 
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that the Indian solution was probably the best but it was too late to 
realize.^° Partition of Palestine thus brought permanent trouble in the 
West Asia, which at present is extremely explosive with the possibility 
for a great deal of trouble in the future. Had Nehru's plan been accepted 
the problem perhaps might have been solved much earlier. 
The Existence of Israel is a Reality: 
Nehru was well aware of the complications of the creation of the 
State of Israel brought to the region. He declared in 1958 that ever 
since Israel came into existence, it has been a source of constant 
irritation for the Arabs countries. This is because "the Arab countries 
looked upon Israel as an outpost from which their freedom might at any 
time be threatened". However the fears of the Arab countries were not 
without foundation and India fully sympathized with them. Israel 
reliance on force since its commencement to 1945 and its refusal to 
respect the United Nations Resolution as well as the Security Council's 
Resolution on the right of the Palestinian refugees' fully aroused Arabs 
suspicion about its expansionist propensities. Once partition had taken 
place and the question of recognition of Israel came up. Nehru said, 
"Any action that we may take must be guided not only by idealistic 
considerations but also a realistic appraised of the solution. Our general 
policy in the past has been favourable to the Arabs, and at the same 
time, not hostile to the Jews. That policy continues for the present, we 
have said that we are not recognizing Israel. But this is not an 
irrevocable decision and the matter will no doubt be considered afresh in 
view of the subsequent developments, including the find decision of the 
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United Nations". '^ Ideologically, Nehru knew from its own experience 
that partition did not solve basic problems rather it accentuated them. 
Therefore, on the question of Israel's admission to the United Nations, 
India's first reaction was to abstain. But later, on as a part of the policy 
of cooperation with the Arabs states, Nehru ordered the Indian 
delegation to vote against since "India could not recognize an Israel 
which had been achieved through the force of arms and not through 
negotiations". ^^  
However the Government of India recognized it on 17 
September 1950 on account of it's being a reality but did so 'de facto' 
and not 'de jure' because Israel had followed a wrong policy against the 
Arabs particularly against the Palestinians. Secondly the criterion that 
religion should become the basis for nationality was unacceptable and 
thirdly Zionism is considered a product of Western imperialism and not 
a part of the general Asian liberation movement and under present 
political circumstances Israel has had to maintain close relations with 
certain Europe state. Nehru at the same time assured the Arab countries 
that India would continue to support the cause of the Palestinian 
refugees, and that recognition did not means endorsement of Israeli 
position on its frontiers. It was pointed out that India's continuing non-
recognition of Israel was not only inconsistent with its overall 
relationships but limited the effectiveness of the Government of India's 
role as a possible intermediary between Israel and the Arab states.^^ 
Israel was again disappointed when it was not invited to the Bandung 
Conference. Contrary to which the Arab states occupied Center stage at 
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the non-aligned bloc with Nasser, Nehru and Tito as its major heroes. At 
Bandung, Nehru urged the Arabs not to rule out negotiations as a means 
of setting the Palestine issue and joined other Asian-African states, in 
calling for implementation of the United Nations Resolutions on 
Palestine. 
In the later years, India also backed the Arab case for an equitable 
distribution of the Jordan River waters. These measures combined with 
New Delhi's reluctance to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, 
indicated India's concern for the Arabs. The Israelis not being able to 
evoke a firm response from Nehru on the issue of establishing 
diplomatic relations were extremely critical of his attitude. David Ben 
Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, commented: "I cannot 
understand how Nehru fits his behaviour to Israel with Mahatma 
Gandhi's philosophy of universal friendship. Nehru gave definite 
promises to the Director General of our Foreign Ministry eight years ago 
that he would soon establish diplomatic relations with Israel, but so far 
he has not kept his words". '^^  
The Israelis seemed to have achieved a break through when, in 
1953, Jawaharlal Nehru allowed an Israeli consult to function in 
Bombay. But further Israeli hopes were shattered when despite repeated 
requests and unofficial delegations to India; Nehru refused to establish 
diplomatic ties with Israel. According to Nehru "This attitude was 
adopted after a careful consideration of the balance of factors. It is not 
a matter of high principles, but it is based on how we could best serve 
and be helpful in that area. We would like the problem between Israel 
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and the Arab countries to be settled peacefully. After careful thought, 
we feel that while recognizing Israel as an entity, we need not at this 
stage exchange diplomatic personnel. As I said, it is not a matter of 
principle, and it is not a matter on which two opinions cannot be held. 
That in the balance is the decision we arrived at, and we think it is a 
correct decision". ^^  Even the permission of letting an Israeli Consul 
function at Bombay was in all probability given to facilitate the 
migration of Indian Jews desirous of going to Israel because after having 
thrown out the Palestinian-Arabs, a pressing need was felt for cheap 
labour in Israel both for farming and semi-skilled jobs. The Indian Jews 
perfectly fitted this requirement. 
Jawaharlal Nehru's inclination towards the Socialists, changes in 
West Asian regimes pressure from the United States and the Soviet 
Union and studied endeavours so as not to make the British unhappy 
were other factors which might have contributed towards Nehru's 
softness towards Israel in the initial phase. 
However, the Status quo has been maintained with Israel from 
1953 onwards till today. The Palestinian movement has also seen a lot 
of ups and down-from the time the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) came into being to the current days of Intifada in the occupied 
territories. However, Nehru's involvement with the Palestinian question 
did not end with 1953, but became more comprehensive after his 
friendship with Nasser and emergence of other issues linked with 
Palestinian refugees and Arab nationalism. 
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Even after Nehru's death. India was not indifferent towards the 
PLCs efforts for peaceful settlement. The PLO Chairman Yasser 
Arafat had been conferred with the 1988 Jawaharlal Nehru Award for 
International understanding. Announcing this in September 1989 the 
Ministry of External Affairs said: 
India has always been sympathetic to the cause of Palestinian 
people and has been steadfast in its support to Yasser Arafat and the 
People of Palestine. In honouring Yasser Arafat in the name of 
Jawaharlal Nehru, "we underline our commitment to support the right of 
every people to freedom, justice and peace". ^^  
Above all India's Arab policy bore the imprint of the personality 
of Nehru. His unflagging commitment to enlargement of freedom, to 
de-colonization and to ever-increasing cooperation among nations 
influenced the entire spectrum of Independent India's relation with the 
Arab world. It also earned for India a measure of respect, which 
outweighed transitory disagreements. 
The Crux of the Middle East turbulence, since the World War II, has 
been the Palestinian problem. The human tragedy imposed upon the 
Palestinians by the creation of Israel has been unprecedented in the world 
history. The People of Palestine were reduced to the status of refugees and 
derived out from their homes. They were illegitimately punished for the crimes 
that Hitler committed on the Jews. According to Professor Arnold J. Toynbee, 
"the tragedy of recent Jewish history is that, instead of learning through 
suffering, the Jews should have done, to others, the Arabs what had been done 
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to them by others, the Nazis. A grave injustice was and is being done to the 
Palestinians". Since then those helpless people of Palestine have been running 
from pillar to post in search of their homeland. 
Palestinian issue has dominated India's West Asian policy partly on 
humanitarian concern and partly due to the political and ideological affinities, 
since the Palestinian revolution has, in course of prolong struggle against 
imperialism and Zionism, acquired secular and SociaHst dialectics. 
Indian leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru have expressed their 
warm sympathy and support to the cause of Palestine. Nehru was equally 
conscious of British imperialist in the Arab countries. The Balfour Declaration 
of 1917 was a betrayal of Arabs by the British. According to Nehru the Arab 
struggle against British imperialism in Palestine was as much a part of this 
great world conflict as was India's struggle for freedom. 
Jawaharlal Nehru was convinced that the Palestinian problem was 
created by the British and would never be solved by them. Though he 
expressed deep sympathy for the Jews when they were being prosecuted and 
hounded out of various countries of Europe and acknowledged their 
considerable contribution to the country since they entered the land of 
Palestine. Nevertheless, he believed Palestine essentially to be an Arab country 
and regarded it basically a national struggle for the independence of the Arabs. 
Nehru was very vocal on this issue of Palestine and rightly felt that if the 
third party withdraws from Palestine it might be easier for the Parties 
concerned to settle their own problems themselves however difficult they might 
be and a further elaborated his points to make it clear (1) that you cannot solve 
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this problem by trying to crush the Arab people (2) that it evil not be settled by 
British imperialism but by the two main parties coming together and agreeing 
to terms. ^^  
Nehru even rejected the partition plan of Palestine and suggested that a 
federal state with autonomy for the other region would have been the better and 
lasting solution. According to him this was not only a fair and equitable 
solution of the problem, but also the only real solution of the problem, any 
other solution would have meant fighting and conflict. Though India's 
proposal was included in the Palestine Committee, it did not fmd favour with 
most people in the United Nations. When partition of Palestine became 
inevitable, it was realized that the Indian solution was probably the best, but it 
was too late.^ * 
Partition of Palestine thus brought permanent trouble in the West Asia, 
and the Palestinian situation has been and still remains one of the most volatile 
problems in the world. It threatens at any moment to cause open warfare 
between the nations of the Middle East. With the introduction of weapons of 
mass destruction into the area, such a conflict would kill millions of irmocent 
people. Such a struggle might very well draw other nations around the world 
into the fray, sparking a new world war. Therefore a lasting peace settlement in 
the area should become a top priority for the leaders of the world. Had Nehru's 
plan been accepted, the problem perhaps might have been solved much earlier. 
Now the present situation is that Israel has become a powerful state and 
the. United States helping her and backing her up I.R. Menon Tripunithura 
(Kerala) writing in the Hindu of June 16, turned the spotlight on Israel, in 
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defiance of would opinion. He said: Israel has declared that it will settle the 
Israel-Arab question only in discussion directly with the Arab States and not by 
the intervention of any third party. It has this ignored and flouted the United 
Nations and its fiinction as a world Organization. 
Israel has also declared that it is determined to get away with the spoils 
of war and is bent upon dictating terms from a position of strength. In that case, 
events will leads to a treaty imposed on Arab states in the spirit of the 
Versailles Treaty imposed by the Allies on a defeated Germany. If this 
happens, the aUies of Israel will be sowing seed for the emergence of another 
Hitler in the Middle East and thereby for a World War III. In would be better if 
the world takes notice of these facts in time and averts a future calamity. 
The sad fact is that both the United States and Israel are so out of touch 
with Arab Actualities, so enamoured of cliches about Islamic terror and Arab 
radicalism and anti-Semitism, that they seem to have missed the fact that Arabs 
wants peace, that Palestinians also want to lead a decent life of independence 
and democracy as much as the common Israeli or American does. 
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INDIA AND THE KOREAN CRISES 
"I agree that European problems are and have been very important but 1 
have felt that in the perspective of things to come, the people were wrong in not 
devoting the requisite attention to the problems of developing Asia" 
Jawaharlal Nehru 
South-East Asia may be roughly defined as an area of Continental Asia and the 
offshore Philippines and Indonesian archipelagoes which lies South of China 
and East of India.' It comprises of nine countries which are Burma, Thailand, 
Malaya, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Philippines and 
Indonesia. Diverse by race, religion and wealth they had before the war nearly 
one common feature: i.e. with the solitary exception of Thailand all war held 
under the colonial rule. 
The Importance of this region politically economically and strategically 
in the area of world politics can hardly be exaggerated. 
Politically, the end of Western hegemony in this area has created a power 
vacuum, making it highly susceptible to pressures fi-om without. It has been 
described as *a sector of low demographic pressures between the Chinese and 
Indian anti-hills. As a result the new settlers firom India and China have 
created acute political problem for this region and shaped its attitude to these 
two populous neighbours. The upsurge of Communist China since 1949 has 
upset the balance of power in this region and her shadow looms larger here. 
The interest taken by the Western power in this region provides protection to 
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the South-Asian countries against the fate of becoming satellite to China. 
Independence in South-East Asia has not brought peace and stability. On the 
other hand, it has become increasingly evident that its security needs to be 
under written by powers on its own rims.^  
Economically, South-East Asia is considered to be one of the vital 
areas of the world on account of its elephantine resources of tin, rubber, oil and 
other essential commodities. Since this region provides a very good example of 
colonial economy for the colonial Powers. So its importance has increased 
with time. From the very beginning the development of natural resources of 
this area was in foreign hands. The competition among the imperialist powers 
has drawn South East Asia into the whirlpool of international politics. India has 
also considerable economic stakes in South-East Asia. She has been a major 
economic power in this region and, even before the British invasion; it was the 
biggest trading country of South-East Asia. The establishment of trading 
colonies in various South-East Asian Countries lent greater impetus to Indian 
trade. Moreover the economies of the two are interdependent and 
complementary, not competitive which further resulted in building closer 
relations between India and South-East Asia. Also it has been asserted that for 
India's defence, South-East Asia is the most vital area. From the point of views 
of the sinews of war, South-East Asia is the richest area in the world. It 
produces what India lacks for defence of the Indian Ocean Zone .. .we have 
what they need and we need what they have. In our self-interest alone we must 
cultivate a close friendship with all these countries. 
Strategically: It is of inunense significance to Asia. 'It lies athwart the world's 
most important lines of sea and air communications and contains some of the 
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capital land routes leading North ward into China or Southwards from China 
towards the Indian Ocean'. '* The industrialization of the West depending on the 
raw products of tropical countries, combined with the growth of sea and air 
transport, has made South-East a very important part of world economy. 
The peace of the world to a very large extent depends on the peace and 
security of this area in which every major power in Europe and Asia had some 
interest or the other. Great Britain, by her position in the vital Indian mainland, 
by her possession of Malaya and Singapore, and by her overriding interest in 
the defence of Australia and New Zealand, the United States, by her 
commitments in the Philippines; the French by their position in Indo-China and 
Japan, because of her proximity and her dependence on the oil and rubber of 
the Indies, have all come to regard this area as being of special interest to them. 
In fact, no area better exemplified the rivalries of imperialism than South-East 
Asia.^  
United States Interest in South-East Asia: It was in 1898 when the 
United States entered the South-East Asia. In the initial stages it took minimal 
interest in this region like trade and commerce. But in 1949 after the 
Communists had taken over China and invaded South Korea and Tibet in 1950, 
there began a re-examination of United States Asian policy which led to more 
intense involvement in freed Asia.^  Nevertheless after the World War II South-
East Asia loomed so large in American national interests that its started 
fighting for position with fiill national interest and started securing military and 
economic commitments of a scope never previously participated. 
The main interest of the United States in South-East Asia Consisted of: 
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(a) Containment of Communism (b) Its security concern (c) Trade promotion^ 
Contaiimient of Communism: According to the Cold War Strategists 
South-East Asia was the last blockade against Communism in all Asia. If 
communism were to sweep through South-East Asia it would blanket the entire 
Continent and tip the balance of world power to the Communist bloc* 
Security Concerns: Military analysts contend that South-East Asia was of 
immense importance for United States security even in terms of military 
strategy. For United States South-East Asia was comparatively more important 
than Panama and Suez Canal. It was only through the narrow Strait of Malacca 
may the barrier be penetrated conveniently and if this region passes into the 
hands of hostile powers, the peninsula and offshore Islands of South-East Asia 
would cut the world into two. Same principle was applicable regarding 
American security in the Pacific during the World War II. The question of 
Japanese domination of Continental East Asia and the island of the Western 
and South-Eastern Pacific was a vital Pacific issue.^  
Through such experiences as Pearl Harbour there were abundant 
evidences of the threat to the American security of Pacific Ocean and 
domination of Continental Asia by a single power after Peking-Moscow axis 
estabhshed control over a large part of Asia.'° 
From the view point of United states security interest it was important 
that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further Communist expansion 
in South-East Asia. Indo-China is a key area of South-East Asia and is under 
immediate threat of Communist. The neighbouring countries like Thailand and 
Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if a Communist 
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dominated government controlled Indo-China and the balance of South-East 
Asia would be in grave hazard.'' 
For United States, South-East Asia owes a special meaning. It is an area 
of forward defence of the Pacific. In addition, the United State share to a 
significant degree the specific interest in South-East Asia of its allies and others 
whose security would be threatened by a hegemony of single Power in Asia.'^  
Trade Promotion: For United States, South-East Asia was very 
important regarding its natural resources. Due to worldwide energy crises and 
scarcity of other natural resources, the position of South-East Asia as source of 
raw materials had been enhanced. Consequently, this economic factor was a 
source of attraction for the foreign countries.'^  Moreover after the World War 
II, United States was faced with the traumatic possibility of denial of its 
economic penetration into the market industries and raw materials in many 
parts of the world. Thus America was not in favour of South-East Asian 
valuable material resources going into the hands of hostile power and the 
West.''' Moreover the American's were interested in having South-East Asian 
market for American products.'^ 
USSR interest in this Region: The Soviet Union had certain well-
defmed objectives in this part of the globe. Firstly it wanted to avoid an open 
clash with China. Though China does not want it, the Soviet Union has kept 
the door open to a detente. The second objective of the Soviet Union was to 
keep both Communist China and the United States out of the entire region. 
Thirdly Soviet Union wanted to prevent Pakistan from falling entirely into the 
arms of either the United States or Communist China.'^  
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India's link with South-East Asia reached back into history and legend. 
Indian philosophy, culture, the three-principle religion i.e. Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Islam came from India. Many of the political and government 
devices, the court structure, legal proceedings, art and architecture, languages 
were all derived from India. All these left an everlasting impact on the 
countries of South-East Asia.'^ Both India and South-East Asia are strategically 
very important for each other. Therefore, a friendly, economically strong, 
politically, stable tension free South-East Asia is vital for peace and security of 
whole of Asia and so also will contribute to peace and security of India. 
Likewise, India's central geo-strategic location is significant in the context of 
South-East Asia. India's relations with South-East Asia are of abiding 
importance to her. India has vital stakes in South-East Asia whose 
independence and security is bound up with her own. According to Nehru 
India was the gateway to both West and South-East Asia. The independence 
and security of South-East Asia served to strengthen India's own independence 
and security and any series setback there will constitute a potential threat to 
India too.^* 
India shares common boundaries with four South-East Asian nations 
Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Moreover, a major portion of her 
foreign trade depends on sea and all the major sea routes through which Indian 
ships passes. Keeping all this in mind, it seems that India's unpretentious 
performance in this region could not have been a deliberate choice. Therefore, 
while constantly keeping in view the interest and policies of other powers that 
are interested in this region, one has to keep a constant watch over the 
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developments and events taking place in the area and draw conclusion in a 
wider perspective.'^ 
Since 1942 South-East Asia occupies an important place in the strategic 
Indian defence. This area is of immense importance for India both land wise 
and sea wise. As a matter of fact this area is regarded as the "core area" of 
India's security extending from Durand Line to the Border of Burma. "South-
East and Persian comprises the first circle of Indian security while the Indian 
Ocean region the second one". 
Additionally, the developments during the World War II also points out 
to the fact that the security of both India and South-East Asia are 
interdependent. 
South-East Asia is no doubt strategically very important for India. On 
the contrary, India due to her geo-strategic location is of immense importance 
as far as South-East Asia security is concerned. Geographically India is 
adjacent to South-East Asia. Besides geographical nearness, it has a very 
significant strategic location between the two Oceans i.e. the Indian Ocean and 
the Pacific Ocean. All the important sea routes pass through this region, which 
are the lifeline for the maritime countries of the world. Moreover, the Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands make India maritime neighbour of Burma, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia. The distance between the Indian islands and the 
Indonesian Islands of Sabang and Sumatra is only about 100 miles. The Great 
Channel between them provides direct access to the Strait of Malacca. Not 
only this, South-East Asia has been regarded as of immense importance from 
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the point of view of India's defence needs. Conversely, India also can fulfill its 
defence needs because both are complimentary to each other in this respect. 
Before the establishment of British rule, India had to face no serious 
problem of security. It was because during the British's period, the Eastern 
border was secure because of the Franco-British entente. If there was any 
danger to India, it was from the North-West, which was ensured by establishing 
"Buffer States". Though British rule brought political and administrative unity 
to India, it also created many new problems for her, especially between the two 
world wars. India was drawn into the arena of world politics because she was 
ruled by the most powerful colonial power of that time. 
British being the supreme naval power of that time, added by Anglo-
Japanese Treaty of 1902-20, were a guarantee to the India's security from the 
side of the sea also. Furthermore, on her South-Eastem side, Netherland a 
friend of British governed Indonesia Russia was of no threat because she was 
not strong enough to challenge British authority and pose a threat to India. 
Moreover, the emergence of Japan as an ambitious naval power and her 
subsequent abrogation of Anglo-Japanese Treaty, made India the core in the 
defence of British Empire in South-East Asia, Far East and also Middle East. 
Consequently, a thorough "reappraisal of India's Strategic situation took place 
and a new emphasis was laid on India's Oceanic involvement in power 
relations. Her strategic interests widened considerably and this formed matrix 
of a new awareness, which was to characterize future policies.^ ^ 
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Additionally with the fall of Singapore in 1942 it was clear that India's 
security was intricately linked up with the security of countries along the rim of 
Indian Ocean. 
The loss of Singapore had exposed the coastline of India to combined air 
and naval attacks from the seas. Malaya, Singapore, Indo- China and Burma 
were of immense interest to India as compared to Afghanistan and Iran, A 
hostile power in Cam- Ranh -Bay would be no less dangerous than it would be 
in the Persian Gulf What happened in Bangkok was of as much interest to 
India as what happened in Basra.^ ^ 
In summation we can say that India and South-East Asia have 
interdependent security interest and cannot remain unaffected by the 
developments taking place in each other's sphere. This has been proved 
historically that is why Major Anthony Strachey a former Officer of the Indian 
Navy suggested that "the lessons of the last war is surely that India must 
always take adequate precautions that her Eastern neighbours do not become 
the spring board for yet another attack on her". '^' According to L. Wrigh "to 
ignore South-East Asia in its strategic thinking for India would be madness", 
Indo-China: It is not only geographical and cultural relations but also 
the common foreign policy adopted by the three countries i.e. Indonesia, Laos 
and Cambodia during 1950's, which played a great role in bringing these 
countries closer to each other. While dealing with India's relations with the 
countries of this region, its role as a caretaker of peace in Indo-China is of 
immense value. Besides working hard for peace there, India prevented other 
counties from interfering. Nehru said "The Geneva Agreement was essentially 
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based on the fact that the great power groups should not push in aggressively in 
the Indo-China states. They should follow an independent and unaligned 
pohcy".^ ^ 
Indo-China situated further in the East constitutes the "Outer line of 
defence" for India. Out of three Indo-Chinese states Vietnam commands the 
most important attention. Literally speaking a country, which is in control of 
three Indo-Chinese regions, will be in a position to pose a threat to India from 
two fronts firstly through Thailand and Burma and ascending through Malaysia 
and Singapore.^ ^ 
The new states formed i.e. North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia by disintegrating Indo-China is today the real trouble spots in South-
East Asia. These countries form the whirlpool of destructive conflict between 
nationalism and communalism. The conflict is still going on in South Vietnam 
and to save it from Communist take over. North Vietnam has turned 
Communist. South Vietnam since the fall of Diem in 1963 has been in political 
turmoil Cambodia has moved closer to China and Laos maintaining precarious 
West-oriented neutrality. If the violent upheavals and tensions in this region 
are not immediately resolved it might threaten to engulf the whole of South-
East Asia.^ *" 
India played an active role in bringing about peace in Indo-China. 
Though India was not an invitee to the Geneva Conference, but behind the 
scene activities of Krishna Menon in Geneva brought the parties closer to a 
OR 
settlement. The Geneva Agreement provided for three ceasefu"e agreements 
with regard to three states i.e. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 
90 
India and the Korean Crises 
The three International Commissions for supervision and control were 
set up to supervise and control the armistice agreement. The International 
Commission consisted of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with 
India as Chairman. Although it was a "difficult and complicated task a 
thankless one occasionally", India discharged it with utmost diligence and 
sincerity.^ ^ It was assumed that implementing the agreement would lead to the 
independence and sovereignty of the three states. 
As contemplated by the Geneva Declaration, the general election took 
place in the year 1955. The Commission had to face many problems because no 
election had taken place in Vietnam because of which no political settlement 
had taken place as envisaged by the Geneva Agreement. Further no progress 
could be made towards consultations between the competent representatives of 
the two zones on unification on the basis of election. Besides the role played 
by India as the chairman of the International Commission for supervision and 
control and India's opinion on vexed problem was considered of immense 
value by the countries of this region. 
Cambodia:-Culturally, Laos and Cambodia belong to the Indian world 
whereas Vietnam belongs to the Chinese. But in the modem period contacts 
between India and these states were several. Cambodia had tense relations with 
Republic of Vietnam and Thailand. Border incidents, territorial claims and 
press attacks led to constant tensions on Cambodia's border. Under such 
circumstances, Cambodia received protection and support from India by 
personal contact and through Internal Commission. 
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Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Prime Minister of Cambodia visited India on 
11 August 1958. He visited India in order to consult with Nehru and "to seek 
his advice on the difficult relations his country was having with her 
neighbours". Thus one of the factors responsible for trouble in Cambodia was 
its pohcy of non-aligimient which did not find favour with its neighbours^° 
which further led to border troubles and closure of fi-ontiers, particularly those 
with Thailand. '^ 
Till the middle of die year 1955, Cambodia was linked with the Western 
bloc^^but soon after the Bandung Conference, Cambodia adopted the policy of 
neutrality and adherence to Panchsheel. 
At the Calcutta Conference Prince Norodom Sihanouk expressed deep 
admiration for Nehru and described Cambodia's foreign policy as being very 
close to India." He fiirther added; "our small and peaceful nation, too often 
threatened, has found immeasurable comfort in the comprehension shown and 
encouragement given by India by the contribution of her policy, which is a 
peace pohcy. 
Prince Sihanouk also referred complaints of Vietnamese troop 
incursions in Cambodia to the International Control Commission. There was a 
wide difference of opinion with the Commission about its adequacy to discuss 
such issues. The Canadian delegation was against such discussion. He was of 
the opinion that in order to respect the Cambodian sovereignty Cambodia 
should be allowed to deal with such border incidents. They said the border 
incidents had been referred by the Cambodian government to the Commission, 
and if the Commission is to fiilfiU its responsibility and to see that the 
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Cambodian frontiers are respected as required under various articles of the 
Geneva Agreement", it was necessary to discuss such affairs. "Failure on its 
part to take suitable action will tantamount to a failure in its duty". The Indian 
and Polish Delegate's said.^ "* 
It was out of morality that India supported Cambodia in its trouble. Its 
support to Cambodia was made ineffective by the Canadian delegate attitude. 
Disappointed by the Commission and India, Cambodia leaned towards Peking 
and established diplomatic relations with it.^ ^ Thus India failed to keep 
Cambodia out of Chinese sphere of influence. 
Although no military alliance was concluded between Cambodia and 
China but Prince Sihanouk hinted out that "today China is a support of our 
sovereignty".^ ^ 
Laos: - During 1954 the two Northern provinces of Laos who were 
under the control of Pathet Lao a rebel group in India, through the International 
Control Conmiission in Laos tried to restore these provinces to the Royal 
Laotian Govermnent. Although various agreements were concluded between 
the Royal Laotian Govermnent and the Pathet Lao, the political and military 
integration of the Pathet Lao into the national life of Lao was not possible. 
The Commission insisted that Laotian Government should reach a 
political settlement with the Pathet Lao so that it would lead to an overall 
peaceful settlement in the kingdom. 
Repeated intervention on behalf of the Pathet Lao finally gave the 
government a feeling about the ICC that it was "practically a tool and a 
spokesman for the policy of the opposition", according to Sissouk Na 
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Champassak, a member of the Royal Laotian Government. He further added 
that though India did not provide any help in the Laotian cause but it desired to 
see Laos freed from its dilemma. Previously India took a favourable view of 
the Pathet Lao and said that Prince Souvana Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos, 
in letter to the Commission, required it's winding up. 
The Canadian delegate passed a Resolution at a meeting of the 
Commission to this effect. The Indian and Polish delegations opposed this. 
According to the Canadian delegate the task assigned to the Commission had 
been completed whereas the Polish delegate believed that some task yet 
remained. Therefore what were needed were not dissolutions but reductions of 
its activities. 
The Indian delegate also refused to agree with the Canadian view and 
formally put forward for consideration the view that "the three International 
Commissions have to continue till a political settlement is completed in all 
three countries" of Indo-China This Resolution by the Canadian delegate 
"introduced discord and disharmony in the previously smooth and effective 
working of the Laos Commission". On 19 July 1958, the Conunission decided 
in favour of an indefinite adjourrunent, "with a provision that it may be 
reconvened in accordance with the normal procedure". 
Vietnam: - North and South Vietnam belongs to the Chinese world. For 
nearly a whole millennium North Vietnam was governed by the Chinese 
therefore there was a strong feeling of hostility towards the Chinese. But at the 
same time there was a feeling of kingship with the Chinese and a genuine 
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respect for Chinese cultural achievement. The Vietnamese feel more at home 
with them than with any other foreigners. 
The attitude of the North Vietnamese towards the Chinese is a complex 
mixture of hatred, fear and sneaking admiration. Nationalism, though 
dominated by the Communists, is a powerful force in North Vietnam and if it is 
given an opportunity, it may yet assert itself to free North Vietnam from the 
Chinese hold. 
Strategically Vietnam is very important as far as security of South-East 
is concerned. According to Anthony Eden, it acts as a protecting pad for South-
East Asia, and any aggressive power in control of it with little difficulty could 
overwhelm the entire region. 
The tragic development in Vietnam was the result of colonialism. 
Vietnam was the only South-East Asian country in which nationalism had to 
wage such a fierce struggle against colonialism. It brings to the notice that 
Communist was taking control of the nationalist movement. As Professor 
D.G.E. Hall says "her (France) rigorous repression of political agitation and her 
intransight opposition to popular sentiments were the real explanation of the 
Communist success in gaining control over a nationalist movement in Vietnam. 
Nowhere else in South-East Asia did this happen". ^^  The three forces i.e. 
Nationalism, colonialism and communism in no other country of South-East 
Asia got so intricately twined, which resulted in instability and crises which 
control continues even today. 
Burma: - Burma an immediate neighbour of India is of paramount 
importance for India because she shares common borders both with India and 
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China and act as a line of communication to a blockade China. A hostile Burma 
would be a springboard for Chinese aggression. Burma not only controls one of 
the most important Southward land routes from China but also provide a 
sanctuary for hostile Nagas and other hill tribal. Besides, this Burma is very 
rich in natural resources. India was practically depended on Burma for her oil 
and rice. What Burma is lacking in is the military strength to defend her 
borders. India's security is directly threatened if she is occupied by a hostile 
power. Besides, "the possibility of a direct attack on India, on land, Burma is 
the weakest link in the defense system of South-East Asia and Singapore. If 
Burma falls, the whole of South-East Asia collapses, the control of the Bay of 
Bengal by an enemy power imperils the security of India". ^ ^ Moreover "in the 
circumstances of modem Air and Naval warfare, the occupation of Rangoon, 
Akyab and Andaman would paralyse India's coastal communications without 
even a major attack". According to K.M.Panikkar the "defence of Burma is 
in fact the defence of India, and it is India's primary concern no less than 
Burma's to see to it that its frontiers remain inviolate".''^  Besides India's own 
oil resources being limited, the Indian Navy has to depend on Burma oil with a 
coastline such as India has and with the new problems of South-East Asia 
defence, the Air and Naval power of India has to be considered in terms of 
modem requirements. But neither Navy nor Air Force can operate without oil. 
It is for this reason Burma's defence has to form part of India's own defence. 
Presently China's policy regarding her role in the Indian Ocean is quite 
confusing. Though she abide by the principle of regarding Indian Ocean as a 
zone of peace, but it cannot be mled out that she will take part in the armed 
race in the coming years in a "modest degree". It is expected that in order to 
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have port facility in the sea she may use Burma. If this development takes 
place it will really hamper India's security.'*' 
Moreover, Burma is lacking control over the border area where 
insurgent activities supported by Burmese Conununist Party is going on. The 
Indian Naga insurgents and other such groups have taken refugee in the Naga 
hills of Burma and are collaborating with local insurgents. These insurgents 
are posing a serious and long-term threat to both Burma and India. Although 
PRC, in order to maintain good relations between India and South-East Asia 
has declared that he has given up the policy of supporting these anti-national 
elements but her actual intentions are not clear. Thus we conclude that Burma 
occupies a very significant place in India's security considerations both internal 
and external. 
Thailand: Thailand occupies strategically significant position in the 
East. Indian security may be threatened by an attack from the side of Thailand 
through Burma on land. Her communication system may be totally in disorder 
by the control of Malaysia and Singapore. Thailand considerable importance 
for India was realized during the World War II when it was acutely felt that in 
Thailand's security lay the security of India. This fact was recognized in the 
Tripartite agreement of January 1, 1946, which was concluded by Thailand, 
Great Britain and India. 
The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of Friendship, commerce and navigation 
governs Indo-Thailand relations at present. This will continue until a fresh 
treaty is finalized. India continued to maintain cordial relations with Thailand, 
though in the year 1950, Thailand entered into an agreement with the USA for 
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military assistance and later joined the SEATO. Thailand also opposed India's 
stand on SEATO at the Bandung Conference.''^  
The attitude of the government of Thailand has been one of sympathetic 
understanding regarding India's staying in Thailand. Moreover the Alien 
Registration Act, introduced in Thailand in 1950 was leniently applied to those 
Indians who were brought forcibly to Thailand by the Japanese during the 
World War 11.^ ^ 
Indonesia: Last but fai- from being the East important to India is her 
traditional friend Indonesia. The Indonesian area by virtue of her vast 
population and political wealth and power is one of the riches countries in the 
world. Her strategic importance for India is countless. Indonesia stands on the 
line of communication between England and Australia and guards the border of 
America's communication with China and Far East. The security of the Indian 
Ocean and Pacific is largely dependent on strong Indonesia. It may not be an 
exaggeration to say that Indonesia holds the key to the stability and security of 
South-East Asia. According to Indian point of view "Indonesia under the 
control of hostile power can threaten the security of India, bar India's access to 
the Pacific and Australia, greatly hinder her communication with Europe and 
Africa, cut off India's sources of supplies of food and raw materials and choke 
of India's trade". '*'* Indonesia has great potentialities of being used as a base of 
operations in linked up with the fate of Singapore, while the security of 
Singapore itself is dependent on that of Malaya.'*^  
India and Indonesia have common interests, as the developments in 
the Indian Ocean area do not pose threats to their continued existence as 
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sovereign states. Moreover, it is in the interest of both to create an atmosphere 
of security that is needed for the continued development and progress.'*^ Thus 
India and Indonesia share common interests to work together, to promote peace 
and security in the Indian Ocean area. 
Malaysia: After Burma it is Malaysia, which stands adjacent to India 
and in strategic and economic importance it lays next to Indonesia. Malaysia is 
a key factor in the sterling area, with which India is deeply involved. It is 
among the most important trade centers of the world. India also has close ties 
with Malaysia because the Indian immigrants constitute an important element 
in Malaysian politics and economy.'*' 
Though Malaya did not follow India's lead in espousing non-alignment, 
and was not a signatory to SEATO, or any other bloc, it usually toed the British 
line in foreign affairs and the United Nations.''* This identical approach of the 
two nationals was mainly due to the clauses of the agreement which provided 
independence to Malaya. According to this agreement Malaya was not only to 
remain in the Commonwealth but to be bound to Great Britain by a treaty of 
mutual alliance. Nehru was anxious to see Malaya gain independence under 
non-Communist aegis. He was also anxious to have Malaya in the 
Commonwealth and maintain closer ties with Britain. Before and after 1963 
India had cordial relations with Malaysia inspite of the fact that Malaysia has 
been actively aligned with the West. Malaysia not only refused to recognize 
Communist China, but also established diplomatic relations with South 
Vietnam and helped her in giving military supplies to fight Communists 
subversion.''^  Moreover when China attacked India in 1962 Malaysian Prime 
Minister gave "all out support to India". Later he even launched a public 
99 
India and the Korean Crises 
campaign, the "save democracy fund", which raised more than one biUion 
dollars to help India defend herself against Chinese aggression.^ ° 
India's cordial relationship with Malaysia is a proof of mutual 
understanding and respect for each other, irrespective of different policies. 
Further foundation has been laid down for greater cooperation and alliances 
between the two countries. 
Philippines: India's relations with the Philippines remained in a limbo 
for many years. The reasons behind it were that the Philippines sought security 
in a military tie-up with the United States because of the American bases built 
up during the war and because of the American presence, which left very little 
choice to the island Republic, and somewhat because of the Communist armed 
revolt in the fifties. The Philippines occupied a strategic position in the Asian 
Pacific region and the Americans would not leave it at any cost. The nature of 
the Philippines regime made it truly anti-Communist and during the early years 
it did not look-kindly upon the Non-aligned Movement. '^ 
India had ancient cultural and political interests with the Philippines. 
Due to her historical and poUtical background Philippines has never been in the 
stream of South-East Asian history. Also because of her unequivocal 
alignment with the USA, her refiisal to recognize Communist China, her 
membership of the SEATO, her strong attack on neutralist policies at Bandung 
in 1955 led India and Philippines move in opposite directions in the conduct of 
their foreign policies. There was a change in the situation after the border war 
with China in 1962 and more perceptibly after 1966 with series of efforts made 
by India to enlarge contacts with South-East Asia. Trade and cultural contacts 
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developed appreciably in the subsequent years." There was a steady progress 
CO 
on demarcation on the ground of the boundary between India and Burma. 
Moreover, continuous efforts were made to bring the two countries closer to 
each other. The Philippines were invited at the Asian. Conference initiated by 
India. Nehru, in particular was interested in developing Indo-Philippines 
friendship, and India also concluded a treaty of friendship with the Philippines. 
Gradually Philippines realized the need for Philippines to identify themselves 
with the Asian neighbours and with the Asian feelings. Consequently, the 
Philippines started taking greater interest in building closer relations with the 
Asian neighbours and specially the South-East Asian, the first to sympathize 
with India at her plight during countries.^ "^  
The Indo-Philippines relation has been cordial, and was among the first 
to sympathize with India at her plight during the Chinese aggression. There 
was immense goodwill with regard for India in the Philippines, and there was 
considerable scope for wider collaboration between the two countries.^ ^ 
Korean Crises 
Geographically and historically, Korea occupies the heart of the 
strategic triangle of North Asia, with Siberia on one side, China on another and 
Japan on the third. ^ ^ Korea has great strategic significance situated on the Far-
Eastern cross-road. It could easily be a center for Chinese and Soviet influence 
into the sea of Japan or a bridgehead for Japanese penetration of the Asian 
mainland. It is this strategic location and commercial viability which had 
made it a center of tensions in the Far East and has been a victim of power 
politics and policy of sphere of influence followed by great powers. In the 
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preceding hundred years three major International wars have been fought over 
the control of this region. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-05 and the Korean War of 1950-53, which involved the 
United States, and Communist China among others as major belligerents.^ * 
Thus divided Korea was a creation of United States Soviet ideological 
and military rivahy in the Cold War. Presently the intense rivalry between the 
two political regimes across the demilitarized zones made the balance of power 
surrounding the Korean peninsula much more unstable^^ 
Since the later part of the 19* century, Korea had been a victim of great 
power conflicts and ambitions. The Russia-Japanese war of 1904-05, had 
settled the issue in favour of Japan and with American and English consistent; 
Korea was passed into Japanese control in the year 1910.^ ° 
From 1910 down to Pearl Harbour, there was no inclination from great 
powers to challenge the position of Japan in Korea. Nevertheless, challenge 
came, once Japan became an active belligerent on the side of Germany and 
other Axis Powers. By the Cairo Conference held in the year 1943, President 
Roosevelt of USA, Generalissimo of China and Prime Minister Churchill 
pledged to determine that Korea in "due course of time would become free and 
independent". The pledge was further reaffirmed by the Potsdam Declaration 
of July 26, 1945, which was to be subscribed by the Soviet Union when it 
declared war against Japan on August 8, 1945. '^ But in February 1945, it was 
reported that a 'secret agreement' had been signed between the three countries 
i.e. USA, UK and USSR according to which the country had been divided into 
two, one half belong to the Russians and the other half to the Americans. 
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However, on 8 August 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and 
occupied the North of 38* parallel. Later on 8* September the United States 
forces accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces South of 38* parallel. Thus 
Korea was divided into two parts i.e. North Korea and South Korea and this 
parallel became an 'Iron curtain' separating the two zones.^ ^ Although the 38* 
Parallel was supposed to be a mere military line, it gradually became a virtually 
permanent political dividing line. At the Moscow Conference, held in 
December 1945, an agreement was made regarding the procedure to be 
followed for achieving an independent and democratic Korea. But later on 
negotiations between the United States and Soviet Military Command broke 
down.^ "* 
Thus the real cause of differences stemmed from the fact that for both 
USA and Russia, Korea was of vital strategic significance. 
Importance of Korea for USSR: The Soviet Union wanted to ensure that 
no hostile power should have invasion bases within the reach of the Russian 
soil. Since Japan was ab:eady under American possession. Therefore Soviet 
strategy was guided to mask Japan with a line of Russian held bases. The three 
military air bases in Siberia, the Kurele Islands and Sakhalin were already 
under its control. But in order to have full control on the Asian mainland, 
firstly it was essential to have control over Korea. 
Importance of Korea for USA: Korea is strategically located in such a 
manner that it could be a center for Chinese and Soviet influence into the Sea 
of Japan or a bridgehead for Japanese penetration of the Asian mainland. Thus 
Korea for USA is of immense value if it wants to keep its hold in the Pacific, 
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and to carry out its policy of containment against the Soviet bloc. It is due to 
this strategic significance that it has been a center of major Far Eastern 
conflicts. Since the Korean crises in 1950, the center of attraction in 
International politics shifted from Europe to the Far East and it marked the 
beginning of Cold War in the area concerned and a major threat to the World 
War III. "Since there was a fear of expansion of Communism therefore United 
States decided to establish a government in Korea which would be friendly to 
Western countries but prove to be a challenge for Communism. Thus Korea 
became a battleground where conflicting ideologies and ways of life raised 
their ugly heads.^^ 
It was due to the failure of the United States and USSR to agree on steps 
to carry out the wartime promises^^ of independence for Korea, which led the 
United States, on Sep. 17, 1947 to refer the Korean problem to the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
In the debate that followed, both the contending parties repeated their 
respective positions.^* Regardless of the protests from USSR the General 
Assembly voted a Resolution^^ in order to establish a United Nations 
Temporary Commission with authority to observe elections for a national 
assembly which in turn would establish a national government for Korea. But 
the Commission could not function much effectively as it was not allowed to 
enter North Korea.^° 
Both the North and the South Korea wanted to re-unite the country 
under their respective leadership. On 25 June, 1950 came the cataclysm when 
North Korean forces crossed the 38* Parallel and fighting started between the 
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two/' The Communist affirmed that it was the South Korean, which first 
crossed the frontier. A.A. Gramyko the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
USSR said. "That the present events in Korea which began on 25 June as a 
result of an offensive attack launched by the forces of the South Korean 
authorities on Frontier areas of the Korean People's Democratic Republic was 
a result of a calculated plan".^ ^ This issue of incursion from North Korea into 
South Korea was brought to the notice of United Nations by USA. 
Consequently the Security Council met and demanded the immediate 
withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38 parallel. A unified Command was 
set up by the Council under the United Nations flag and on 7 July 1950, and 
General Mac Arthur was appointed as the Supreme Commander of the United 
Nations.^ '* On 7* October, 1950, General Mac Arthur was authorized to extend 
the war in North Korea. The crises reached its climax when the United Nations 
forces approached the Yalu River (which divides Korea from Manchuria) and 
the Chinese volunteers in large number entered Korea. Thus it was on 11"* 
October 1950, when a spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Minister declared 
that the Chinese people could not stand idly while Korea was being invaded by 
the United States and its accomplices. The Intervention of the Chinese 
volunteers forces, as a reaction to the crossing of the 3S^ parallel by the United 
Nations Command made the United Nations condemn China as an 
'aggressor'. The heavily outnumbered troops under the Command of General 
Mac Arthur fell back and were not able to reintegrate the line till the Chinese 
were some seventy miles inside South Korea. 
In 1951, after serious reverses, the United Nations forces again began to 
move forewaid. But in April 1951 there arose another heavy North Korean-
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Chinese counter attack which resuhed into a virtual Stalemate at the 38^  
parallel7^ It was in early July 1951 that negotiations started between the two 
sides but they could not prove to be a success 7* 
However there were difficulties with regard to the fixation of the 
armistice line and exchange of prisoners of war. An agreement was signed on 
the repatriation of prisoners of war on Jime 8, 1953 and thus hostilities ended. 
This agreement also provided for the voluntary repatriation of the prisoners of 
war under the supervision of the neutral nations Repatriation Commission. 
. India's opposition of US intervention in the Korean crises 
India was willing to see a negotiated settlement of the Korean problem 
as it believed that the division of Korea would be disastrous for the future of 
Korea and would endanger peace and stability in the Far East. According to 
K.P.S. Menon, "If the Koreans are tenacious of independence, they are equally 
tenacious of their unity. Nothing is more remarkable than the homogeneity of 
the Korean nation. They belong to the same race, speak the same language and 
are fond of the same traditions. The North cannot live without the South, nor 
can the South without the North. The South is agricultural and the North is 
industrial; the South is the Bread-basket of Asia, the North is a reservoir of 
power...Korea is thus indivisible, whether you look at problems from an 
economic, political or historical point of view. Deep down in the heart of every 
Korean, whether in the North or in the South, is this longing for 
unity...Distracted and disillusioned, Koreans of all shades of opinion have 
been approaching us and telling us that 'the United Nations is our last hope.' If 
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this last hope, too is shattered Korea may blow up and it may be the begimiing 
of vaster cataclysm in Asia and the world". 
Thus, when further negotiations between USA and USSR failed it was 
on 17 September 1947, USA referred the issue of the independence of Korea to 
the second session of the United Nations General Assembly. India besides UK, 
USA, China and Syria mooted the idea of the inclusion of the Korean issue in 
the agenda of the United Nations. It was however opposed by the Soviet Union 
on the grounds that the United Nations has no right to take up the matter 
because according to them the purpose of the United Nations is to deal with 
questions which arises after war and not during war.^ ° India as Chairman of the 
(nine member) United Nations Temporary Commission in 1947 stressed the 
need to unify Korea by ascertaining the wishes of the people through fair and 
free elections in both part of Korea as it believed that a real national 
govermnent could not be created by having elections only in the South In the 
words of K.P.S. Menon. 
"I have grave doubts as to whether the national government which may 
emerge out of these elections will be really national. I have grave doubts, 
whether we can ensure a free atmosphere for the elections I may say 
that the attitude of my government is that we must try to implement the 
Resolution of the General Assembly whenever and to the extent that 
circumstances permit". *' 
But later, since there was no other way left, India also favoured elections 
in the South only, and on conditions that the door to future unification be left 
open and continuous efforts should be made to achieve unity by consultation 
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between the North and the South. Keeping this in mind the government of 
India made following suggestions for elections. 
Firstly "That a general election to be held not on a zonal basis but under the 
supervision and control of the United Nations Temporary Commission. 
Secondly, the elections to be held on the basis of adult suffrage without any 
political discrimination by secret ballot. 
Thirdly, the Korean Assembly should meet immediately after it had been 
elected to form a national government. 
Fourthly, the national government immediately after its formation should 
establish its own national security forces and dissolve all military and semi-
military formation not included there in and 
Lastly, a definite time limit should be fixed for the withdrawal of the 
occupation forces".^ ^ 
After elections had taken place, India insisted that further efforts should 
be made to facilitate the imification of South and North Korea. M.C. 
Sheetalvad, an eminent Indian Scholar, argued that reunion between North and 
South Zone was of paramount importance and efforts should be made to 
achieve it by all means. He also made the following suggestions. 
1. Independence throughout the whole of Korea should be achieved as 
soon as possible with the East possible delay; 
2. Independence to be granted to Korea as an integral unit and the 
Assembly should not approve of any arrangements which might lead to 
weakening of the prospect of achieving that aim and 
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3. The Assembly should give its full support to ensure that every efforts be 
made for conciliation between the people of the two zones. 
Moreover, she did not agree that elections should be conducted by the 
occupying powers. Elections were held on May 10, 1948 in the United States 
zone and the Republic of Korea was formally proclaimed on July 15. On 
September 9, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea was proclaimed in 
North Korea without any reference to the United Nations Commission. India 
refused to recognize the Republic of Korea as she felt that, it would perpetuate 
the partition and it might come in the way of unification of the two parts of 
Korea. 
Role played by India in the United Nations after 1950 when 
Aggression had taken place: On 25* June 1950, when armed conflict broke 
out between the North and the South Korea. Nehru at a Press Conference of 
July 7, 1950, clarified India's stand regarding the Korean crisis and stated, "It 
was clear without even great enquiry that this was a well planned and large 
scale invasion". '^* The invasion of South Korea by North Korea threatened the 
peace of the world. The United Nations Commission of which India was 
Chairman, lost no time in drawing the attention of the Secretary General to the 
situation, which it felt, was serious. It suggested that the Secretary General 
might consider the possibility of bringing the matter to the notice of the 
Security Council. In the first Resolution adopted on 25* June 1950 the Security 
Council noted "with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of 
Korea by forces from North Korea constituted a breach of the peace".^^ The 
Resolution called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon the 
North Korean authorities to withdraw there armed forces to the 38* parallel 
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forthwith. The Security Council also called upon the members to render 
assistance, to the United Nations in the execution of this Resolution and to 
refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities. India, along 
with eight others Security Council members, voted for the Resolution. 
On 27 June 1950 the President of the United States ordered United 
States air and naval forces to give the South Korean Government troops and 
support. Later, on the same day, in the absence of the representative of the 
Soviet Union, a permanent member, in the Council adopted a Resolution by 7 
votes to 1 (Yugoslavia) with two abstentions (India and Egypt). The 
Resolution read: "Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic 
of Korea by force from North Korea constitutes a breach of peace recommends 
that the members of the United Nations fiimish such assistance to the Republic 
of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore 
international peace in the area". *^  The representative of India, not having 
received instructions from his government, did not take part in the vote on that 
Resolution. On 30*** June 1950 India informed *^  the Security Council that it 
accepted the Resolution because it was "opposed to any attempt to settle 
international dispute by resort to aggression". Moreover the halting of 
aggression and the quick restoration of peacefiil conditions were essential 
preludes to a satisfactory settlement. It was also made clear that the acceptance 
of this Resolution did not involve any modification of India's general foreign 
policy. The Indian delegates explained. 
"This policy is based on the promotion of world peace and the 
development of friendly relations with all countries. It remains an independent 
policy, which will continue to be determined solely by India's ideals and 
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objectives. The Government of India earnestly hopes that even at this stage it 
may be possible to put an end to the fighting and to settle the dispute by 
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negotiation . 
It was this emphasis which India placed on negotiation even at the time 
it accepted the Security Councils recommendations for collective measures 
which made the Indian attitude different from that of other goverrmients which 
accepted the decision. 
India again abstained from the vote on 7**^  July 1950, when a Resolution 
requesting all member states to make military forces available to a unified 
United Nations Command under the United States was passed in the Security 
Council and also withheld military cooperation from the United Nations 
Operation in Korea. This was because it did not like the idea of the taking a 
military action to repel the aggression and also, disapproved of the maimer in 
which the United Nations intervention was being organized. It also criticized 
the very Character of the United Nations Conmiand, which, in point of 
composition, control, direction and objectives was virtually a United States 
Command fighting under the United Nations flag.^ ° The ftinds needed for the 
operation were contributed entirely by the United States and not by the United 
Nations. It was also significant that the Indian Government did not send armed 
forces to Korea. On the same day Nehru, in his Press Conference, explained 
why India declined to send armed forces to Korea, and said "Any military 
assistance is beyond India's capacity and would make little difference. India's 
defence forces have been organized essentially for defence and not for service 
in distant theatres of war . ^ ' The reason given by the Indian Government for 
not sending the armed forces was that they were only adequate for the defence 
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of the country. Another consideration in India's decision not to send its armed 
forces was that it was keen on playing the role of a neutral mediator in the 
crises. 
Jawaharlal Nehru earnestly tried to find a basis for terminating the 
conflict. Thus when both the parties i.e. Western bloc and Communist bloc 
started giving Korean war a global shape, Nehru sent personal messages to 
Stalin and Dean Archeson on July 13 and 15 July 1950, respectively for a 
speedy and peaceful settlement of the Korean dispute. The message stated: 
"India's purpose is to localize the conflict and to facilitate an early 
peaceful settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council so 
that representatives of the Peoples Government of China can take a seat in the 
Council, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can return to it, and whether 
within or through informal contacts outside the council, the USA, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republic and China with the help and cooperation of other 
peace-loving nations, can fmd a basis for terminating the conflict and for a 
permanent solution of the Korean problem. 
But Nehru received no encouraging response from any of the parties.'"^ 
Thus India's efforts to mediate and secure a peaceful settlement of the crises in 
accordance with the two Resolutions of the United Nations Council were not 
appreciated by the United States which alleged that India was following a 
policy of appeasement.^ '' They thought that Nehru was trying to conciliate the 
Communist bloc, which was associated with aggression. On July 18, 1950, in 
his reply to Nehru's appeal Dean Acheson politically rejected India's 
suggestion for seating Communist China at the United Nations and said: 
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"There has not been at any time any obstacle to the full participation by 
the Soviet Union in the work of the United Nations except the decision of the 
Soviet Union itself... ..In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant 
governments for China's seat in the United Nations is one which must be 
reached by the United Nations on its merits. It is a question on which there is 
at present a wide diversity of views among the membership of the United 
Nations. I know you will agree that the decisions should not be dictated by an 
unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which should subject the United 
Nations to Coercion or duress".^ ^ 
It was clear from this reply that the United States regarded Indian 
suggestions as implying concessions to the Communist powers as a price to be 
paid for the North Korean aggression and leaving the Korean question open 
without asking any commitments on the part of the Commimists. In 
Washington "Nehru's message caused xmderstandable annoyance. The United 
States was now being asked to buy off a Communist aggression, already 
underway".^ ^ According to India's opinion these concessions seemed to be 
necessary parts of the process of easing tensions for a general settlement in the 
Far East. As a result wide differences arose between the two countries. In the 
eyes of the United States the fact of Communist aggression was of uppermost 
importance while India saw the Korean question together with other, Far 
Eastern issues which in a way blurred the fact of Communist aggression. 
Washington was convinced that it was better to fight the aggression than to 
secure peace by making concession, which it had refused in the earlier part of 
the year and was all the more unwilling to grant when the only new factor in 
the situation was an act of aggression against the United Nations.^' 
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Nehru showed his annoyance while giving speech in the Indian 
ParUament on Aug.3, 1950 and said, "If we are energetic in condemning the 
aggression by North Korea, it is necessary to add that we are by no means 
satisfied by existing conditions in either North or South Korea. The policy of 
the Western powers is dominated more by European problem than by those of 
Asia, and they continue to take decisions which affect vast areas of Asia 
without understanding the effective needs and the spirit of these people. In the 
West there is little understanding of the Eastern outiook we can understand 
the outlook of the Asiatic countries very much better than the West. Yet the 
future of Asia is still determined by the Statesmen of the Western world".^ ^ 
Nehru further emphasized that any attempt to tackle Asian problem 
without taking Asia into account was bound to prove fruitiess. And certainly 
this was a major cause of difference with the West, and was the best way to 
solve the far Eastern problems.^ ^ 
By September 1950 the Korean War had taken a turn in favour of the 
United Nations. The General Assembly implicitly endorsed on 7* October 
1950 the crossing of the 38* parallel by the United Nations forces as India 
regarded this as an unfortunate step. '°° Its general line was that the United 
Nations forces enter Korea in defence of South Korea and not for the 
subjugation of North Korea. Nehru publicly stated his frnn and vigorous 
opposition to the crossing of the 38*"^  parallel by the United Nations forces and 
warned the United Nations that "We are of the opinion that every efforts should 
be made to bring the Korean war to a conclusion and that it would be wrong to 
carry out military operations, when peaceful methods can bring about the 
necessary result". •"' This observation was partly a result of the declaration 
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made by Mr. Chou En Lai on 30*** September, that China would not stand aside 
if the United Nations Force were to cross the 38* parallel, and this crossing 
could quite possibly lead to an extension of the conflict.'°^ Sir B.N. Rao the 
Indian representative to the United Nations, also expressed the same sentiment 
and said "Faith in the United Nations were even to appear to authorize 
unification of Korea after the Organization had resisted the attempt of North 
Korea to unify the country by force against South Korea".'°^ 
India also expressed her opposition to the branding of China as 
aggressor by the United Nations. On United States initiative on January 20, 
1951, as she thought that such a step might result in an extensive flare-up in 
Korea and even disrupt the Organization itself.'"^ The American Government 
believed that India's attitude of Neutrality in the Korean crises was inconsistent 
with its support for the United Nations. Replying to it India pointed out that 
Peking entry into the war was defensive and not aggressive and that it was only 
a reaction to the crossing of the 38* parallel by the forces of the United Nations 
Command. Later when Soviet Resolution in the Security Council condemning 
the United States for committing armed aggression on Chinese territory and for 
intervening militarily in Korea and demanding withdrawal of the American 
forces was put to the vote, India again abstained as India believed that such 
allegation and counter allegations would result in making the settlement of the 
dispute through negotiations increasingly difficult. Moreover it was felt by 
India, that by remaining non-aligned on the issue it would be able to serve the 
cause of peace in a better way. 
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Appreciation of India's Role in the Korean Crises with special 
Reference to Nehru: 
Korea lying at the crossroads of Asia was of immense importance 
for the three big powers in Asia i.e. China, Japan and India. Anything 
effecting Korea would have an immediate effect on these countries. 
Therefore, Nehru strongly demanded that since Korean crises was an 
Asiatic problem and so it should be solved by Asians as they are in a 
best position to understand the whole issue. 
Moreover, India's political and geographical importance in Asia 
leads it to play an active role in this conflict. Politically there were three 
big powers in Asia i.e. Japan, the people's Republic of China and India 
since Japan was aligned with the USA and China with the USSR. So 
India remained the only country with it policy of non-alignment, which 
could hold the balance of power there. Therefore, Korean issue was not 
an isolated phenomenon but it fell within the broader context of India's 
general foreign policy'°^ Thus The Korean war gave an opportunity to 
examine the potentialities of the policy of non-alignment, formulated by 
Nehru. This was nothing but a mere manifestation of Cold War politics. 
Had Nehru not been there to mediate in the crises, the war had all the 
possibilities of turning into a global war with the direct participation of 
the two blocs. Nehru took initiatives to localize the conflict. According 
to him "we are compelled by circumstances to play our part in Asia and 
in the world, because we are convinced that unless these basic problem 
of Asia are solved there can be no world peace".'°^ Thus, Nehru's 
approach to the whole crises was positive, constructive and neutral. 
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On June 25, 1950, when the war broke out in Korea, the United 
Nations Security Council passed a Resolution accusing North Korea of 
aggression. The USSR had already withdrawn from the Security 
Council in January, for not replacing Chiang Kai-Sheik's representatives 
by the representatives of Red China. President Truman dispatched the 
American troops in support of South Korea as Security Council 
Resolution authorized the United States to enforce necessary sanctions. 
When both the parties i.e. Western bloc and Communist bloc 
started giving Korean war a global shape Nehru through his mediatory 
efforts helped in bringing the opposing sides together for negotiation 
rather than providing support to one side militarily. In accordance with 
this policy he wrote letters to Marshal Stalin of USSR and Dean 
Acheson of the USA on July 13 and 15 respectively asking for ending 
the war. In his letter to Marshal Stalin Nehru Stated: 
"India's purpose is to localize the conflict and to facilitate an 
early peaceful settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the 
Security Council, so that representatives of the People's Government of 
China can take a seat in the Council, the USSR can return to it, and, 
whether within or through informal contacts outside the Council, the 
USA, the USSR and China, with the help and cooperation of other 
peace-loving nations, can find a basis for terminating the conflict and 
for a permanent solution of the Korean problem". '°^ 
Nehru's proposal that China should be admitted into the United 
Nations and the North Korea be given a hearing was accepted by Stalin. 
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Stalin in his reply to Nehru said. "I welcome your peaceful regulation of 
the Korean question through the Security Council with the obligatory 
participation of the representative of five Great Powers, including the 
People's Government of China". '°^ 
One of the important development that took place in the world 
body, after Nehru's initiative for a peaceful settlement, was the return of 
USSR to the Security Council without any commitment to stop fighting 
in Korea to which she could have committed had Mao's China been 
admitted into the Security Council. However, Nehru's proposal was 
rejected by the United States. Even in India, Nehru faced criticism in the 
Parliament. Shyama Prasad Mookherjee termed Nehru's message to the 
USSR and the United States as "appeasement" of the Soviet Union. To 
which Nehru replied in the Parliament in the following words: "we 
differ in the method of approach ....we do not open the lock of men's 
hearts with hammers, bayonets and bombs, but I am more convinced of 
this than anything else that in the ultimate analysis, no problem is 
solved by the bomb and bayonet and the tank".'°^ 
To quote the British Labour leader Fenner Brockway, "Nehru 
exerting a restraining influence on China, had alone more than anything 
else, to prevent the Korean conflict from involving the world".''° 
K.M. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador in Peking at that time, had 
become an important diplomat to serve as a link between the Chinese 
authorities and the government of India, on one hand, the China and the 
West, on the other. On October 2, 1950 through Panikkar Chinese 
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Premier conveyed that "if the American crossed the 38^ ** Parallel China 
would be forced to intervene in Korea...The South Koreans did not 
matter but American intrusion into North Korea would encounter 
Chinese resistance". ^" China considered the stationing of American 
troops in Taiwan as a direct threat to its mainland. Panikkar had 
informed Nehru of the gist of this conversation that night. According to 
Panikkar, the United Nations was aware of the Chinese stand, but it did 
not care for Chou En-Lai's warning and on October 8, United Nations 
force crossed the 38*'' Parallel in order to bring about the unification of 
Korea. It was indeed a tragic decision. At this stage it was not a war for 
the unification of Korea but it was a direct and conscious show down 
between China and United States. 
At that time, Nehru was alone in the world making all possible 
efforts so that Korean war may not escalate into a global war. He was 
afraid because with the United States intervention and with the Chinese 
admission in the war, there were possibilities of all the supporters of 
Communist or Western democratic ideology, to join the war and it 
would have resulted into a large-scale disaster of lives and property. 
The Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference held in January 
1951, provided Nehru with a good opportunity to carry out discussions 
with various heads of States regarding Korean crises. There at London, 
he prepared a number of proposals to the Chinese authorities through the 
Indian Ambassador in Peking. In the same manner Senegal Rau, the 
then, Indian representative, interpreted proposals prepared for Soviet 
Union to its authorities proposed to convene a Conference on Korea. It 
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was speculated that he might visit Moscow and Peking with the peace 
proposal. On 11 January 1951, the Amrita Bazar Patrika reported on 
concluding session, of the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference 
in the following words; 
"Nehru would visit Paris where he will discuss all the relevant 
factors in this regard with India's Ambassadors in Europe, USA and 
USSR who have been asked to assemble there at the time and if all goes 
according to plan, Nehru would fly to Moscow from Paris to confer with 
Stalin. From Moscow he would proceed to Peking and confer with Mao 
Tse-Tung"."^ 
"In Paris Nehru had three rounds of Conference with the Indian 
diplomats and diplomatic chiefs in European capitals he also had 
discussions with the United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie and 
the French President and the Prime Minister. At Paris, he discussed the 
plan about cessation of hostilities in Korea and the strategy to prevent a 
world conflict with Radhakrishnan, Krishna Menon, Senegal Rau, 
Bajpai and Vijaya lakshmi Pandit- the leader of the Indian delegation at 
the United Nations".^^^ 
Nehru had also discussed the Korean question with world leaders 
attending the Commonwealth Prime Minister Conference held in 
London. At the later date, cables were "being exchanged between Indian 
house, Kremlin and Peking"."'' The UK, Ceylon Pakistan agreed with 
Nehru's proposal that the recognition of the Peking regime by all 
Commonwealth countries and giving Mao a seat in the United Nations 
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must come first, while Austria, New Zealand and South Africa realized 
that Nehru's approach to the Far East problem was realistic."^ 
It was a part of Nehru's diplomacy that by not condemning China 
as an aggression in Korea, he had helped elevating India's stature in 
international politics and thus saved India from the accusation of being 
allied with the United States. The American Resolution was defeated 
and at the same time Nehru's worthiness as a great statesman was 
realized by almost the entire world as he exercised a great influence on 
China and USSR so far the settlement of Korean conflict was concerned. 
Nehru in his letter to Chou En-Lai, a Chinese Premier, dated January 23, 
1951 pleaded: 
"The occasion demands the highest statesmanship which, by its 
vision and generosity will upset the forces making for war and give to 
Asia not only peace and strength but also a moral leadership. The new 
China is in a position today to give such a far seeing and generous lead 
for peace, which can result in an immediate removal of tension and fear 
from the world. We in India and China have suffered enough 
humiliation in the past and have resented it and fought against it. We 
should follow a different course and try to secure a stable peace through 
a peaceful and cooperative approach. This would be no sign of 
weakness but of strength and confidence in us". "^ 
However, Nehru was influential in reaching to the point of 
solution of Korean problem but the question of exchange of prisoners of 
war (POWS) had, however, become a thorny issue, defying solution to 
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cessation of hostilities in Korea. The Chinese Government demanded 
that the transfer of POWS should be in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention, which meant that once the prisoners were released they 
would be outside the control of the detaining authority. But neither the 
USA nor China were signatories to the Geneva Convention.''^ 
Thus the question regarding prisoners of War became a thorny 
issue before the armistice agreement. The most important obstacle to the 
armistice agreement was the question of disposal of the prisoners of 
war. China and North Korea wanted all the POWS to be repatriated 
whether they liked it or not, while the prisoners of wars expressed their 
wish against repatriation. Nehru played a significant role in the solution 
of this Knotty question and instructed Vijay Lakshmi Pandit and Krishna 
Menon to met privately with both the Communist and Western 
delegations. India worked hard for about a month and finally moved a 
Resolution in the seventh session of the General Assembly, on 3'^ 
December 1952: 
The release and repatriation of the prisoners of war shall be 
effected in accordance with "the Geneva Convention relative to the 
treatment of prisoners of war" dated 12 August, 1949, the well 
established principals and practices of international law and relative 
provisions of the draft Armistice Agreement, 
Force shall not be used be against the prisoners of war to prevent 
or effect their return to their homelands, prisoners of war shall be 
treated in accordance with the General spirit of the Convention. 
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This Resolution was made up of Nehru's proposal (acceptable to 
China) that prisoners should be repatriated under the supervision of 
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission consisting of representatives 
of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. The umpire was 
to be appointed by the Commission itself. Nehru warned that if India's 
peace proposal for ending the Korean war were not accepted "then the 
world would be taking step towards another great war".^'^ Anthony 
Eden, the British Foreign Secretary Commanded the Indian proposals as 
"timely and constructive". But this Resolution was seen with suspicion 
by both USA and USSR.USSR termed the Indian Resolution as a "rotten 
solution" because of the bitter attack on the Indian Resolution by the 
Russian representative. The United States representative Acheson, 
overcoming the earlier suspicion of Indian motive "had warmly 
commended the Indian initiative and expressed agreement with the 
Intention of the Resolution". '^ ° The United States agreed to vote for the 
Indian Resolution. It was a great success on the part of Indian 
diplomacy; but the real credit should be given to the Cold War politics. 
However, on December 3, the General Assembly adopted the Indian 
Resolution by 55 votes to 5, the minority being the Communist bloc. 
Consequently, Nehru came under bitter attack both from Russia and 
China. He was blamed of aspiring for Asian Leadership Nehru's 
increasing influence made them realize that a "small power was 
assuming too much importance in an area meant primarily for the 
giants . 
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However, the United States delegation assured India of making all 
possible efforts to support the proposal. The armistice would not have 
been possible unless the United States delegation was ready to 
understand and follow other views and opinions other than its own. 
However, China exhibited a different kind of mental set up after 
Stalin's death in March 1953 as they now accepted the Indian proposal 
that all the prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated should be 
handed over to the neutral state. Hence they were now accepting the 
Indian proposal against which they voted earlier. Not only were the 
terms of this agreement similar to the provisions of the Indian 
Resolution of 3'^ '' December 1952, but also India was asked to take over 
the Chairmanship of this Commission that was being set up under the 
agreement. Hence only, after two months China signed the prisoners of 
war agreement and this could be possible only because of India, as India 
intensely lobbied for the acceptance of the Chinese proposal of setting 
up a Repatriation Commission of five neutral states. 
In the meantime, in June 1953, some 27000 out of 35,000 anti-
Communist North Korean prisoners had escaped from prisons, of which 
Americans were usually in charge a thousand of whom were recaptured 
and some killed and injured. About 9,000 prisoners remained in 
custody. The Chinese Government was very much disturbed over these 
happenings in South Korea. However, India with the help of UK, 
succeeded in resolving the issue and finally on 27 July 1953, armistice 
was signed, thus ending the impasse over the issue of POWS. '^ ^ This 
was a personal triumph to Nehru and Menon. Anthony Eden highly 
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appreciated the success of the Indian diplomacy in the House of 
Commons: "It is only fair that I should add a tribute to the Indian 
delegation and Mr. Krishna Menon in particular for there wise 
statesmanship". '^'' 
India took over the Chairmanship of the Neutral National 
Repatriation Commission. The custody of about 22,604 POWS from the 
United Nations Command and 359 from the Command of the Korean 
Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteers was given to India. The 
prisoners were repatriated at will without any force or threat of force. A 
custodial force of about 6000 soldiers was provided by India to perform 
this task. According to the report of the United Nations Command on 
the operation of the Neutral National Repatriation Commission "some 
22,000 former soldiers of the North Korean and Chinese Communist 
Armies, having freely chosen not to return to Communist control, were 
released from prisoners of war status. Some 88 POWS desired to go to 
neutral nations, and thus they landed in India along with her custodial 
force. The Government of India provided them protection. President 
Eisenhowever of United States in his letter to Nehru very much 
appreciated the efficient functioning of Indian Custodial Forces in the 
following words. 
"I want to express to you my appreciation and that of my 
countrymen for the performance of the Indian Custodial Forces. No 
military unit in recent years has undertaken a more delicate and 
demanding peacetime mission than that faced by the Indian forces in 
Korea. The vast majority of prisoners placed in their charge had from 
IZ3 
India and the Korean Crises 
month of imprisonment and uncertainty become highly nervous and 
volatile. The confidence inspired by the exemplary tact, fairness and 
firmness shown by the Indian officials and men led to their two able 
commanders Lieutenant General Thimayya and Major General Thorat 
did much to alleviate the fears and doubts of these prisoners...They 
deserve the highest commendation".'^^ 
Above all Nehru's role of mediation became very effective and 
successful during the Korean crises. He did whatever circumstances demanded 
and said to his critics "we went to Korea because if we had not gone, there 
would have been not truce and no ceasefure and the war would have gone on 
with the danger of its expansion". Thus the de-escalation of the Korean war 
was Nehru's first major contribution towards world peace. He was a man of 
caliber, who showed the guts of taking over the most delicate task i.e. the task 
of mediation in the international affairs. He said, if India had not sent the 
custodial force "she would have helped in aggravating the perilous situation in 
the world. There was not other country that could do it or that would have 
been acceptable to both the parties". 
However after so many years of discussion in the United Nations, the 
Korean settlement is still far and has once again become a major problem 
threatening the peace and security of the entire world. 
Mistrust of North Korea has been bedrock of US policy since war on the 
Korean Peninsula ended in 1953. Pyongyang's erratic behaviour consistently 
confirm such skepticism.'^ ^ 
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the 
Pentagon made a decision to reorient the United States military. Instead of 
being tooled for a single conflict against a rival Super Power, United States 
forces needed the ability to wage two wars simultaneously against "rogue 
states" in different parts of the world. The most commonly cited pair of 
potential enemies being Iraq and North Korea. But now the Bush 
administration has shown a sign of sudden change in its statement and has 
Ostated repeatedly that it wants no military conflict with North Korea now, or 
in the foreseeable future. Korea had already pulled out of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and tossed weapons inspectors out of his country. 
Moreover, a United States intelligence source revealed that North Korea had 
activated a coal-fired steam plant, a sign that Kim Jong II is now getting ready 
to cook up some plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
has passed the North Korean nuclear football to the United Nations Security 
Council, saying that it was the Councils turn to do something about North 
Korea's weapons programme. Meanwhile, CIA Director George Tenet 
reminded a Senate Committee that Kim Jong II has stockpiles of missiles that 
can reach South Korea and Japan, and he's developing longer-range models, 
including the Taepo Dong-2 three-stage missile design to reach the Continent 
of United States. Moreover he is also known to have up to 5,000 tons of 
chemical agents, including mustard gas and sarin, and biological weapons 
arsenal believed to include anthrax, small pox and the plague. In response to it 
Japan told the News Agency that if Tokyo were to receive intelligence that 
North Korea was preparing a missile attack, Japan would have the legal right to 
launch a strike in self-defense. Suddenly the Continent seemed to be much 
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closer worst-case scenario: war in Asia, with nuclear-armed North Korea on 
one side, Japan and the United States on the other and South Korea perilously 
trapped in the middle.'^ ° 
However, North Korea is insisting on direct talks with the United States 
and wants to be treated as an equal, without sharing prestige with South Korea 
or Japan. On the other hand the United States vows that it will never hold 
direct one-on-one talks with the North Korea unless Kim Jong II first promises 
to abandon nuclear-weapons development. What Washington has in mind is 
that the crises should be multilaterally resolved by the international community 
and, was happy that the IAEA referred the North Korean issue to the Security 
Council. The most logical step in that process would be United Nations 
sanctions against North Korea, which Pyongyang has said it would consider as 
a declaration of war. In fact the Security Council is unlikely to do anything 
soon. 
However in recent weeks, hopes had risen that North Korea might return 
to the six-nation talks, especially after Bush refrained from any direct criticism 
of North Korea when he started his second term last month.'^' Nehru type of 
mature diplomacy is needed to solve the nuclear problems with North Korea. 
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VIETNAM AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
History of Vietnam: 
Vietnam requires the full attention of the entire world. It was of 
paramount concern to those who were free, and to those who were already 
behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains. The aftermath of the Vietnamese war 
will not only decide the fate of the people in the area but it will have a great 
impact on the rest of the world. "Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the NATO 
Council in December, 1965, that Europe fate may also depend on the outcome 
in Vietnam.' 
The Vietnam conflict was worrying the statement and scholars all over 
the globe. The growing escalation and armed hostilities in Vietnam made U 
Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations warn: "I am afraid we are 
witnessing the initial phase of World War III". ^ 
Geographic Location of Vietnam: 
"Like two rice baskets at the opposite ends of their carrying pole" this is 
how Vietnam is being described by its fellow citizens.^ The Republic of 
Vietnam located in Indo-China Peninsula, just out between India and China, 
with China in the North, Laos and Cambodia in the West (Thailand is located 
further to the West) and South China Sea in the East. It stretches like an 
immense "S" along the coast of the Pacific." Vietnam is about 4500 miles North 
and South, about 300 miles wide in the North, 300 in the South; and only 40 in 
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the center. The Mekong River Deha provides the South with a very rich 
agricultural area; the Red River is the life of the Northern bulge.^  
Genesis of Crisis: To understand the situation in Vietnam the 
knowledge of her past is essential. The Vietnam crisis owes its origin to the 
time of French conquest of Indo-China, which was completed in 1884. In the 
days of French colonial rule Vietnam was divided into three parts. Tonkin in 
the North with Hanoi as it's capital, Annam in the middle with its capital at 
Hue and in the South Cochin China administered from Saigon. Hanoi also 
served as the administrative capital of the whole of French Indo-China, which 
besides the three Vietnam territories included Laos and Cambodia.^  To be 
precise when France controlled Indo-China she governed all the present North 
and South Vietnam, plus Laos and Cambodia. 
France governed on the principle conquer, divide and rule. Since the 
beginning of the French rule, the Vietnamese expressed their opposition to 
foreign rule, which they suppressed with speed and austerity. During the 
World War II Vietnam was occupied by the Japanese, which provided excellent 
opportunity for the nationalist to achieve their goal.^  The Japanese troops 
landed in Tonkin in 1940 and occupied the whole of Indo-China by the middle 
of the year 1941. Both the French and the Japanese joined together and 
administered the country under Japanese rule. 
It was in this situation that Dr. Ho Chin Minh founded the nationalist 
Independence Front. The Indo-Chinese Communist Party, the leading force 
was bom in May 1941. This front being the broadest national grouping ever 
seen in the history of the Vietnamese National Liberation Movement, led the 
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Vietnamese people struggle against the French. Just before the general 
surrender of the Japanese to the Allies, the Viet Minh declared a part of the 
Northern Tonkin as a liberated area. 
Meanwhile, the Big three powers of Europe i.e. the United States, Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union were deciding the fate of the Asian country.' On 
March 9, 1945, the Japanese, realizing that their fate was sealed, suddenly 
overthrew the French administration and put Emperor Bao Dai as the head of 
the nominally independent Vietnam administration uniting Tonkin with 
Annam. On 22"'' August 1945 soon after Japan had accepted the allies terms 
Viet Minh set up a provisional government at Hanoi to take in Annam, Tonkin 
and Cochin-China which consisted of more than four fifth of Indo-China 
population. The Viet Minh under Ho Chin Minh refused to recognize Bao Dai 
Government and proclaimed the independence of Vietnam on September 2, 
1945. 
The Potsdam Conference held in July 1945 gave a new turn to the 
course of events in Indo-China. The allied leaders decided that the surrender of 
Japanese troops in Indo-China, South of 16*'' Parallel should be accepted by 
Great Britain and North of \6^ parallel by the Republic of China and that the 
way should thus be prepared for the return of French.'" 
The situation in Vietnam was very delicate at this juncture. Neither the 
British nor the Chinese troops moved into Vietnam immediately after V-J day. 
By the time allied troops arrived in the country the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV) under Viet Minh had proclaimed its independence and was 
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demanding that it is to be recognized. By the time French arrived the ground 
was aheady laid for struggle. 
Under these conditions the two occupying armies in the North and the 
South of 16^*^  parallel, followed different policies in their dealings with the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The British General Gacey refused to 
recognize the Viet Minh administration, which was having complete control 
over the Southern half as well. He released and rearmed the French who were 
imprisoned by the Japanese and helped them in re-establishing their power 
South of the 16"' parallel. By March 1946 the British withdrew. The 
withdrawal of British was one of the major factors responsible for war in 
Vietnam." 
In September Ho Chin Minh proclaimed the independence of the 
country and established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. '^  Bao Dai was 
made the Chief of the State of Vietnam after the French occupation of certain 
areas around Saigon.'^  On the other hand the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
was recognized by China and the Soviet Union. 
A change took place in the Ho-Chin Minh regimes. The Indo-Chinese 
Communist Party was dissolved and an association of Marxist studies replaced 
it. When Ho-Chin Minh realized that he would not get political backing from 
USA. He therefore decided to take help from French on temporary basis. As a 
result negotiations resulted with the French and the Treaty was signed between 
the French and China in February 1946.^ '* 
By the agreement of March 6, 1946, France recognized the DRV 
(comprising the whole of Tonkin and Aimam) as "a free state having its 
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government, its Parliament, its army and its finances, and forming part of the 
Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union"/^ 
It was also agreed that a referendum would be held in Cochin-China, 
where most of the France interests and much of the colony's wealth lay to 
determine whether Cochin-China should join, the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam.'^  
There had been a marked accord on the way in which the future of 
Cochin- China was to be determined but the French made it clear that no 
referendum would be held. Firstly they adjourn the possibility of maintaining 
law and order and secondly they declared the status of Cochin China to be that 
of an independent Republic under French authority. But Ho Chin Minh wanted 
a literal application of the original application i.e. The unity of whole Vietnam 
as an independent political entity but within the French Union as an equal 
partner with economic and cultural cooperation between Vietnam and France. 
But Ho Chin Minh was not ready to accept the revival of colonial 
subservience. 
Ho Chin Minh also refused to grant independent status under the French 
Union to the DRV, as conceded in the agreement of March 6, 1946. The 
ultimate result was that from 1946 until 1950 France and Viet Minh were at a 
long brutal war with each other. It was in 1950, the operation changed into a 
confrontation of the free world with China-Russia Communist powers. And 
Ho Chin Minh received military equipment from China and Russia. 
With the passage of time, the French showed no desire for 
accommodation, the local inhabitants became convinced that France was 
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determine to keep their land as a colony as before which resulted in widespread 
nationalism. With the growing strength of the independent movement, the 
power of the Communist leadership also increased. Since Communists were a 
compact group who always knew what they wanted. 
The hostilities between the Viet Minh and the French were halted by a 
new agreement, the Modus Vivendi of September 14 and 15, 1946. 
Nevertheless frequent clashes continued. On 23 November, the French 
bombed Haiphong and on 19 December the North responded with joined 
attacks on Front forts in Tonkin and Annam. Thus began the full-scale war, 
which ended for a time in 1954. With the partition of Vietnam at the 17^ '' 
parallel.'^ 
Vietnam and the United Nations 
The Vietnam war has adversely affected not only the relations between 
the major powers but also the entire atmosphere in the United Nations Inspite 
of the fact that the Vietnam conflict was as old as the United Nations. It had 
never made a full dress appearance on the stage of the United Nations. The 
escalation and intensification of fighting in Vietnam has reached such a stage 
that it was drawn into the vertex of the international conflict and a scene of 
bitter warfare. Since 1946, yet no serious attempts have been made to refer the 
question to the United Nations. The initial attempt was made by the United 
States to present the case of Vietnam to the United Nations Security Council, 
but the move was rather mirewarding for a number of reasons. Both historical 
and political, the United Nations as an Organization has been powerless to 
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intervene or to promote in any way a de-escalation of the fighting or a peaceful 
solution to the conflict.^ ° 
The initial difficulty lies having it adopted in the agenda. After its 
acceptance, most members thought that public discussion would bring no 
fruitfiil results, but on the other hand it might worsen the situation due to 
denunciation from both sides. Even if the United Nations tries to decide who is 
the aggressor and what should be done, it would be very difficult for the United 
Nations to decide what "aggression" is and whether or not it is 'war' or civil 
war in Vietnam. The General Assembly or Security Council of the United 
Nations has never defined the term "aggression" neither the words 'war' or 
"civil war". Hence the United Nations is unable to decide whether it is 
aggression or civil war in Vietaam. 
Secondly the root cause was the French unwillingness to implement the 
international collaboration in solving the Vietnam problem. During the Franco-
Viet Minh war, the United States, encouraged by the successful initiative taken 
by the United Nations in solving the Korean crises proposed that the Vietnam 
conflict might also be referred to the United Nations. But the French refused to 
do so because thereafter their actions in Indo-China would be brought under the 
United Nations. On the other hand the French wanted to preserve the feeling 
that Indo-china was a French colonial problem and it should be solved under 
French sovereignty. Moreover, they felt that to bring this problem under the 
United Nations might weaken their claim to regard the country as private 
preserve of France. Since most of the members of the United Nations had no 
colonies, the French were aware of the separate view they would take and to 
maintain this identity they were also impervious to do anything, which might 
146 
Vietnam and the United Nations 
increase the expansion of international jurisdiction in the colonial sphere. 
Though France was sure to get friendly response from the NATO due to its 
drain in Military strength which resulting in the intensification of French 
opposition to German rearmament but she could not be sure of the response 
from the United Nations. '^ 
Even Britain was also not eager to place the Indo-Chinese affairs before 
the United Nations. Because they were afraid that it might cause a great split in 
the United Nations and "what is even more serious for us is a split in the 
Commonwealth". ^^  
Moreover, by bringing the Peoples Republic of China into discussions 
on matters relating to Far East created further rift and prompted the Western 
powers to avoid reference to the United Nations. With reference to the 
agreement, that China should be present at the conference table to discuss 
Korea and Indo-China. The Western powers had to find a way out in bringing 
China to the conference table without comprising their position about China's 
representation in the United Nations. 
Moreover, the British Govermnent had its own interest and so they 
wanted to avoid the question of bringing the colonial rule in Malaya before the 
United Nations. As a result they supported the French attitude that Indo-China 
question should be discussed outside the United Nations. Above all, the 
apprehension that the United Nations might not be able to do anything in the 
face of opposition from the Soviet Union and the possible delays created by the 
Western powers in securing a speedy solution of the problem, played an 
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important part in favour of the settlement of Franco Vietnamese war outside the 
United Nations ^^ 
Finally the big four that is the United States, the UK, the USSR and the 
France agreed in March 1954 to have the Vietnam problem considered by the 
Geneva Conference to enable all the Indo-Chinese states and China who were 
not members of the United Nations to participate in the conference. The 
conference on Indo-China opened in Geneva on April 26, 1954, and following 
preliminary consultation on the question of participants to be involved, the first 
preliminary session took place on 8 May. Delegation from nine countries, 
which participated in the conference were Cambodia, Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, France, Laos, and Peoples Republic of China, State of Vietnam, the 
Soviet Union, the U K and the USA. The Franco, Vietnamese war was thus 
brought to an end by the Geneva Agreement concluded on July 1954.^ '' 
Once the French willingness to discuss the entire political and military 
question with the opponent was known, the talks on Indo-China at Geneva 
reduced themselves to the settlement of technicalities. During this stage it 
would be useful to note the attitude of the state of Vietnam delegation to the 
Geneva Conference. Dr. Tran Van Do, leader of the South Vietnam Delegation 
to the Conference had sent a note on July 17, 1954 to the French authorities 
protesting that they were negotiating for ceasefire in Vietnam without keeping 
the Vietnamese government informed. The French denied this allegation. On 
18 July 1954, Dr. Tran Van Do put forward his own proposal for a ceasefire in 
the form of a declaration. The declaration called for the settlement in the 
following stages, under the United Nations Supervision. 
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1. Complete Ceasefire in Vietnam without any demarcation being drawn. 
2. The regrouping of the forces of both sides in specified areas. 
3. The disarming of all irregular forces. 
4. The disarming of the Viet Minh forces and the simultaneous withdrawal 
of all foreign troops from Vietnam; and 
5. Elections throughout Vietnam when, in the opinion of the United 
Nations, security and order had been established. 
With the signing of the ceasefire agreement on 21 July, between the 
High Commands of the French Union forces and the Peoples Army the two 
parties agreed to stop fighting and Vietnam was provisionally divided at the 
17*'' parallel between the French Union Forces High Command and the 
People's Army of Vietnam. Certain areas were agreed upon by the parties for 
the purpose of regroupment of troops of the two parties and general elections in 
the whole country would be held before July 1956. Which would bring about 
Unity of Vietnam? An International Commission comprising of India, Canada 
and Poland was appointed to supervise the armistice with India as Chairman. 
The parties were not allowed to establish any foreign bases and import of any 
war materials and military personals excepting by way of replacement. It was 
agreed that all prisoners of war and civilian internees were to be liberated 
within 30 days of the ceasefire agreement and both parties agreed to refrain 
from retaliation against all those who fought against them during the hostilities. 
However the exclusion of South Vietnam from the ceasefire agreement 
proved to be a grave blunder. The American took Geneva Agreement as a 
challenge and in retaliation to it a separate agreement was signed by Mr. Badell 
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Smith, the United States representative at the time of the consideration of final 
declaration. According to his statement, the United States government took 
note of the cease-fu:e agreement signed between the parties and also of 
paragraph 1 to 12, inclusive of final declaration.^ ^ 
The Geneva Conference marked wide International acceptance, outside 
the United States, of the People Republic of China as among five great powers. 
Even though United States, was against having any diplomatic cooperation 
With China had to sit at the same conference table and recognize Chinas 
interest in the settlement of South-East Asian problem. The visit of Chinese 
Premier to New Delhi for discussion with Nehru helped in creating a friendly 
atmosphere at the conference. Even though India did not participated in the 
Geneva talks its success was in no small degree ascribed to the initiative taken 
by Jawaharlal Nehru. Moreover the presence of V.K. Krishnan Menon 
(Jawaharlal Nehru revolving Ambassador) at Geneva proved to be of great 
significance to the negotiating parties who paid tribute for his friendly help. It 
was a matter of pride for India to find herself mentioned in all the combinations 
proposed for the composition of the International Commission. 
The agreement regarding the military and pohtical settlement of 
Vietnam rested entirely on the ceasefure agreement and the fmal declaration and 
not on the Charter of the United Nations. The fiill impUcation of this is evident 
if one realized the absence of any sanction or guarantee for these settlements by 
the countries that agreed to the fmal declaration. 
Soviet Union and Peoples Republic of China insisted at the Geneva 
Conference to that the signatory powers should "jointly assume obligations to 
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provide collective guarantees for the peace of the three Indo-China states, so as 
to free these states from any threat of force or outside intervention. 
While dealing with important proposals made by the third parties to 
bring the various parties together for negotiation the name of U Thant the 
Secretary General of United Nations should not be forgotten. 
Since 1965, the then Secretary General U Thant personally offered 
several formulas to the parties directly concerned with a view in shifting the 
quest for a solution from the battle field to the Conference table and creating a 
congenial atmosphere for negotiations. According to him negotiations were the 
only honourable way for tlie Americans to disentangle themselves gracefully 
from Vietnam. While speaking at a Press Conference on 24 Febuary, 1965 he 
says. "I am sure that the great American people, if only they know the true 
facts and the background to the developments in South Vietnam will agree with 
me that future bloodshed isuimecessary". Without giving any explanation of 
what he meant by the statement he said "As you know in times of war and 
hostilities the first casualty is truth". ^^  After exploring all possible avenues of a 
negotiated settlement, U Thant on 16 July, 1966 proposed a three point plan to 
stop the war in Vietnam. 
1. The cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam: 
2. The scaling down of all military operations by all parties in South 
Vietnam and 
3. The willingness of all parties to enter into discussions with these who 
are actually fighting.^^ 
151 
Vietnam and the United Nations 
The three point plan offered a solution for all the three aspects of the 
Vietnam war the international aspect involving the United States and the DRV, 
the Civil war aspect involving all the four parties (US, DRV, RVN and NLF) 
and the Peaceful solution to be achieved by negotiations at a conference. 
United States refused to accept the plan, as it was not prepared to stop the 
bombing of North Vietnam unconditionally. Agitated at the thought that 
prolongation of the war might suffocate the United Nations itself and taking 
into consideration the existing circumstances and prevailing mood of the 
parties principally concerned, U Thant modified his original three point plan 
and announced on March 14, 1967 a new three point proposal to end the war in 
Vietnam.^ " 
These proposals conceptualized three steps: 
1. A general standstill truce 
2. Preliminary talks 
3. Reconvening of the Geneva Conference. 
These new proposals were accepted by the United States but were rejected by 
the D.R.V. While modifying his original proposals U. Thant left out the 
demand for the stopping of United States bombing of North Vietnam, which 
resulted in Hanoi rejection of the proposal. A spokesman of the Foreign 
Ministry of the D.R.V. while commenting on U Thant modified peace proposal 
said "To call on both sides to cease fire and hold unconditional negotiations 
while the United states is committing aggression against Vietnam and taking 
serious steps in its military escalation in both zones in Vietnam is to make no 
distinction between the aggressors and the victims of aggression, to depart from 
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reality, and to demand that the Vietnamese people accept the conditions of the 
aggressors"."" The Secretary General of the United Nations U. Thant, 
considered visiting Peking and Hanoi to discuss Vietnam in April 1965, but 
Peking stated that "United Nations intervention in the affairs of Indo-China 
cannot be tolerated",^^ and Hanoi described it as an "inappropriate" approach 
tending to secure United Nations interventions in the Vietnam situation." 
However on March 28,1967 he admitted that it was not an easy task to submit a 
conciliatory proposal because the war as seen from different sides was so 
different and so were the perspectives and approaches of different parties. But 
he was very confident about his original and modified version and considered 
them to be the perfect solution to the conflict and the most useful steps in 
preventing further escalation of war. 
U.Thant fiirther asserted his conviction in the aide memoir containing 
the new proposals "that a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam continues 
to be a vital need, for moral and humanitarian reasons and also because it is a 
step which, could lead the way to meaningful talks to end the war". While 
replying to question at the Press Conference he maintained that cessation of 
bombing of North Vietnam is an imperative necessity to create conditions or 
peaceful talks. He reiterated his belief that "once the bombing of North 
Vietnam is stopped there will be meaningful talks in a matter of few weeks".^ "^  
On 12 May 1967, U. Thant said the he considered his earlier peace plans 
dead because neither side had accepted them without reservations.^^ He 
repeated his appeal for a cessation of the bombing "which alone can produce 
the conditions necessary for negotiation". He regarded such bombing as of 
"questionable morality and doubtful legality"^^ Even after receiving repeated 
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rebuff U. Thant was hopeful that one day his council would bear fruit. The 
United States lost a great opportunity offered by U Thant to withdraw herself 
from Vietnam with honour in 1966 and 1967, by rejecting his proposals for a 
cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. 
Before involving itself with massive combat troops in Vietnam in 1961 
and extending the war till February 1965, the United States did not follow the 
United Nations Charter provisions for peacefiil settlement of conflict and it 
even failed to bring this issue before the United Nations. Nevertheless, the 
United States representatives in the United Nations have been following the 
procedural obligation of reporting their action in Vietnam under article 51 to 
the Security Council. No other country thought of raising this issue in the 
United Nations Security Council. The first attempt on January 31, 1966 was 
made by the United States to held the meeting of the Security Council "to 
consider the situation in Vietnam" and submit a draft Resolution to that 
effect. The Soviet Umon and France opposed the inscription of the item on 
the Council agenda. The Soviet Union supported the position of the DRV that 
the Vietnamese question should be settled within the machinery established by 
the Geneva Agreement of 1954.^ ^ France considered that the United Nations 
was not competent enough to consider the conflict as the principle parties 
concerned, with the exception of the United States were not represented in that 
Organization. It was also doubted whether the United Nations was empowered 
to discuss a question, which was formally settled within the framework of the 
Geneva Conference. The United States was however, successful in putting the 
issue before the Council. But as the issue involved was a procedural matter in 
154 
Vietnam and the United Nations 
which the permanent members of the Council did not have the right of Veto so 
no further action was taken to consider that item in the Council. 
Moreover, the reasons, if any, for non-involvement of the United 
Nations with regard to Vietnam may be found in the political field. Under the 
Charter, only the Security Council is empowered to take "preventive action" to 
preserve international peace. This is an organ where the permanent members 
enjoy the Veto power in regard to all non-procedural matters. That is, the 
Council is ineffective against the permanent members who enjoy their support. 
Therefore the Council failed in bringing any settlement on the question of 
Vietnam. The Soviet Union and France were sure to reiterate their objections. 
Moreover they were committed to the positions that no negotiations could take 
place unless the United States stops bombing of North Vietnam 
unconditionally. 
In these circumstances there was no possibility of United Nations taking 
effective measures to settle the Vietnam conflict. During the 22*"* session of the 
United Nations General Assembly in September 1967, most of the members 
supported the idea that the Geneva Agreement would provide the basis for a 
peaceful settlement of the Vietnam War. Even U Thant played no useful role 
for the United Nations at this jimcture. He felt if a cease-fire agreement could 
be achieved in Geneva in 1954, outside the framework of the United Nations, 
the same condition was applicable even at this moment. According to him 
peace can be restored by the return to the Geneva Agreements. 
Great many problems could be solved in Vietnam if all the countries of 
the world recognize the fact of existence of two independent sovereign states in 
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Vietnam. Moreover, if both these states were given the membership of the 
United Nations it might pave the way for peaceful co-existence of these states. 
Importance of this conflict and Impact on the region 
Vietnam, situated as it is in South-East Asia, torn, troubled and 
afflicted, continues to be a sensitive spot in world politics full of explosive 
potentialities. Vietnam due to its strategic significance for the superpowers & 
their conflicting ideologies is the most discussed subject in the world. It is of 
greatest concern to the free world as well as the Communist world. To the free 
world it is a symbol of aggression whereas to the Communist world it 
represents the current phase of war for world domination. It is of greatest 
importance no other International problem since the Korean war has caused so 
much concern to the rest of the globe. The interference of the big powers has 
further made the solution of the problem more difficult and Vietnam has 
become "Berlin of Asia" threatening peace and security of entire humanity. 
The continuing war in Vietnam has opened up dangerous possibilities 
of a global conflict, which has resulted in political uncertainty and economic 
instability in the whole region of South-East Asia. The last decade has 
witnessed a shift of the Cold War from Europe. This is because of the big 
power focusing their foreign policies on South-East Asia and converting it into 
a puppet on the international chess board, before the newly independent 
countries into the region had time to settle themselves down to a stable political 
system and achieve basic economic standards.'*' Various events have shown 
that a military victory to either party is not possible in Vietnam without 
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engulfing the whole world into war. The only alternative left is to seek a 
negotiated peace. 
French States in Vietnam: For the French the war in Vietnam was a 
fight to preserve their empire in Asia, their precious balcony on the Pacific and 
to maintain their position as one of the great powers. But after the victory of 
the Communist China in 1949 it was looked upon by several Western nations, 
including Britain and the United States as an important phase in the Cold War 
in which they were involved. Also, the Vietnamese struggle was a great danger 
for the "democratic" nations of the world because the frontier of China was a 
Communist country ran along with those of Tonkin which was under the 
bastion of Ho Chin Minh.'*^  Moreover the immediate recognition of the DRVN 
by China and Russia led France to view it as the vanguard of the Communist 
thrust towards South-East Asia and this explanation they even passed on to the 
USA. In order to look for American support they even tried to change the 
character of the war by impressing upon the Americans that the Indo-Chinese 
conflict was mainly anti-Communist in character.'*^ Although the United States 
agreed to aid the French efforts, but it reftised to Americanize the war, as the 
whole of South-East Asia was beyond her defense perimeter in the Pacific. 
While refusing to participate in the war directly, the Secretary of State 
nevertheless admitted that the United States "must be prepared to meet 
wherever possible all thrusts of the Soviet Union".'*'* 
In May 1950, due to her economic and military weakness France 
approached the United States for aid to fight in Indo-China. Since then 
American aid to France agreed $500 million annually. In 1953 the aid 
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increased up to $750 million per year. In 1953-1954, the United States was 
bearing between 2/3^ ** and VA * of the cost of war. 
At this stage the Indo-Chinese war appeared to be a conflict between the 
two power blocs. While the United States was supplying military aid and 
equipment to France, on other hand, the People Republic of China was 
supporting the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The intensity of war 
increased and negotiations became fruitless. 
United States Involvement in Vietnam: 
Indo-china has been the testing ground of American policies in South-
East Asia, although the evolution of hostilities between the French and the Viet 
Minh, involving a complexity of factors. United States support for the freedom 
movement of the colonial peoples; United States poHcy towards the United 
Nations, United States interest in French internal stability and economic 
strength. Western European military strategy and defence against the expansion 
of Communism not only in Indo-China but in the world as well. Prevented the 
United States from making satisfactory policy decisions in the beginning 
towards Indo-China while recognizing that the problem of meeting the threat to 
the security of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was the concern of France and the 
respective government.''^  United States was not inclined for any deep 
commitment in Vietnam although it had started realizing the importance of the 
struggle that the French were waging against conununism. It was the 
Communist victory that led to American involvement in the area. America not 
only believes that its own well being is served by assuring dignity and security 
to other peoples, but it has economic as well as strategic interests in the area. 
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"Vietnam is a peace of real strategic state being on the corner of mainland 
Asia, across the East-West trade routes and in a position that would make it an 
excellent base for fiirther Communist aggression against the rest of free 
Asia".'^  It was the involvement of the global forces of expanding Communism 
that there emerged a, complex of interests, direct and indirect, which dictated a 
policy of active involvement. According to Hans Morganthao'*^ the stakes that 
led to American presence in Vietnam were: resistance to Communist 
aggression; the containment of China, the containment of Communism and the 
prestige of the United States. The United States also considers it to be the most 
expedient to get involved in the conflict and thereby to settle the past dues of 
the Korean warfare in which 96,000 American soldiers were killed by the 
Chinese. 
The American stakes in Vietnam may be summed up as follows: -
Vietnam symbolizes the bedrock of the free world in South-East Asia; 
the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. The DRVN come on state to be 
"a Veritable Communist spearhead and a dangerous threat in South-East Asia". 
Communist expansions in Vietnam would terrorize Burma, Thailand, India, 
Japan, Philippines, Laos and Cambodia. Therefore efforts must be laid down to 
build up a strong and free Vietnam. A weakening of the basic will to help 
South East Asia would tend to encourage separate Soviet pressures in other 
areas. Secretary of State Dulles was afraid that, "if the Communist won over 
Indo China they would surely resume the same pattern of 
aggression against other free people in the area"."^ ^ America 'South-East Asia' 
was of great strategic value to USA in terms of defence. It has an important 
position in the East-West air and sea routes and flanks the Indian sub-Continent 
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on one side and Australia, New Zealand and Philippines on the other, and 
dominates the gateway between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. If this area 
falls into the hands of Communist, it would pose a serious threat to the security 
of the United States and the free world. Thus it was necessary for America to 
meet the challenge in Vietnam. According to President Humphrey "The war in 
Vietnam is not an isolated phenomenon ...it is the focus of a broader conflict 
which involves the whole Asian Continent. It also involves basic principles of 
international conduct".^ ° 
Thus American policy was systematized in the context of American 
Security. Vietnam was important not only in itself but as an area of conflict 
between United States and China the one seeking containment and the other 
expansion. The American policy in Vietnam might know that if it did not 
intervene in Vietnam, the whole of area would go overboard and become 
Communist. Therefore it became necessary for America to defend South 
Vietnam because its whole position depended on it. According to Eisenhower 
"if Indo-China fell not only Thailand but Burma and Malaya would be 
threatened with added risks for East Pakistan, South Asia and Indo-China as 
well". '^ Mr. Nixon while expressing similar views says "Why is the United 
States spending hundreds of miUions of dollars supporting the forces of the 
French Union in the fight against Communist China?...If Indo China 
falls...then the whole part of South-East Asia goes under Communist 
domination... Japan, who trades and must trade with this area in order to exist, 
must, inevitably is oriented towards the Communist regime".^ ^ 
The war in Vietnam made the United States realize its security interests 
in South-East Asia. Secretary Rusk stated, "Certainly we are not there merely 
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because we have power and like to use it. .. .But we are in Vietnam because the 
issues posed there are deeply intertwined with our own security and because 
the outcome, of the struggle can profoundly affect the nature of the world in 
which we and our children will live"." 
Secondly South Vietnam was a testing ground for American policy in 
South-East Asia Vietnam was a deciding factor for Americans whether or not 
the free world could help a nation defend itself against the subversion and 
Guerilla warfare, which make up the war of "national liberation" tactics. If 
South Vietnam fell the will of the other undeveloped nations to resist 
aggression would be weakened and the whole fabric of free-world strength 
damaged. ^ '' 
Thirdly, war in Vietnam represented a proving ground of democracy in 
Asia. If this democratic experiment failed, then it would lead to fall of 
democracy in the minds of Asians. The United State was directly responsible 
for this experiment and could not allow it to fail. Fourthly, Vietnam 
represented a test case of American responsibility and determination in Asia. 
American involvement in Vietnam was considered to be a moral commitment 
to help the Vietnamese who were fighting not only for themselves but also for 
all the freedom loving people. If South Vietnam sank, American stature would 
also sink to low ebb. It would also affect American allies, who would lose 
faith in American promises of help and security in face of aggression. This 
point was stressed in President Johnsons famous John Hopkins speech of April 
7, 1965. He said "Around the globe from Berlin to Thailand are people whose 
well-being rests in part on the belief that they can count on us if they are 
attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these 
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people in the value of an American commitment and in the American world. 
The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war". 
Lastly, America's stake in Vietnam's strength and security was selfishly 
motivated, for it could be ultimately measured in terms of American lives and 
American dollars. American commitment in Vietnam was indirectly connected 
with the future security of America. ^ ^ 
India's Efforts for the Solution of the Problem: 
"Vietnam, the Cinderella of South East Asia, is 
fighting unhonoured, unwept and unsung" 
The Madras Mail (1948) 
Peace in Asia was of instant significance to India. Asian peace as a rule 
was generally threatened during this period by the rise of internal Communist 
forces in many Asian countries an occurrence that in turn drew the American 
and then the Russian on to the Asian stage. 
As normal, the Indian policy during this phase of Vietnamese crisis was 
also the same i.e. her concern for peace and stability in Indo-China, appeal for 
political solution through a Geneva t5T)e conference to end the crisis for good 
to ensure peace and security of the people of Vietnam. ^ ^ 
In this Asian drama Nehru played many roles but mainly those of 
mitigator of fear of Communism among the Asian nations, a peacemaker 
between the two power blocks and a proud and sensitive nationalist. He 
maintained an incomparable ideological firmness between his different roles 
but in times of conflict, he choose sometimes reluctantly to act in India's 
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national interest for which he was often misunderstood by his own country men 
and had to face a lot of criticism. 
Thus, from the very begiiming Nehru has been very vocal on the 
Vietnam issue. He always spoke in favour of the Vietnamese people and 
viewed the Vietnam crisis from an angle diametrically opposed to that of USA, 
which even resulted in strained relations between the two countries. India has 
always been distrustful of the Western powers whose main aim is subverting 
independence and establishing colonial rule. Biased by this view India saw 
American move in Vietnam as a struggle for world domination in some form of 
imperialism.^ ^ Moreover Nehru was of the opinion that American interference 
in Indo-China would draw the Chinese into the arena and that the Korean story 
would be repeated. He was prepared to accept the Communist rule in North 
Vietnam in preference to the possibility of a super power confrontation in the 
region because that would lead to the possibility of a World War III. On T' 
January 1946, Nehru expressed his views in the following words: 
"Recent developments would seem to indicate that America is 
underwriting this empire, possibly with suitable minor changes. That is a big 
decision to take for it is certain that the countries of Asia will not willingly 
submit to any empire or any domination and will revolt against it " 
But later on Indian attitude and reactions towards the developments in 
Vietnam were conditioned by the imperatives of her relations with the P.R.C. 
and her own domestic problems. Because during the mid sixties, India was 
passing through an acute food shortage caused by successive failures of crops. 
As a result India had to heavily depend on United States aid (PL-480) to obtain 
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food grains. Therefore Jawaharlal Nehru has to slow down his voice 
reluctantly to act in India's national interest. Besides, India's growing 
closeness with Soviet Union and her dependence on her for obtaining arms to 
meet the threat to her security also seems to be a factor, which cast its shadow 
over Indian Policy in the following years.^ ^ 
For a country like India which was extremely anti-colonialist, and which 
favoured nationalism rather than communism, the situation in Vietnam looked 
very complicated. Because all the three "ism" there were so interwined that to 
support nationalism without strengthening coloniahsm and Communism 
amounted to tight rope walking. 
Thus India's pohcy towards Vietnam from 1945 to 1960 can be divided 
into three phases i.e. from 1945 to 1949; from 1950 to July 1954 and from July 
1954 to 1960. 
During the first period, India strongly opposed French colonialism, and 
was sympathetic towards the Communist dominated nationalist movement led 
by Ho-Chin Minh, but she did not carry this sympathy to the point of actually 
strengthening this movement materially, morally and diplomatically to the 
advantage of Communism. During the second phase, India was still showing 
sentimental preference for Ho Chin Minh, but was strictly neutral politically 
and diplomatically. During the third phase, India progressively moved closer to 
the nationalist to the disadvantage of the Communists.^ ^ 
If the years 1945-1949 were critical for Vietnam^", they were same for 
India, which was beset by all sorts of difficulties at home, yet inspite of her 
internal difficulties, India could not close her eyes and turned a deaf ear to what 
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was happening in the Vietnam. '^ Nevertheless, in 1945-46, she could do 
nothing more than expressing moral support for the Vietnamese struggle for 
freedom. 
In the year 1945 when the British troops were sent to Saigon to disarm 
the Japanese, who were used by the British Commander to suppress the 
Vietnamese nationalist under the guise of maintaining order. There was a storm 
of protest among the Indians, especially as among these troops there was a 
contingent of Indian soldiers from the 20 Indian division. Moreover, the All 
India Congress Committee, passed a Resolution stating that it viewed "with 
anxiety the attempts that are being made to maintain the political and economic 
subjection of Burma, Malaya, Indo-china and Indonesia".^ ^ In December, the 
same Committee, meeting in Calcutta, passed another Resolution declaring that 
"any support from any quarter to imperialist design in Indonesia, Indo-china, 
and elsewhere, is resented throughout Asia".^ '' In March 1946, it passed another 
Resolution stating that "it had become urgent and necessary to end foreign 
domination over the countries of Asia and Africa and for foreign armies to be 
withdrawn from all such countries, and notably from Indonesia, Manchuria, 
Indo-china, Iran and Egypt".^ ^ In Delhi in January 1946, Nehru declared that 
"we have watched British intervention there with growing anger, shame and 
helplessness, that Indian troops should be used for doing Britain's dirty worked 
against our friends who are fighting the same fight as we are ". In the 
same year, he even sent greetings to Ho-Chin Minh. He even made clear to 
France that "Our hearts are with the people of Indo-china. The attempt to crush 
the spirit of freedom in Indo-china has deeply moved the Indian 
people... Though it is difficuh for Indians to know the facts of the conflict; one 
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thing is patent that foreign armed forces are trying to crush Vietnam". President 
of the Congress Party A.J.B. Kripalani, warned France that fighting "worse 
than the last war" would break out in Indo-china "unless the people of Asia 
were granted freedom". At the same time steps were taken by the Indian 
Government to help Vietnam. However, these steps were limited in scope. 
India and the Geneva Agreements: 
From 1950 onwards, Communist China and the United States became 
increasingly involve in Indo-china. The war further added fuel to the flames 
and was in danger of leading to a general conflict. The prevention of this event 
was foremost in the mind of the Indian Government, especially from 1952 
onwards after the invasion of Laos by Viet Minh troops had brought the war 
closer to the Indian borders. Keeping these considerations in mind Nehru 
appealed for a cease-fire in Indo-china in a speech in Parliament on February 
22, 1954. 
The fight in Indo-china was, therefore, in his views, essentially one of 
nationalism and colonialism. In the eyes of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indo-chinese 
conflict was "bom of a movement of resistance to colonialism and attempt to 
deal with it by the traditional method of divided and rule". Although foreign 
intervention had made the issue more complex, but it did not change its basic 
character. "The recognition of this aspect, he said, as well as the recognition of 
national sentiments for freedom and independence and safeguarding them 
against external pressure can alone form the basis of a settlement and of 
peace . 
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Regarding India's interest in the matter Nehru declared that the 
developments in Indo-china were of "grave concern and grievous significance" 
to his country, and that their implications encroached on the newly won and 
cherished independence of Asian countries. According to Jawaharlal Nehru 
"The maintenance of the independence and sovereignty of Asian countries as 
well as the end of colonial and foreign rule are essential for the prosperity of 
Asian people and for the peace of the world". Furthermore, India did not seek 
any special role in Asia, nor did she champion narrow and sectional Asian 
regionalism. "We only seek to keep ourselves and others, particularly our 
neighbours, he affirmed to a pohcy of peace and non-alignment in world 
tension and wars".^ ^ 
Moreover the proclamation of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" in 
September 1945, and its recognition by the Government of China further 
complicated the issue by transforming a local conflict into an international one, 
and that too at a stage when the battle-lines for the ensuring Cold War were 
being drawn. 
Hence, in an earnest desire to maintain peace and help resolve some of 
the differences. Nehru followed up his cease-fire proposal by a vocal protest 
against the contemplated extension of the Indo-China conflict. He said that 
peace could not be established with threats in view of the forthcoming Geneva 
Conference, as it was not the time for provocations and threats. Furthermore, in 
line with her policy of non-involvement, India did not permit any foreign 
troops and military supplies bound for Indo-China to fly through her territory. 
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When the threatened intervention in Indo-China did not materiahse and 
Geneva Conference was about to commence its business, Nehru put forward 
his six-point plan for the peaceful solution of the Indo-China problem. While 
announcing this six point plan on Indo-China, Jawaharlal Nehru expressed his 
earnest hope that the conference in Geneva would seek to resolve the question 
of Indo-China by negotiations and succeed in doing so, so that the "shadow of 
war which had for long darkened our proximate regions and threatened to 
spread and grow darker still be dispelled". 
Hence having stated India's basic approach to the question, Jawaharlal 
Nehru made the following six suggestions. "^^ 
1. "A climate of peace and negotiations has to be promoted and the 
suspicion and the atmosphere of threats that prevails ought to be dissipated. To 
this end, the Government of India appeals to all concerned, to desist from 
threats, and to the combatants to refrain from stepping up the tempo of the war. 
2. A cease-fire:- To bring this about the Government of India propose: 
(a) That the item of a "cease fire" be given priority on the Indo-China 
Conference agenda. 
(b) A cease-fire groups (sic) consisting of the actual belligerents; viz., 
France and her three associated states and Viet Minh. 
3. Independence: The conference should decide and proclaim that it is 
essential for the solution of the conflict that the complete independence of 
Indo-China, that is, the termination of French Government, should be placed 
beyond all doubt by an unequivocal commitment by the Government of France. 
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4. Direct negotiations between the parties immediately and principally 
concerned should be initiated by the Conference. Instead of seeking to hammer 
out settlements themselves, the conference should request the parties 
principally concerned to enter into direct negotiations and give them all 
assistance to this end. Such direct negotiations would assist in keeping the 
Indo-China question limited to the issue, which concern and involve Indo-
China directly. These parties would be the same as would constitute the cease-
fire group. 
5. Non-intervention. A solemn agreement on non-intervention denying aid, 
direct or indirect with troops or war- material to the combatants or for the 
purposes of war, to which the United States, the USSR, the UK and China shall 
be primary parties, should be brought about by the conference. The United 
Nations, to which the decision of the conference should be reported, shall be 
requested to formulate a convention of non-intervention in Indo-China 
embodying the aforesaid Agreement and including the provisions for its 
enforcement under United Nations auspices. Other states should be invited by 
the United Nations, to adhere to this convention of non-intervention. 
6. The United Nations should be informed of the progress of the 
conference. Its good offices for purpose of conciliation under the appropriate 
articles of the Charter, and not for involving sanctions, should be sought. 
Though, Nehru's six point plan for a peaceful settlement of the Indo-
China conflict failed to attract any positive response from the Western 
countries. But as for as Britain was concerned, the plan was received without 
much enthusiasm both in official and non-official circles.^ ° Nevertheless, when 
169 
Vietnam and the United Nations 
the Prime Ministers of Ceylon, India, Burma, Indonesia and Pakistan met at a 
conference in Colombo. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary had taken the 
initiative in linking the Colombo Conference with the Geneva Conference. 
Though none of the parties to the Colombo Conference was represented at 
Geneva.^ ' But, Eden was fully convinced that any settlement for Indo-China to 
be reached at Geneva could only be affected if Asian states including India 
were associated with it.'^ Agreeing to this approach, Eden on 29 April, sent 
from Geneva a cable to the Prime Minister of Ceylon, India and Pakistan in 
Colombo. He was believed to have given an assurance to the three 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers that the British Government did not wish to be 
a party to any decision likely to be reached at Geneva, which would conflict 
with the legitimate aims of the Asian countries. He further enquired of them 
whether they were prepared to participate in a guarantee to assure the future of 
Indo-China if the Geneva Conference arrived at an acceptable settlement. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, in his reply was reported to have stated that the Government 
of India would be willing to participate in, or be associated with a guarantee, if 
the Geneva Conference arrived at an acceptable decision and if India were 
invited to do so by both sides. Furthermore, it was emphasized that India would 
not be willing to consider as part of her commitments the obligation to use 
force against anyone violating the terms of the settlement.^ ^ 
A trend away from extremist enthusiasm for freedom and towards a 
more cautious advocacy of it was discernible in India's attitude regarding Indo-
China. Thus India followed an attitude of non-commitment towards the Indo-
Chinese Government and was not in favour of any foreign army functioning in 
Asia. Nehru even refused to recognize Ho-Chin Minh or Bao Dai and said that 
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India would follow the developments until the people had reached some 
decision. He was against taking sides in this issue. His admonition was "we 
should not jump into the fray".^ '* After all, what can we do about it, except to 
give moral sympathy and get involved? We do not think that is practical 
politics. 
The Indian Government tried its level best to persuade other British 
Commonwealth countries to remain aloof from the power politics of this 
region. India considered Bao Dai to be a puppet of France and the image of Ho 
Chin Minh was that of great patriot and nationalist in the eyes of the Indian 
people. But his close links v^th China and the Soviet Union were not liked by 
Indians. But Indian Government was confused as to which of the two regimes 
had full support and sympathy of the people not could it get proper information 
regarding the political situation at that time. Moreover India believed that it 
would not benefit her if Indo-China became a pawn in the Cold War.^ ^ 
Regarding India's attitudes towards Indo-Chinese issue Jawaharlal Nehru said 
that it was a positive attitude because we do not want to make the situation 
more difficult for Indo-China's fight for Independence.^ ^ Thus India adopted a 
policy of neutrality in Vietnam in order to help facilitate the solution of the 
problem and in accordance with it declared the policy of non-alignment. 
The Government of India in April 1954, made a public appeal to all the 
government and people's concerned to seek to bring about a cessation of 
hostilities in Indo-China. This was without prejudice to any of the political, 
military, territorial or other issues involved. The Indian appeal evoked 
favourable response from Burma, Indonesia and from the Prime Minister of 
Canada who happened to be in India at that time. There was a significant 
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interest, concern and appreciation for Government of India's appeal in France, 
both in the country and in the ParUament, favoured the Indian approach and 
suggestions. The Indian Government felt that the question of cessation of 
hostilities was an important statement, which could open the way to further 
negotiation.^ ^ 
However, India played an active role in its negotiations, which resulted 
in the Geneva Agreement in 1954. Even after Nehru's death there was no 
change regarding India's basic position in Vietnam Swaran Singh, Minister of 
External Affairs stated'^  that "we firmly believe that the only way to solve the 
Vietnam problem is to abandon warlike activities and to hold discussions with 
the object of implementing the Geneva Agreement so that the people of 
Vietnam may be able to determine the future with their wishes without any 
interference fi"om any quarter whatsoever". Under Article 34 of the Agreement 
signed on July 20, 1954 in Geneva. India served for over a decade as a 
Chairman of the tripartite International Commission for supervision and control 
on in Vietnam (ICV) with Canada and Poland as the other members. With a 
few exceptions India mainly played a negative role in the Commission. It was 
for the first time in the year 1962, that India issued a report along with Canada, 
with Poland disagreeing, in which North Vietnam was found guilty of 
infiltration into South Vietnam. Another occurrence was when the ICV 
produced a majority report on 13, February 1965 in which the Indian and 
Polish representatives said that the air strikes of February 7 and 8, indicated the 
violation of Geneva Agreement. 
On 24"' April 1965,the then President Radhakrishnan of India proposed 
a cease fire on both sides, policing the boundary between North and South 
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Vietnam with an Afro-Asian force °^ and the maintenance of the present 
boundaries as long as the people concerned wished this. The United States 
called the proposal "constructive" and full of interest and of hope. '^ Peking 
denounced it as "preposterous in the extreme" and the Government of North 
Vietnam described it as "erroneous" and accused India of "indirectly 
encouraging, through the plan in the sleeves". To sabotage the 1954, Geneva 
Agreement, as it would tend to perpetuate the division of Vietnam. However, 
India's policy has been to continue to make used of every forum and channel to 
secure peace in Vietnam. 
The Geneva Settlement was regarded by Jawaharlal Nehru as a 
memorable event in history, one in which he saw United Asian opinion tripping 
in favour of peace.^ ^ The Indian Government extended its full support to the 
agreement. 
(a) The agreement provided for the insulation of the country from outside 
military intervention and has specified clauses forbidding entry of 
foreign military personal or material of any type into Vietnam except in 
replacement of permissible quantities akeady in the country. India 
regrets that foreign interference is continuing and the dream of 
reunification of Vietnam remains unachieved. The Government of India 
has always worked for the implementation of Geneva Agreement. ^ ^ 
The communique of the Colombo Conference of the Asian Prime 
Ministers largely incorporated the points from Nehru's six-point plan. After 
welcoming the attempt made by the Geneva Conference in fmding out a 
peaceful solution, it advocated a speedy cease-fire and direct negotiations 
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between the parties principally concerned. It even urged for the complete 
independence of the Associated States and reiterated the suggestions regarding 
the utilization of the good offices and machinery of the United Nations. 
Though the term 'non-intervention' did not appear in the communique the 
Prime Minister suggested that the principal countries concerned, apart from the 
belligerents, should reach an understanding to prevent a resumption of conflict 
after the cease-fire."'' 
However, in August 1964, Gulf of Tonkin incident produced a critical 
phase in Vietnam situation. The Indian Government expressed distress over the 
incident and was of the opinion that the situation would not be further 
aggravated and peace would soon be restored."^ On the contrary the situation 
worsened and on 7 February 1965 the United States started bombing North 
Vietnam. The Indian Government issued a statement expressing its deep 
concern over the situation as it might lead to full-scale escalation of war in 
Vietnam. The statement called for an immediate suspension of all provocated 
action in South and North Vietnam by all parties involved in the issue and steps 
should be taken to create the atmosphere necessary for the convening of a 
Geneva-type Conference for an enduring solution to the Vietnam problem. 
This new Conference would be in conformity with the declaration of the Cairo 
Conference of non-aligned Nation in October, 1964.^ ^ 
On 26^ March 1965, Swaran Singh, External Affairs Minister of India 
in the Lok Sabha expressed "distress" and "shock" over the use of gas in South 
Vietnam affecting the Vietcong and civilian population. He declared that India 
considered this act against humanity and hoped that no further use of it will be 
made in South Vietnam. 
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Besides India also played an active role at the Belgrade Conference so 
that the political solution of the problem could be achieved. But to its dismay 
only United States welcomed it but the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
rejected it. Inspite of the rigid attitude of Hanoi, L.B .Shastri asked for the halt 
of the Northern Bombings as a precondition for discussions. The Prime 
Minister said that though Hanoi had imposed conditions for negotiations, but 
held that this was not a vital point. ^ ^ since then, the demand for an end to 
Northern bombing without urging simultaneous de-escalation by the other side 
became a major plank in the Indian evaluation of Vietnam. 
The Annual report of the Ministry of External Affairs (1966) 
summarized the Indian position on Vietnam. As follow: 
a). The impossibility of the military solution. 
b). The urgency of the political settlement on the Geneva Model. 
c). The immediate need for the Northern bombing to cease. 
d). The ending of fighting throughout Vietnam. 
e). The withdrawal of United States forces from South Vietnam and 
f). The peacefril creation of a unified Vietnamese state without foreign 
on 
troops and military alliance. 
The report resulted in a heated controversy. The United States sought 
explanation on the mention of the withdrawal of the American forces, and was 
told by the Minister of External Affairs that the document misrepresented 
India's policy on this point. But a close estimate of India's policy shows that 
175 
Vietnam and the United Nations 
the demand was in fact a part of India's position at that time which was based 
on: -
a). India's opposition to American military forces in Asia. 
b). Her interpretation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, and 
c). Statement by the Indian leaders during the year 1965. Pressurized by 
critics who blamed that food shortage in India during 1956 and the aid 
provided by the American in the form of PL-480 prevented the 
government from speaking against the American's. The letter dated 15* 
Feb. 1966 says: 
"For quite sometime the United States Government has been pressuring India 
to side with them in their aggression against the Vietnamese people". Indira 
Gandhi and Swaran Singh defending themselves against the critics say's that 
the conditions for the withdrawal of the report had official endorsement and 
was not in error. However the Indian Government did not approve of United 
States withdrawal before as desired by Hanoi and NLF (National Liberation 
front). Indira Gandhi also tried to calm the United States by saying^° "if you 
look at the reality of the situation, it is easy to say 'withdraw' but it is not so 
easy to do it in practice". 
However, on 30, June 1966, when United States planes started bombing 
in North Vietnam Swaran Singh our External Minister regarded it as a "most 
serious development" and hoped that the bombing would stop. '^ Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi also expressed the fear that the bombing would intensify the war, 
which may pose danger not only for South-East Asia but also for India .^ ^ 
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India engulfed with other problem was unable to do anything. The lEast 
it could do was to convey its dissatisfaction of the bombing. Again Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi made an important effort on 7*** July 1966 in the form of 7-point 
formula for the solution of the Vietnam Crisis. The Proposal was broadcasted 
from All India Radio, on the eve of her visit to Soviet Union.'^  The proposal 
runs as follows: 
1. Convening of the Geneva Conference by Soviet Union and Great 
Britain. 
2. Bombing of North Vietnam to be stopped immediately. 
3. This should be followed by a cessation of hostilities and belligerent 
movement throughout Vietnam in full observation of the (1954) Geneva 
Agreement. 
4. The International Control Commission to safeguard the "stand-still 
arrangements" with India accepting added responsibility in their task if 
necessary. 
5. Withdrawal of all foreign troops, forces from Vietnam. 
6. The guarantee by the Geneva powers of territorial integrity and 
independence of not only a neutral Vietnam but also Laos and 
Cambodia. 
7. The Geneva powers could also write a rehabilitation and development 
plan for the three Indo-China states to repair the ravanges of war. 
While presenting the basic approach followed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
that there could be no military solution in Vietnam. A peaceful solution could 
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only be reached through a conference table and hence necessity for the co-
chairman to convene a Geneva type Conference. 
Thus the objective of the conference should be to fmd a solution within 
the frame work of Geneva Agreement of 1954 i.e. the Vietnamese people 
should be able to decide their future according to their own wish without 
pressure or interference from any quarter.^ "* 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi plan showed a way by which all the parties involved 
could stop fighting and start negotiating. This plan proved satisfactory both for 
United States and Hanoi since it sought to prevent North Vietnamese supplies 
flowing to the Viet Cong in the South which was what the United States 
desired and it also provided for a peaceful settlement which would let the 
Vietnamese decide their own future without any outside interference, which 
was demanded by Hanoi. Thus the proposal was welcomed by the United 
States since it gave priority for a conference and demanded for a bombing halt 
as a precondition. 
However, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi reached Moscow, there appeared a 
change in her original proposals. The Gandhi-Kosygin communique, issued 
after her visit to Russia, marked a shift in India's stand i.e. she demanded an 
immediate end to the American bombing of North Vietnam and maintained that 
the conflict could only be settled within the framework of the Geneva 
Agreement of 1954. The communique was significant, as it did not mention the 
conveying of a conference or an end to the fighting or even the withdrawal of 
foreign forces. Though foreign bases were regarded as obstacles to peace 
Certain rearrangements of ideas were noticeable in the joint communique 
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priority was given to the cessation of bombing while Mrs. Indira Gandhi's 
suggestion for a conference was relegated. India's option of securing a Russian 
call for a Geneva type Conference was of no particular benefit. In the ultimate 
analyses the communique was more akin to soviet than Indian formulas. Some 
likely explanation for this act on the part of India can be given in terms of 
India's concern about possible Russian Military aid to Pakistan following 
Soviet mediation at Tashkent, the influence of T.N. Kaul, India's economic 
needs and the deficit pohcy plarming Mrs. Indira Gandhi later on showed some 
modifications in her proposals that she now linked the demand for ending 
Northern bombings to a call for negotiations and made the halt a precondition 
for peace meetings. It caused misgivings in the minds of the United States. It 
was felt that Mrs. Indira Gandhi had changed the original proposal according to 
which both parties should discontinue their actions, and that she was 
demanding that unless the United States took the first step and halted the 
bombing without the counter-assurance that Hanoi would reciprocate or 
Moscow would call the Geneva Conference it would be difficult to hold a 
Geneva Conference. It was felt that this change in original position by Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi was to please the Russian and possibly it was because of 
pressure from them. The press reports say that Mrs. Indira Gandhi might have 
taken the Russian sides to ensure that Moscow did not agree to Pakistan request 
for arms firom the Soviet Union. The New York Times of 21^' July 1967 says 
that Mrs. Gandhi's new statement was causing anguish in Washington. Firstly 
it was aroused by the communique in which both India and Soviet Union 
expressed concern at the deterioration of the international situation and the 
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increasing war danger which had occurred as a resuh of imperiahst and other 
reactionary forces. 
This shift in the Indian stand greatly disappointed the United States 
because it was for the first time such controversial predictably offensive 
languages was used by the Indians to the USA. The United States Official was 
quite realistic to admit that it was extravagant to ask India to take their side in 
the Vietnam conflict. They even realized that India had to drive a middle 
course between the United States and the Soviet Union because United state 
itself took an "impartial" position between India and Pakistan during the 1965 
conflict but complained that India by asking the United States alone to take the 
first step towards de-escalation was tilting the balance the other way. 
Even after the 7* July proposal by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. India continued 
its efforts for a peacefiil solution in Vietnam. In August India advised the 
revival of the joint Commission, which would enable the two sides to patrol 
together the demilitarized zone. American appreciated this suggestion because 
an effective patrol could end North Vietnam's illegal and increasing use of 
zone as a funnel for its South bound troops. It would also proved beneficial for 
Hanoi because it would end the threat of retaliation on the Northern side of the 
line, which would be in the interest of Hanoi. But Hanoi could not be expected 
to agree to this suggestion since in the past also it had obstructed the 
ftmctioning of the ICC so as to shield from its scrutiny the acts of Vietnamese 
Communists in violation of the Geneva Conference. 
Regardless of its peace efforts, India was not a participant to the Manila 
Conference of October 1966 as it was considered to be "a gathering of a group 
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of specific nations would increase rather than decrease tensions". ^^  India 
wisely condemned this peace bid by the USA and its allies as a diplomatic stunt 
to mislead world opinion which opposed the continuance of American bombing 
of North Vietnam.^ ^ 
In 1966 India also joined hands with Egypt and Yugoslavia to demand 
withdrawal of "all foreign forces" without any time limit. 
Next, along with other Non-aligned nations India supported the United 
Nations Secretary General initiative to bring about peace in Vietnam.^ ^ On 6"" 
October 1967 Swaran Singh who led the Indian delegation to the United 
Nations General Assembly at its last session said "It is our conviction that 
people of Vietnam alone can decide their destiny without any foreign 
interference".^ ^ The Indian emphasized that unconditional stoppage of bombing 
was the first essential step, which could lead to cessation of all hostile activities 
in Vietnam and peaceful talks between the parties concerned. But the USA 
disagreed with the Indian assessment of Hanoi.'°° However; a certain amount 
of flexibility was visible in the United States attitude when Arthur Goldberg, 
the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, annoimced at the United 
Nations that USA would support an invitation to South Vietnam (NLF) to 
present its case before the Security Council. This was according to the Indian 
demand. Thus, at East one of the obstacles to negotiation was removed by the 
United States. 
India as a Chairman of International Control Commission made an 
appeal to Chester Bowles, American Ambassador, that she did not recognize 
the right of hot pursuit as claimed by USA to chase the Vietcong across the 
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border.'"' The United States urged that India should activise it and intensify 
supervision of the Cambodian border so that the conflict might not spread to 
Cambodia.'°^ In 1968, India informed the Cambodia Head of state (Prince 
Norodam Sihanouk) that the ICC would inspect specific complaints of 
violation of the Cambodian territory by Vietcong or any other belligerent of the 
Vietnam war. This Indian interpretation was against American expectation of 
utilizing the Commission as a mobile border patrol would spread a wave of 
anger in USA. 
USA and the State department criticized India for not using its position 
as Chairman of the ICC as the discriminatory treatment meted out to USA 
caused great resentment. Again India's refusal of accepting American advise 
on Cambodia implied that India had supported the Communist plan and sided 
with those who were responsible for spreading the war. It was clear that India 
has drifted from its original position of neutrality previously. India accepted 
that the infiltration and subversion was from the North but now India took an 
altogether different view of the issue. Replying to Hem Barua (BSP) Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi said, "She was aware of the Soviet Union supplying arms to 
North Vietnam. But the people in Vietnam were fighting for security and as 
long as there is no end to aggression, "we cannot say from whom they should 
take arms and from whom they should not".'°^ 
As far as Johnson visits with North Vietnam in Geneva was concerned. 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi had no hope if anything could come out through this 
meeting. Contrary in the beginning he regarded President Johnson as a "man 
of peace". This marked change in India's attitude implied that India was close 
to North Vietnam and away from USA. Moreover the North Vietnamese claim 
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that America was an aggressor and the Vietnamese victim of aggression, 
fighting for self-protection. 
On r* April 1963 United States announced to stop aerial and naval 
bombardment of North Vietnam. India described it as "most welcome" and as 
a step towards de-escalation of the war in Vietnam. India as a Chairman of the 
ICC also assured its whole-hearted cooperation.'^ '^  
India also took the initiative to confirm Hanoi's response to the United 
States decision to halt bombing of North Vietnamese territory. Hanoi reply 
was partial but not conditional. Personally also Mrs. Indira Gandhi offered 
India's good offices for arranging peace talks between Dr. Ho Chin Minh and 
President Johnson. India also welcomed the agreement between the United 
States and North Vietnam to hold preliminary talks in Paris, and called it as "an 
act of Statesmanship". '°^ In order to create a better atmosphere for negotiation 
United States finally offered to stop all bombing of North Vietnam and 
agreement was also reached on including both South Vietnam and NLF 
representative in the negotiations. India hailing the American decision 
characterized it as "a step towards peace". Paying accolade to President 
Johnson, Mrs. Indira Gandhi said that he had acted with "understanding and 
courage". However India kept silent on the Paris Peace talks because being the 
Chairman of ICC she desired to maintain a position of neutrality. Moreover, 
she believed that any expression of opinion on delicate issues of procedures 
concerning Vietnam by nations other than those directly involved would not 
help in resolving the difference. 
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The year 1969 showed a fresh strain in India's relations with USA 
Previously India had approved President Nixon's 8 Point peace plan, but a 
clash occurred when USA showed its disapproval against India's decision to 
recognize the Communists new Provisional Revolutionary Government in 
Vietnam. Mrs. Indira Gandhi also rejected Nixon's assertion that United States 
had made ultimate concession for peace and declared that every country had 
the right to decide its future without any interference from outside power.'"'' 
Moreover India's decision to send the Cabinet Minister to attend the funeral of 
President Ho Chin Minh represented a new direction in India's foreign policy. 
It marked a shift from the half-hearted attempt of the past to treat North and 
South Vietnams on par and could very well become the starting point of a new 
trend in India's Asian Policy. Our Foreign Minister Mr. Dinesh Singh, after 
havmg proposed a 4-step programme for peace in Vietnam to the United 
Nations General Assembly went to pay tribute to Late Dr. Ho- Chin Minh in 
whom according to him, "Asia has lost an indomitable soldier for freedom". 
This was liable to be interpreted in the State department as an avoidable 
attempt to needle the United States. 
The United States raised a lot of hue and cry over the report that India 
was favourably considering to regrade its consulate general in Hanoi to an 
embassy level. As it would unbalance India's position as the Chairman of the 
International Control Commission and it would seem to extend support to 
North Vietnam at a time when United States was in fiiU mood of having a 
settlement without any demands from other sides. The United States was much 
annoyed at India's false assertion that real negotiation would soon follow once 
bombing stops in the North. It was bitterly alleged that India was adopting a 
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double standard, which demanded United States to withdraw and make all 
concession while at the same time supporting Hanoi's unreasonable stand. 
Therefore, in retaliation President Nixon warned that India's move to ungrade 
the status of the mission in Hanoi would be considered as an unfriendly act by 
the United States Congress.'°^ 
Further, a Congressman informed the Foreign Secretary, Kaul, that such 
action would jeopardize the American aid to India including the food aid. 
William Broomsfield a representative even went to the extent of introducing a 
Resolution which aimed at denying all aid to India. Subsequently the 
Resolution was withdrawn as the Government of India agreed to extend 
diplomatic recognition both to the Government of North and South Vietnam.'°^ 
Later on India refused to grant diplomatic recognition to Saigon until President 
Thien made his government more broad based. 
No doubt American threat to stop giving aid created serious concern in 
India, but its immediate reaction was to unite public opinion against America's 
Vietnam Policy and to improve relations with North Vietnam. Taking any 
notice of America's feeling India decided to follow its national interest and 
maintain friendly relations with nations, which were geopolitically important to 
it, regardless of ideology. India thought. North Vietnam which was on China's 
doorstep, could very well become a bridge between India and China in future. 
On the other hand India tried to soften American sensitivity by pointing out 
that India's should be welcomed by America as it was in America's interest 
that a major non-Communist influence, which till now was imaginary would be 
operating in Hanoi. India further argued that once USA maintained friendly 
relations with Vietaam then there would be no particular virtue in India 
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following suit. Later on Dinesh Singh kept aside United States objections on 
upgrading the mission and assured Parliament that further decisions would be 
taken keeping India's national interest and not under pressure.''° 
India also raised her voice against American encroachment on the 
sovereignty of Cambodia, as it would only worsen the situation. Our External 
Affair Minister, Swaran Singh further went on to describe the Vietnam War as 
a "heroic struggle of a people of a small country to preserve its independence 
against the world's greatest military power". To make the matter worse he 
further added that India at present is in no mood of according official 
recognition to the Provincial government of South Vietnam (Set up by NLP 
and Vietcong). "It would be unpractical for us to close our eyes and say that 
we have nothing to do with the NLP or the agencies they may set up. Infact, we 
need to have close relations with them". 
America took great exemption to this statement, which cast aspersions 
on the United States role in Vietnam. On the invitation sent by Foreign 
Minister of India Madame Binh, Foreign Minister of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of India visited India in July 1970. This was 
another example of marked departure from the policy of calculated non-
involvement it had so far being following. 
Simultaneously, Paris peace talks were deadlocked because Swaran 
Singh said that the talks could only progress if there was a definite programme 
for the withdrawal of all United States forces, and a more broad based 
government was formed in South Vietnam. He further added that the problem 
of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, could not the solved in isolation but had to be 
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tackled as a whole. In such critical condition a Geneva Conference should be 
held and India along with other interested parties would work out arrangement 
to ensure respect for the neutrality independence, territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of all the states in Indo-China."' 
President Nixon in 1970 set out a proposal to solve the Vietnam 
problem. There was no comment from official side in India on this proposal but 
the Foreign Office regarded it as fallen short of expectations from the 
Communist side in the Indo-China conflict. 
Firstly the cease-fire proposal to be strictly supervised by withdrawal of 
the United States, North Vietnam and other troops from South Vietnam, Laos 
and Cambodia sought to pin down Hanoi to an implied admission of the 
pressure of its troops in these countries. 
Secondly it did not fiilfiU the Communist demand for coalition in a 
broad based government in South Vietnam, without any election, although the 
United States. President indicated that the election should not be the only 
criteria for determining political realities in South Vietnam and other countries. 
Since the Indian Government's view on both these issues corresponded with 
that of the Communist side it faced a dilemma since it did not wish to reject the 
Nixon proposals on the same ground as those given by the soviet Union, North 
Vietnam and the Vietcong as it would be blamed for taking sides in the Indo-
China conflict. Therefore the only way left was to sent a critical note on the 
failure of the Nixon proposal to meet the demands of the situation as seen from 
New Delhi. *'^  
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Anyhow India readily welcomed the Paris Agreement when finally the 
two warring camps agreed to give up war and solve issues through mutual 
negotiations in January 1973. 
Asian peace was of paramount importance to Nehru. Asian peace 
during the Vietnam crises was generally threatened by the rise of internal 
Communist forces which in turn drew the American, China and Russia on to 
the Asian stage. Thus the battle in Vietnam was not only a clash between 
personalities, but also a fight for world Communist leadership. The 
interference of the big powers has fiirther made the solution of the problem 
more difficult and Vietnam has become "Berlin of Asia" threatening peace and 
security of entire humanity. 
Nehru has always been distrustfiil of the Western powers whose main 
aim is subverting independence and establishing colonial rule. Biased by this 
view, Nehru saw American move in Vietnam as a struggle for world 
domination in some form of imperialism. Moreover Nehru feared that 
American intervention would bring in the Chinese and then the conflict might 
spread beyond the frontier of Indo-China state and the next stage would be that 
the Americans and the Chinese would be fighting each other and that was in all 
probability the beginning of the World War III. 
Thus for a country like India which was extremely anti-colonialist and 
which, favoured nationalism than Communism the situation in Vietnam looked 
very complicated. In this Asian drama Nehru played many roles but mainly 
those of mitigator of fear of Communism among the Asian nations, a peace-
maker between the two power bloc and a proud and sensitive nationalist. India 
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as a Chairman of the International Control Commission made a proposal for the 
development of Afro-Asian force in Vietnam to control the demarcation of land 
between the North and South Vietnam. But this proposal was however 
rejected. In the meantime, on the eve of the Geneva Conference, the Colombo 
Conference of South-East Asian Prime Ministers consisting of India, Burma, 
Ceylon, Indonesia and Pakistan was convened at the instance of Nehru on April 
26. His call for cease-fire in Indo-China was endorsed by other Asian nations. 
He put forward a six-point formula for consideration of the parties concerned. 
All other Prime Ministers supported his peace proposals. 
Soon "the Nehru plan" which proposed direct negotiations between the 
belligerents became the basis of the conference. K. Menon, who arrived in 
Geneva with the approval of Nehru, became the focus of attention. He 
"established close rapport with Chou En Lai and of this full advantage was 
taken by Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary who was most anxious to 
see the conference succeed". The members of the nine-nation group that met 
at Geneva could not carry on fruitful talks because of the mutual suspicion 
among the different members. They needed someone to explain the difficulties 
of one side to the other. K. Menon, thus, served as a buffer, an interpreter and 
an intermediatory all roles rolled in one. 
The Geneva Conference had a brief spell of research in the third week of 
June. Later on Chou En-Lai met Nehru on 25* June and said that China would 
be satisfied if the Indo-China states followed a non-alignment policy after their 
liberation. Both the Prime Ministers issued a joint statement emphasizing that 
tile Indo-China conflict to be solved in accordance with the principle of 
Panchsheel. 
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On 18 July, when the conference was held Chou En Lai proposed that 
the International Commission to supervise the armistice arrangements should 
consist of India, Canada and Poland and thus the proposal was accepted by all 
three Western powers. Later on July 19, "Nehru received a frantic telegram 
from Eden enquiring whether India and other Colombo powers would agree to 
guarantee a settlement of Indo-China and join a collective pact for the 
purpose"."'* Nehru was against signing this pact as it went against India's 
policy of non-alignment. 
The conference reached a deadlock on the question of composition of 
the Commission to supervise the armistice arrangements. During this final 
phase of negotiations, K. Menon again acted as an intermediary and clearing up 
misunderstanding persuaded one party to take into account the problems of the 
other. Thus on July 20, Mendes France and the Viet Minh delegates had 
reached an agreement on a demarcation line and by midnight the armistice 
agreement for Laos and Vietnam was signed on July 21. The armistice 
provided for three separate cease-fire agreement for Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia and three International Commissions to control and supervise the 
cease-fire agreements. India acted as the Chairman of all the three 
Commissions. Though the United States and South Vietnam did not signed the 
final agreement on cease-fire they promised not to use force to resist the 
procedure for implementing the cease-fire agreement. With this the eight year 
war came to a happy end. When the hostilities ended in Indo-China Nehru felt 
greatly relieved and happy about India's effort in averting another world war 
and said, "For the first time during these difficult months, we can feel that there 
is no likelihood of a world war in the near fiiture. We came very near it. Many 
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worked hard for starving of this World War III ... .1 think it is right to say that 
the part India played, quietly and unobtrusively, made in a great measure, the 
development possible".''^ 
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India and Africa: 
Geographically Africa constitutes an area of immense importance for 
India. Africa inhabited by some 750 million people, which consists of around 
13 percent of the worlds population of which nearly 560 million lives in the 
sub-Saharan Africa covering about 18% of the land surface of the world. 
Besides, a host of African countries are a part of the Indian Ocean rim and their 
cooperation and help is essential in order to have faster economic growth in the 
area.' 
To draw up a close picture of Indo-Afiica relations towards the year 
2000 A.D. in a profile suitable for future generations, it will be of immense 
value to discuss briefly the past and present day perceptions of these relations. 
This is, of course important and relevant because future is inevitably linked 
with the past and present, and more particularly when dealing with relations 
between India and Africa.^  
Indo-African relationship is not only age old but has been throughout 
cordial and friendly both the countries being next shore neighbours. It is 
because of this geographical juxtaposition that the people of India and Africa 
have showed sharing of many things in common including a threat from Indian 
Ocean. Since long back they commonly shared Indian Ocean for navigation 
and communication. The Indian Ocean rather than dividing the people of 
Africa and India unites them. There are records to show that free, friendly and 
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flourishing trade used to flow between the two peoples for over two thousand 
years. ^  
India's relations with African states are based on its historical ties and 
the pursuit of a common policy of non-alignment, promotion of international 
peace anti-colonialism and anti-racialism.'* It was in South Africa only where 
Mahatma Gandhi began his struggle against colonial and racial injustice 
through Satyagraha.^  The colonial people all over the world were very much 
impressed by the success they attained with the Gandhian technique of mass 
movement. Among the African nationalist the Indian National Congress 
became a model for waging successful mass nationalist struggle.^  Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana wrote "After months of studying Gandhi's policy and 
watching the effect it had, I began to see that, when backed by a strong political 
Organization, it could be the solution to the colonial problem". 
Not only Gandhiji but also Nehru took deep interest in African 
developments. He strongly condemned various attempts made by the 
imperialist countries to take recourse to various pretext to suppress the African 
people and to maintain the supremacy of the white settlers. He made it very 
clear in his speech that India stands squarely by the Africans when he "is being 
kicked, hounded and shot down" and when the Indians there were praying for 
safety. His other achievement was the policy of non-aligrunent which India 
adopted in order to keep out of the mihtary blocs in the Cold War and secondly 
to assert its own rule as a sovereign state in world affairs. Furthermore, non-
alignment enabled an ex-colony to maintain good relations with a metropolitan 
power without any way making it subordinate to the latter. Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
continued the policy of supporting the struggle for racial equality and freedom 
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in Africa and developing close relations with them. India provided with 
essential aid including military, for the struggle that was going on in Namibia, 
and Zimbabwe (formerly known as Rhodesia, MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in 
Mozambique and PAIGE in Guinea Bissau). ^ 
Rajiv Gandhi not only continued with the trend of providing support to 
African cause, but also made it an important constituent of his activist foreign 
policy. He accorded full diplomatic recognition to the Namibian national front, 
SWAPO even before independence had been formally achieved. 
It is against this background we may describe the history of India's 
relations with Africa under three phases: -
1. The first 15 years (i.e. 1947 -62): During this period our first Nehru 
himself has given shape and direction to most aspects of India's foreign policy. 
2. The second phase starts from 1962 and continues till 1977: During 
this period India laboured under the military reverses of the border conflict 
with China. 
3. The third phase includes Mrs. Indira Gandhi leadership period i.e. 
(1977-80) 
4. Lastly, the post 1980 phase starting with the victory of Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi in 1980 witnessed in essence the continuation and enlargement of 
India's involvement in African affairs on lines laid down during the three 
phase. This phase helps in identifying elements of continuity and change in 
India's attitude towards Africa over the last three decades in a chronological 
order. 
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Phase One (1947-62): 
Jawaharlal Nehru had deep sensitivity to the vitality and creativity of 
Africa. The awakening of Asia was of his making. The awakening of Africa 
he viewed, with some awe, as "an epic of history". As a great artist sees in a 
flawless marble the image that is waiting to be carved, so did Nehru sees in 
slumbering Africa its brilliant promise. He talked movingly poignantly, of 
dark Africa, because he saw unerringly ahead the abounding radiance bursting 
out of the Continent.^  
Nehru's personal adherence to Asia Africa renaissance inspired India to 
pledge support to India on two major fronts. 
a. Their anti-colonial struggle to achieve independence, and 
b. The struggle in South Africa to end racial domination of a minority. 
It was before independence when Nehru with his breadth of vision 
evoked awareness in the minds of the Indians about the problems of the 
African people. The experience of having been a colony herself for a long time 
has naturally made India to take up the cause of countries struggling for 
independence. India has supported Africans ungrudgingly on this issue. In his 
first statement on India's foreign policy as Prime Minister of India, Nehru said 
on September 7, 1946 in a broadcast from New Delhi: "We believe that peace 
and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger 
freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly interested 
in the emancipation of colonial and dependent people and in the recognition in 
theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races". °^ Even while, 
addressing the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 and at the Afro-Asian 
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Conference in Bandung in 1955. Nehru returned to his favourite themes of 
ending colonialism in Africa. While addressing the Asian Relations Conference 
in 1949, He encouraged the Asian countries to be aware of their responsibility 
towards Africa. He says, "We of Asia have a special responsibility to the 
people of Africa. We must help them to their rightful place in the human 
family. The freedom that we envisage are not to be confined to this nation or 
that or to a particular people, but must spread over the whole human race. It 
must be the freedom of the common man everywhere and full opportunities for 
him to develop"." 
Finally, Bandung stressed on the emotional link between the people of 
Asia and Africa, who for long generations had been subjected to European 
domination and exploitation. To quote Nasser: - "The Truth is Nehru is not 
only an exponent of the dreams deeply nestled in the hearts of the people of 
India. He is also the expression of human conscience itself, particularly for 
people who lived more or less though the same experiences and faced the same 
problem as India did". ^^  
It was under the leadership of Nehru that India's policy towards Africa 
was promulgated. The cause of freedom movement in Asia advanced very 
quickly after the World War II and it was particularly India's freedom, which 
paved the way for agitation in Africa against the colonial powers. Moreover 
new hopes had cropped up with the emergence of the United Nations with its 
firm inflection on self-determination and political liberation. In the words of 
George Padmore "The name of Nehru is known throughout Asia and Africa 
where he is not only revered as a distinguished Indian patriot but looked upon 
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as an uncompromising in the struggle of colonial people for their independence 
and self-determination. ^ '^  
Nehru frequently strove against confining the colonial struggle to 
certain narrow objectives. Narrowness of human character according to him is 
detrimental to human growth especially in the context of socio-economic 
change. And this posture of Nehru's idea had profound influence upon the 
thinking of Asian and African leaders. He convinced them that the national 
liberation of any country is not an objective in itself but merely a means to that 
objective. Undoubtedly it was Nehru's international outlook, which inspired 
and convinced the young leaders of Africa. No other leader of Asia had 
strengthened the bond between the people of the two countries as Nehru had. 
The intimate friendship between Kwami Nkrumah and Nehru was testimony of 
the reciprocity of sentiments between Nehru and African leaders.'"* 
Undoubtedly it was Nehru's thinking on "human liberation" which had a 
profound effect on the African rulers and the ruled alike. It was Nehru's 
dynamic leadership, which enabled these newly emerged people to get their 
rightful place in the country of nations. Apart from this his profound impact 
worked against extreme nationalism, against over religiousness and dogmatism 
etc. '^  
Nehru in 1953 said: "I have had a long time a strong feeling for the 
martyrdom of Africa, not today, but for centuries. Probably, that Continent has 
suffered more in many ways than any other part of the world. My dearest 
sympathy goes to these people and I would like them to turn a comer, which 
leads them to greater well being and freedom.'^  
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Role Played by India against Racialism during the Post war Period: 
It was in the year 1910, when the white minorities declared their 
independence from British and started on with the worst form of racial rule, 
which later on culminated into the policy of apartheid. The world apathy at the 
time, for apartheid the most obnoxious revulsion of human rights in the history 
of mankind aroused Indian to stand as pioneers against its abolition Gandhiji 
was the first among them to be painfully conscious of the sufferings of the 
Africans in South Africa. He suffered with them for years, fighting non-
violently for their self-respect. Even in the midst of our own travails, we should 
never forget those of others. Nehru noble spirit had revolted at what he had 
heard and read.'^ 
It was India, which led a crusade against racial discrimination and 
apartheid and the colonial rule in Africa in the United Nations and other world 
forums. It was India, which in the beginning fought alone for the cause of the 
African people. In view, of its historic (unique role in the struggle against 
Apartheid) beginning with Gandhiji, in South Africa. India observed the United 
Nations anti-apartheid year in a befitting manner. For this purpose a national 
committee was set up which coordinated activities like seminars pamphlets and 
film shows to tell the people of India that apartheid is a crime against humanity 
affront to man conscience. As soon as the curse of racial discrimination 
vanishes in South Afiica the better it is. As A. B. Vajpayee said, we are firmly 
convinced that in the world where progress and humanitarianism have become 
the touchstone of human development, we cannot allow such regressive and 
inhuman practices to continue". '^  
2UC) 
Congo and the United Nations 
India's dispute with South Africa arose because of discriminatory 
treatment meted out to the people of Indian origin in the Union. During the 
British rule some five million Indians had migrated to the different colonies of 
the British Empire, under the system of indentured labour. The ill treatment 
meted out to the Indians abroad agitated the minds of the Indian national 
leaders especially Gandhiji. He out of concern for the fate of his country men 
in the racially structured society of South Africa was drawn into active 
politics.'^ Indian nationalist of all shades pledge to give their full support in 
improving the status and conditions of people living abroad.^° But soon it was 
reaUzed that the suffering of Indian's in that country was the part of suffering 
of the entire mass of people whose majority constituted of blacks. However, 
India very soon recognized that opposition to racial discrimination could only 
rest on the human right provision of the United Nations Charter. It therefore 
started severing its economic relations with South Africa and extended 
diplomatic and moral support to the liberation movement in South Africa. This 
change in policy was underscored in President Dr. Rajendra Prasad's address to 
Parliament in 1952. "The question", he observed, "is no longer merely one of 
Indians of South Africa, it has already assumed a greater and wider 
significance. It is a question of the future of Africans more than that of Indians 
in South Africa". 
From 1952 onwards, in its struggle against racial discrimination in 
South Africa, India included the cause of Africans as well and after Sharpeville 
massacre (1960) it gave paramount to African interests and asked the people of 
Indian origin to merge their interests with the interests of the Africans. India 
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was the first country to break diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1954 
and severe economic relations against racial discrimination. 
It was by 1960, after Sharpeville massacre, the change in attitude of 
India came to be endorsed by the United Nations Security Resolution 
recognizing that South Africa race policies "might endanger international peace 
and security". '^ 
Curiously enough, it was not the involvement of India in the affairs of 
the South Africa that may be held responsible for shaping its anti-colonial 
policies in other part of the Continent. On the other hand it was India's 
realization that in order to protect the Indian community in East Africa in 
particular would be exploited by the racist colonial elements as indicated by 
India's expansionist intentions. This fear was not baseless. Already the 
Government of South Africa had started a campaign against India's 
"imperialist ambitions" in Africa. At a press conference held in London in 
1954, South African High Commissioner stated that if Nehru could weaken 
European influence in Africa then it would mean Africa for the Indians. 
Taking it as a catchword from South Africa, the European settlers in 
Kenya also cited the presence of the Indian community in East Africa as 
evidence of India's future designs to colonize Africa. In 1948, the governor of 
Kenya in a secret letter to the colonial Secretary described Nehru as a "Hindu 
Communist" who was plotting to grab Tanganyika under the camour flag of 
United Nations Trusteeship. This prolonged anti-Indian campaign by these 
racist- colonial elements did not prove useless; it gradually soured the relations 
between Africans and Indians. During 1948-49 several riots took place in 
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Kenya, Uganda and South Africa between the two communities. In the Eyes of 
Europeans Indians were "dirty, unscrupulous and generally harmful" race came 
to be shared by a large number of African also. 
Thus Nehru was persuaded to send Apa Pant as High Commissioner to 
Kenya. Apa Pant carried Nehru's command to pledge India's support to the 
African cause even at the cost of abandoning the interests of Indian setters in 
East Africa. India with all efforts prevented the Europeans from converting 
Kenya into a "white man" countiy. Nehru acknowledged the danger of Kenya 
becoming an extension of South Africa. It would prove to be disastrous from 
African point of view as well as for India it could have disrupted the peace 
zone India wanted to estabUsh in the Indian Ocean. Hence, soon after arrival in 
Nairobi, Apa Pant made known his goveniment policy to back the African 
nationalist no matter how the Europeans or the colonial office felt about it. It 
was clearly Nehru's approach to Kenya that set the tone of India's general 
African policy. The main constituent of its policy were -
I. Emphasis on de-colonization and the achievement of African majority 
rule. 
II. Opposition to racial domination in East, Central and South Africa and 
III. Advice to Indian settlers to integrate themselves into the indigenous 
population. 
How in the later years Nehru became somewhat impatient with the 
Indian in Africa and declared in the Lok Sabha on 15 September 1953 "they 
(i.e. the Indians) could expect no help from us, no protection from us if they 
seek any special rights in Africa which were not in the interest of Africa". ^^ 
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With regards to de-colonization India's policies were based on two basic 
premises-
1. In their struggle for independence, the Africans should follow peaceful 
constitutional path. 
2. Secondly, the international balance of forces would force the colonial 
powers to wind up their empires in India. 
In the year (1952-53) when the Mao rebellion erupted in Kenya the 
ruling congress party of India issued a Resolution stating that the use of 
violence in the struggle for freedom "is indesirable and harmful" and that the 
adoption of the method of violence by some African groups has injured their 
cause greatly.^ '' Nehru was greatly perturbed to see the situation. His gesture in 
sending an Indian lawyer to Nairobi to defend Kenyatta for his alleged 
complicity in the Mao rebellion is still remembered by Kenyans, as the gesture 
was a symbol of Indian solidarity with the struggling people of Kenya. 
Another African issue that disturbed India was the cold blooded murder 
of Prime Minister Lumumba of Congo by the Belgians in 1960. Attempts were 
made by the secessionist elements to break up the country. But India was keen 
on seeing a United Congo, and agreed to send troops to strengthen the United 
Nations. 
The Liberation of Portuguese colonies of Africa, Angola and 
Mozambique, were close to India's heart. Indian support to the freedom of 
Portuguese colonies became more intense after the liberation of Goa in 1961, 
especially in the United Nations. 
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The Algerian war of independence is a heroic saga of the valiant peoples 
struggle while France was meeting its Waterloo in North Africa, India an 
advocacy of Algeria's right to freedom in the United Nations helped to forge 
Afro-Asian unity on this issue. 
The tripartite aggression by Britain, France and Israel over Egypt following 
Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956 found Nehru angry and 
concerned. Supporting Nasser Government right to take over the Suez Canal, 
India strongly criticized the tripartite attack 
Towards the close of the 1950's India's global concern was extended 
beyond the limited horizon of Asia-Africanism. India's participation in the 
Bandung conference of 1955 and the Cairo Afro-Asian people's solidarity 
Conference in 1957 to express its solidarity with the African people struggling 
for the concern of decolonization and Pan African unity. By the end of 1950's 
some problems arose in the Indo-African relations due to personal difference 
between Nehru and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and by the passing of 
leadership of Afro-Asian movement to Egypt by Cairo Summit (1957) showing 
disrespect to India, which wanted to assume the leadership. Enlarging the Gulf 
was the increasing Chinese influence among the Africans. ^^  
These developments did not unnecessarily disturb India. India's earlier 
zeal to contest Western dominance seemed to be declining particularly in 
regard to African matters. The business of maintaining close relations with the 
Africans was left to the technical and diplomatic staff. Nehru however showed 
his unconcerned about the principles he had implemented for cementing the 
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relations among the third world countries. He was emphatic in his assertion 
that India should not create nor lead any third bloc. 
In 1960, India was suggested to join the Africans to fight Portuguese 
colonialism; Nehru reportedly came out with the remark that Goa's liberation 
was an exclusively Indian problem just as the liberation of Mozambique or 
Angola was an African problem.^ ^ 
Since Bandung Conference onwards the Chinese militancy and 
advocacy of armed struggle supported by material help proved more influential 
for Africans as compared to the non-violent poUcy and materially nil support of 
India. India's isolation from the Afro-Asian was fiirther exposed during the 
Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 and only four African countries Congo 
(Leopoldille), Ethopia, Libya and Nigeria gave diplomatic support to India, six 
other states expressed "sympathy and concern: while Ghana, Tanzania and 
Guinea openly took an anti-India stand". ^^  India's military defeat at the hands 
of China greatly undermined its policy in the world forum. 
Second Phase 1962-71: 
• After the Indo-China conflict of 1962, India thought about refraining its 
African policy on a different set of premises. Instead of proving support to the 
nations of Africa, in block, which seemed to satisfy neither the radicals nor the 
conservatives, it became somewhat more selective. It was essential for it to 
develop close diplomatic and economic relations with those countries, which 
stood by it during the crises. In particular, its pledge increased technical 
assistance to Ethiopia, Nigeria and concentrated its efforts on wining Kenya's 
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goodwill. It also encouraged Indian industrialists to invest in the building of an 
industrial estate of twenty-two units in Nairobi. 
For a time, India's basic drive in Africa became one of winning support 
from those who were openly suspicious of China. But the year 1964, when the 
American Navy entered the Indian Ocean marked significant changes in the 
Indian policy. African issues like apartheid and de-colonization became major 
concerns for India. Once again concrete and vigorous efforts were made to 
revive the friendship between the two countries. It even changed its earlier 
policy of not extending support to violent struggles of nationalists and 
supported all the violent liberation struggles in Southern Africa. This change 
was felt in 1963 when a high powered delegation led by Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
was sent to a number of African countries which besides other things, was to 
access the Chinese influence in Africa and the possibility of forging technical 
and economic cooperation there. This was soon followed by many major 
policy decisions like launching of Indian technical and economic cooperation 
programme (ITEC) in September 1964, and to provide aid to African countries. 
India imposed economic sanction against Rhodesia when the "White" minority 
captured power by unilateral declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. At 
the same time it began giving assistance to the liberation movements through 
the Dare-Es-Salaam based committee of the Organization of African unity^ .^ 
In the year 1967 during Mrs. Indira Gandhi reign. She took personal 
interest in cultivating good relations with the African Liberation Movements on 
a new footing. In 1973 addressing a meeting of the Indian diplomats in Africa 
She urged them to make the Africans aware of the dark forces of imperialism. 
She was in no mood of repeating her father mistake of deferring decisions on 
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disputed matters. She emphasized the South- South cooperation under the non-
ahgned movement and gave material support to the liberation struggle besides 
technical and economic cooperation with 'black states'. India also demanded 
the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations and the Commonwealth. 
In the year 1970 when the expulsion move began in the United Nations General 
Assembly, It supported all the moves of the United Nations against South 
African racist government. It was the fu"st one to impose ban on sports with 
South Africa and played commendable role in the United Nations special 
committee against apartheid. At the same time India kept on playing important 
role against colonialism and policy of apartheid at the non-aligned movement 
and the Commonwealth as well as it argued the South African issues in various 
International Conferences. 
Third Phase 1977-80: 
The same policy continued in the year 1977-80. Though there was a 
change in the ruling party at New Delhi during 1977-80. The Janta Party 
which assumed the office during this period not only continued its predecessor 
Congress Party's formulated policies towards Southern Africa but provided it 
further dynamism on April 1977, A..B. Vajpayee issued a statement on the 
South African situation at the Commonwealth Conference as follows: -
"India's commitment to independence and racial dignity in Africa even 
pre-dates our own struggle for independence. In fact we have always believed 
that our own freedom could not be considered fulfilled until we have redeemed 
Gandhiji's pledge to end racial inequality in Southern Africa.. .when it is from 
the standpoint of de-colonization, self- determination, principles of human 
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rights, racial equality, or just the several international obligations of peace and 
cooperation, it is incumbent on us to persuade if possible or throttle if 
necessary the white minority regime, and to do so quickly.^' 
In 1980, the Congress again came to power under the leadership of Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi. This time India hosted the seventh non-aligned summit and as a 
chairman of the movement, she performed remarkable leadership role for the 
people of Southern Africa. Side by side her material support to the liberation 
struggles and the diplomacy of the South-South cooperation was given more 
emphasis the policy towards Southern Africa reached its climax during the 
reign of Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89). Who showed personal commitment to the 
cause of African people and chalked out concrete plans to participate in the 
regional economic recovery of the Southern African countries. On one hand he 
intensified India's policy of struggle against apartheid at all levels provided 
diplomatic and material support to the liberation struggle but at the same time 
he realized that without adequate material backing to the African states fighting 
against racialism and colonialism no success could be achieved, therefore he 
tried to provide adequate economic backing to its policy in Southern Africa. 
With the above policy one can wrongly surmise taking a first glance 
that India's policy towards Africa shaped by its history, geography, economy 
and culture has only been a benevolent job or at the most it wanted to get the 
numerical supports of the African countries in international forum. But in fact 
the security of Southern Africa became highly linked with the Indian security. 
Following the successful tests of long range 'Polarize A-3' submarine launched 
Ballistic missile in 1963; the USA took the decision around November 1963, to 
form a separate Indian command. This was also confirmed by the Chairman of 
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the United States Joint Staff General Maxwell Taylor, at New Delhi on 19 
December 1963 who was visiting India. Moreover, the entry of the American 
Navy in the Indian Ocean in April 1964, followed by the USSR navy in 1968 
and the power rivalry in the area and the establishment of American permanent 
Naval and Air force bases in the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia) and their 
inventions in Southern African crises. Moreover the formation of United 
States, South Africa, China and Pakistan axis etc posed a severe threat to the 
Indian security. Thus the security of India became linked with peace de-
colonization and end of Apartheid in Southern Africa. 
Africa is one subject on which the Indian Govenmient political parties 
and people are at one and that, perhaps, is one of the abiding legacies Mahatma 
Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru had left behind. Summarizing the contribution 
of India to the total heritage of the Asian African world Ali A Mazruti wrote: 
When one day India enters the ranks of the Super Power two individual 
in history would still remain important for beyond India's border Gandhiji, 
who helped to shape the doctrine of passive resistance as a strategy of 
liberation in colonial days, and the Brahmin aristocrat Nehru, who helped to 
shape the doctrine of non-alignment as a strategy of liberation after colonial 
rule?'' 
Congo Crises "The Congo is a very big issue today in world affairs. It is 
big because it affects the future of the United Nations and also the other 
countries of Africa".^' 
As soon as the name 'Congo' strikes in our psyche the picture of war, 
secession, instability, revolution, rebelhon, assassination and hanging 
216 
Congo and the United Nations 
automatically comes to our mind. Not very long ago, the Congo was an 
African country. It was given the name as "Belgian Congo" and the 
international press often called it a model colony. But since 1960 it has 
become different from other African countries and is no longer a model 
colony. 
The crises that have taken place in the Republic of Congo after it 
achieved its independence on 30 June 1960, created one of the most complex 
and controversial issues of the post world war era. It endangered not only the 
political independence and territorial integrity of Congo but also international 
peace and security.^ ^ It was one of the principal international crises of the post 
war period, in which major powers were brought to the brink of a 
confrontation. During that time African states were divided among themselves, 
and the United Nations was called upon to play expected and unexpected roles 
in the course of which it was attacked by some of its members, its Secretary 
General was killed and its mere existence was called in question. Not only this 
it had even plunged the United Nations into serious crises with Soviet Union 
threatening to withdraw from the United Nations and gave the Cold War a new 
turn by again raking up the East-West tensions. When Khrushchev declared 
war on the United Nations, it seemed, as though the spUt in the United Nations 
was unavoidable. The sole credit goes to Nehru, who undertook the rescue 
mission of his life to save the United Nations from disaster. The causes, which 
led to this catastrophe, were firstly the hurry-scurry shown by the Belgian 
while shifting from the colony, which they had not at all prepared for 
independence. Secondly the large size of Congo, with its ethnic and tribal 
diversity, thirdly the revolt which broke out in the army soon after 
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independence. Fourthly, the attempt made to separate the rich-Southern 
province of Katanga and make it a separate state and finally, the fact that the 
United Nations was required to perform numerous tasks and was hampered in 
them due to insufficiency of its own machinery and due to the hostile and 
independent actions taken by the Government of British and Russia.^ '* 
Congo comprises of three permanent characteristics i.e. the huge size of 
the territory; its immense wealth comprising of both agricultural and mineral, 
and thirdly its geographic location on the African Continent. 
Congo is an immense territory; ten times the size of Great Britain. Thus 
the size of Congo should be taken into consideration while comparing it with 
other African states. 
Apart from this the country has the "Curse" if one may use the term of 
possessing enormous wealth. It is a producer of 7% of world's copper, 67% of 
cobalt and one third of world's industrial diamonds. Besides it is a producer of 
large quantities of cadmium, gold, silver, zinc, iron, tungsten etc.'^ ^ It is the 
wealth of the Congo which has aroused the envy of the outside world. In fact, 
much of the interest shown in the Congo is inspired by an awareness of this 
wealth, which is a source of prosperity for a country but which may even lead 
to strife and brings unhappiness.^' 
Lastly, there is the strategic as well as geographic position of the Congo. 
Sudan and the Central African bound the Republic of Congo situated as it is in 
the geographic heart of Africa. The Republic in the North by Uganda and 
Tanzania in the East, Zambia in the South and the Congo (Brazaville) and the 
Portuguese colony of Angola in the West.^ ^ Because of its position Congo can 
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be either a bridge or a barrier between the different parts of the Continent, and 
its stability and political orientation are therefore of crucial importance to 
Africa and to those with interest in Africa. 
Because of its geopolitical situation, as well as richness of the country it 
had' prompted a competition between the Cold War antagonists for the control 
of this region. It is therefore aptly remarked, that "the Congo is a bride every 
body wants".''^  
A second Congolese reaUty is the divisive factor of tribalism. It is a 
country consisting of more than 200 tribes who speaks more than 200 principal 
languages and dialects. Tribal loyalties as well as ancient ermiities forms the 
characteristics features of Congolese societies which however had impeded the 
growth of national unity in the country.'" 
However the tragedy of Congo, revolved around the fact that the 
Belgians had proved themselves to be totally "Unfit" to shoulder their 
responsibilities as a colonial power."*^  
In short, the Congo at the time of independence represented a 
combination of factors, which were bound to wreck the new ships of state 
sooner or later. 
Congo had been a vast territory possessed by a Belgium company, 
which established trade station on the lower Congo during 1879 to 1884. For 
more than four centuries until 1908, the Congo had been subjected to the most 
ruthless and barbarious exploitation of African labour. Approximately more 
than 30 million people were enslaved and traded abroad under Belgium 
sovereignty.'*'' The barbarous rule of the Belgium king, aroused widespread 
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public outcry in Europe and forced the Belgium government to assume full 
colonial responsibility for the Congo in 1908. The kind of rule that followed 
did introduce some humanitarian measures like the establishment of schools 
and hospitals but it was merely a policy of "Benevolent paternalism" which 
was the comer stone of Belgium colonial policy. The primary objective of this 
policy was to keep the Congolese economically satisfied; socially content and 
politically ignorant.'*'* Belgium in fact tried to suppress the growth of Congolese 
nationalism. No attempt was made to provide for participation or even 
association of the Congolese people with the administration of the country. 
Almost no thought or preparation was given to Congolese independence.'*^ 
The end of the World War II marked a change in the life of the 
Congolese people and in their attitude towards the Belgium colonial rule. This 
change was brought up mostly by the emergence of Evolues '^^ in the Congolese 
society. After 1945, there were particular events, which helped the Congolese 
to visualize the possibility of achieving their independence. It was for the first 
time that the Congolese leaders were seen overseas, when they visited the 
Brussels world fair. The ftfst meeting of all African Heads of State at Accra 
attracted the world attention, and General De Gaulle's launching of the French 
community at Congo Brazzaville had a remarkable effect on the thinking minds 
in Central Africa.'*'' In 1957 for the first time Municipal elections were held in 
the three largest cities of Leopoldville, Elizabethville and Jadotville. These 
municipal elections led to the emergence of political parties, which had 
previously been banned. Moreover it encouraged the development of national 
movements for the independence and unity of provinces, which further led to 
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the emergence of brilliant political leaders like Patrice Lumumba, Joseph 
Kassavubu, Moise Tshombe, Albert Kalonji and Antoine Gizena.'^ * 
In 1959, political unrest suddenly broke-out the Belgium authorities 
firstly resorted to repressive measures and then gave in to the Congolese 
demand for independence. The series of events paved the way for a 'Round 
Table Conference' to be held in Brussels in January 1960. They also worked 
out a constitutional system and set June 30, as the date for granting 
independence. 
The Congolese were lacking not only any experience of self-government 
but also training and experience of running day-to-day administration. As far as 
education is concerned they were only provided primary education obviously to 
avoid their rising "above a certain educational stage".''^  According to the 
United Nations representative, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal of India, "at the time of 
independence, there were only 17 Congolese University graduate, no doctors, 
no Engineers, no professors, no Architects and few if any qualified lawyers".^ ° 
As a guarantee and help to the new Republic, on 29 June 1960, both the 
Belgian and Congo governments signed a 'Treaty of Friendship'. According to 
the terms and conditions of this treaty "Belgium military detachments were to 
remain in the Congo and Belgium officers were to continue to ensure the 
command of the 'Force Publique'. (Later called Armee National Du-Cong-
ANC) as no Congolese had until then obtained even the lowest officer 
qualifications. Belgium was to place advisers at the disposal of the 
administration until command could be taken by Congolese who had acquired 
adequate training". '^ All this shows that even though Congo had achieved 
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independence only in name. In reality it was the Belgium who still exercised 
its full control over Congo. The dream of the Congolese for a happy and 
prosperous Congo after independence was dashed. The expected leaders who 
took hold of Congo after independence had no experience of public life, as all 
of them were too young and parochial in perspective. So it resulted in 
widespread chaos, fear and mutual recrimination of few political leaders. 
Secondly, there was no change in the administrative structure except for 
the new positions occupied by the Prime Minister and the President. 
Within a week after the declaration of independence the Congolese army 
mutinied because the soldiers were not getting increase in emoluments in 
Leopoldville and saw very rare chance of achieving officer's rank. Moreover, 
the Congolese nationals were not in favour of being commanded by the same 
officers as before independence. During the mutiny the Congolese soldiers 
captured the means of communications and threaten the Europeans to the street 
at gunpoint. The situation reached out of control, since maintenance of law and 
order was under Belgian officers who themselves were the targets. Thus the 
whole administration became paralyzed. Moreover, the infant Congo did not 
have its own armed forces for its protection. Even the chief commander was 
the Belgian national. The same conditions continued for two three years even 
after independence. Thirdly the sudden withdrawal of Belgian personnel from 
every walk of life created vacuum and left Congo in a state of anarchy and 
confusion. 
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Thus the history of Congolese independence was too short as there was 
no pre-arrangement for administrative training done by the previous 
government ahhough, the history of brutal exploitation was too long. 
India's Policy towards Congo 
India's relations with African states are based on its historical ties and 
pursuit of a common policy of non-aligiunent, promotion of international 
peace, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism. With these perspective in mind, 
India with utmost interest and with the most friendly and sympathetic feelings 
welcomed the independence of the Congo. Nevertheless, the tragic events, 
which, followed after independence, saddened and were a matter of concern to 
the govenmient and people of India. India having its own experience of 
Colonialism saw, that the root to all problems in the Congo was Belgium 
colonialism. Nehru was of the opinion that the striking failure of the Belgian 
colonial system, which left Congo in such a state, was the result of long years 
of colonial rule, which drained wealth from the country for the enrichment of 
the colonial power, while leaving the people of the country utterly poor and 
backward.^"' 
It was unavoidable that, on gaining independence, the Congolese Army 
should revolt. Conditions under the Belgians rule had virtually ensured this. 
Indian papers informed that it was the Belgians who were responsible for the 
disorder among the Congolese soldiery, in not paying their wages etc before 
leaving Congo. Mr. Krishna Menon rightly said in the General Assembly on 
20 November' 1961, "the very fact that a metropolitan country after years of 
rule, leaves a tenitory in such a state of anarchy that after its withdrawal civil 
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war and outside intervention follow, provides the worst picture of colonial rule 
that has come before this assembly"/"* 
The Government of India persuades that even after independence the 
Belgians were the root cause of all ill evil in Congo. It was patent that the old 
colonial power was coming back to a very considerable extent, not principally 
as military troops, but as civilians, technicians, advisers and experts etc to 
create trouble in an independent state. ^ ^ 
Soon after these incidents took place the Congolese Government at the 
suggestion of the United states Ambassador Timberloke appealed to the United 
Nations for mihtary and technical assistance including military advisors, 
experts and technicians to assist in developing a national army for the Congo to 
maintain national security, law and order. But before the United Nations could 
act on this request the situation aggravated when Belgian warships and planes 
attacked the port city of Matadi. More than 300 paratroopers were landed in 
different parts of the country to protect Belgian lives and property. ^ ^ 
The brutal fighting and counter attack by Congolese mutineers 
aggravated the situation. By July 13, the Belgium troops had expelled all the 
Congolese forces and had occupied the European area of Leopoldville where 
Parliament was situated. Lumumba the Prime Minister of Congo reacted very 
angrily at the violation of the Treaty of Friendship between Belgium and 
Congo. On 29 June 1960 Moise Tshombe soon announced the cessation of 
Katanga from Congo. When President Kasavuba and Prime Minister Lumumba 
visited Katanga, they were not allowed to land in Elizabethville as the airport 
was under the control of the Belgian troops. Tsombe was supported by the 
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Belgium and the Congolese Government anticipated this. Thus on July 12, the 
Government of Congo appealed to the United Nations for urgent military aid to 
protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external 
aggression.^^ 
Thus whether an aggression according to Congo or a humanitarian act to 
protect the lives of its national (according to Belgians point of view) under the 
terms of the United Nations Charter, it appealed to be a classic situation that 
called for action to offset a threat to international peace.^^ Prime Minister 
Lumumba also warned that if the United Nations assistance failed to come 
immediately then Congo would be obliged to seek assistance from other 
sources. 
Congo and the United Nations: 
On July 12, 1960 Joseph Kasavubu the President and Patrice Lumumbu, 
the Prime Minster of the Republic of Congo, appealed to the United Nations for 
"urgent military assistance to protect the national territory of Congo against the 
external aggression launched by Belgian metropolitan troops in violation of the 
Treaty of Friendship.^° They viewed "the unsolicited Belgium action" as an 
"act of aggression" against the new Republic of Congo. They further added. 
"The real cause of most of the disturbances can be found in colonialist 
machinations. We accuse the Belgium Government of having carefully 
prepared the secession of Katanga with a view to maintaining a hold on our 
country. The essential purpose of the requested military aid is to protect the 
national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is 
a threat to international peace". '^ 
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Clarifying its position on the purpose of United Nations Military 
assistance, he further adds. 
The purpose of the aid requested is not to restore the internal situation in 
the Congo but rather to protect the national territory against acts of aggression 
committed by the Belgian metropolitan troops.^ ^ Prime Minister Lumumba also 
warned that if the United Nations assistance failed to come immediately then 
Congo would be obliged to seek assistance from other sources. The Secretary 
General Hammarskjold responded immediately to the request of the Congolese 
Government by invoking Article 99 of the Charter. 
The Security Council on July 14, 1960 adopted a Resolution sponsored 
by Tunisia, United States and Soviet Union voting for it and Britain, China and 
France abstaining from it. It called for the withdrawal of Belgium troops from 
Congo and authorized the Secretary General to "take necessary steps in 
consultation with the Government of the Republic of Congo, to provide the 
government with such assistance as may be necessary". ^ 
The Secretary General after having carefully analyzed the request 
brought to it before the Security Council saying that the Belgian troops are 
being in the Congo "The presence of these troops is a source of internal and 
potential international tensions. It is in this light, I personally wish to see the 
request for Mihtary assistance, which has been addressed by the Government 
of Congo. Although I am fully aware of all the problems, difficulties and even 
risk involved ..'. It is therefore my conclusion that the United Nations should 
accede to the request of Congo". ^^  
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On 14^ ^ July, 1950 the Security Council adopted a Resolution in which it 
stated that it: 
1. Call upon the Government of Belgian to withdraw there troops from the 
territory of the Republic of Congo. 
2. Decides to authorized the Secretary General to take the necessary steps 
in concentration with the Government of the Republic of Congo, to provide the 
Government with such Military assistance as may be necessary/^ 
India called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops 
from Congo. It vehemently criticized Belgium intervention in the Congo as a 
violation of the territorial integrity of the Republic, and as an attack on the 
Congolese people and their independence. India welcomed the Council's 
decision to help Congo in protecting its territorial integrity and Political unity. 
India also feared that the vacuum created by the departure of the Belgians 
might lead to the involvement of the big powers from one side or the other. 
In the light of the experience gained by him during the Organization of 
the UNEF the Secretary General decided to raise troops exclusively from the 
African nations and organized a force called ONUC 'Operation des Nations 
Unies au Congo'. ONUC was, on one hand a civilian operation and on the 
other an mtemational armed peace force. 
The ONUC was based on following objective: -
1. Withdrawal of Belgian troops 
2. Maintenance of law and order 
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3. The termination of the secession of Katanga and the provision of 
technical assistance. 
In July 1960, soon after independence the mutiny first started in 
Leopoldville the Capital of Congo where the United Nations forces was 
deployed occupying key posts such as Radio stations, Airports etc. President 
Joseph Kasavubu and Prince Patrice Lumumba headed the government that 
took after independence. Both had been members of the Congolese national 
movement. Kasavubu the most conservative of the two was not excessively 
hostile towards Belgium and the Western powers. The office of the 
Presidency, which he came to occupy, was largely an honorific post.^ ^ 
It was the unity of Congo, which mostly distracted Lumumba so he 
again requested ONUC to subdue Katanga even with force if there was no 
other way. Since ONUC refused to interfere in the internal conflict this made 
Lumumba very bitter against the United Nations Moreover, Lumumba's 
friendship with Russia^° and the massacre of Kasai by Lumumba's force 
frightened President Kasavuba. As a result Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba 
saying that he had "betrayed his office by providing discord within the 
government depriving the citizens of their fundamental liberties and plunging 
the country into fracticidal civil war". '^ Lumumba on his part discharged 
President Kasavuba. Consequently Kasavuba dismissed Lumumba and in turn 
Lumumba dismissed Kasavuba. But the Parliament refused to accept the 
dismissal of either of them. In the meantime Colonel Mobuta, who had been 
appointed as the Chief of the Army by Prime Minister Lumumba came in the 
forefront within a short span. Colonel Mobuta turned against Prime Minister, 
Lumumba became hostile to even President Kasavuba and in a Coup d' etat 
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captured power and abolished the Parliament. These internal political conflicts 
reflected the influence of the 'Cold War' with Prime Minister Lumumba 
increasingly representing the aspirations of the Soviet Union and President 
Kasavubu those of the West. Meanwhile President Kasavubu refusing to accept 
the decision of the Parliament about himself and Prime Minister Lumumba 
appointed Joseph Illeo as the new Prime Minister in place of Prime Minister 
Lumumba. All this created a puzzling situation on one side there was Colonel 
Mobutu who would not allow the Parliament to meet, and on the other hand 
there was President Kasavuba who would not get the power to function except 
through colonel Mobutu. There was Prime Minister Lumumba who was 
actually in some kind of semi detention and later on assassinated. Prime 
Minister Ileo who had no function to perform and colonel Mobutu who had 
come to power by a coup d' etat having no legal sanctions at all.^ '' 
All this resulted in a chaotic situation in which power and authority was 
getting diffused all over again. The constitutional advisors still held the view 
that Lumumba was the legally elected Prime Minister. These developments in 
Congo plunged the United Nations into a serious crisis. The Soviet Union 
suspected the involvement of Western powers in the murder of Lumumba. 
Meanwhile Colonel Mobutu ordered the Russian and the Czech Embassies to 
have Congo. This obviously infuriated Nikita Khruschev. He accused the 
United Nations of being partial and the United Nations Secretary General of 
partisan actions. Khruschev threatened to withdraw from the United Nations. 
The Congo crises had thus, become another Cold War issue of serious 
consequences. The General Assembly session, which was scheduled to begin 
from September 20, became crucial because of East-West Tensions. Khrushev 
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strongly condemned the handling of the Congo question by the United Nations. 
He even demanded the shifting of the United Nations headquarters from New 
York and also demanded the resignation of Secretary General Hammarskjold 
for following one sided pro-Western line in the Congo Crises. Khruschev 
wanted replacement of the office of the Secretary General by a three member 
executive committee one each from the Western and the Eastern blocs and the 
third from the neutral countries with all the three enjoying the Veto powers. 
At this time Nehru happened to be at the United Nations. He alongwith 
others suggested that during these circumstances real authority which should 
decide finally should be the Parliament and that President Kasavuba was also a 
legal entity.^ '* It was the Western powers which supported Kasavuba in the 
Political crises of Congo, while the African countries recognized Lumumba as 
the legitimate head of the Government in Congo. Meanwhile Colonel Mobutu 
got Lumumba arrested which resulted in civil war in Congo. Throughout these 
developments, the United Nations peace keeping forces in Congo remained a 
mere spectator and could not assist Lumumba in maintaining law and order. 
The Belgian Government supported colonel Mabutu in suppressing his 
opponents. Ultimately Lumumba was murdered while trying to flee the 
country. The Soviet Union suspected the involvement of Western powers in 
the murder of Lumumba. Colonel Mobutu made the United Nations forces 
ineffective. This development in Congo plunged the United Nations into a 
serious crisis. The United Nations, which, had previously done commendable 
work there, became a less and less effective and colonel Mobutu became very 
strong. The situation further deteriorated because the army was not disciplined 
and was not behaving properly. Congo faced further disintegration when the 
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Katanga province declared independence under Tshombe. Moreover Colonel 
Mobutu had appointed certain students as Commissioners to carry on the 
government and Belgians duly advised them. In the Katanga province the 
Belgian officials, experts and advisers surrounded Prime Minister Tshombe. 
Taking advantage of this delay and disintegration Belgians returned to 
Congo in considerable numbers and indirectly exercised authority. They 
openly favoured Mobutu and Tshombe of Katanga. Thus, in a different form, 
there was return of the Belgians in the Congo in all fields. In such a situation 
the work of the United Nations to maintain law and order had become 
extremely difficult. ^^  It was a dilemma that if the United Nations withdrew, it 
would lead to absolute chaos and civil war of the worst type and possible 
intervention by foreign powers. On the other hand the situation itself had 
rendered the functioning of the United Nations ineffective.^ ^ 
Because of the United Nations ineffectiveness, a great deal of 
resentment arose among the members of the United Nations, particularly 
among those who had sent forces to the Congo. Several of them even decided 
to withdrew their troops from the Congo.^ ^ As, according to Nehru, they did 
not agree with the policy, or rather the absence of policy, that was pursued by 
the United Nations.^ ^ All sorts of disgraceful things took place under the plea 
that the United Nations mandate which was limited prevented the United 
Nations from interfering. The United Nations did a good job so far as feeding 
of the people and looking after them was concerned but in the political field it 
remained a silent spectator. Its passitivity was however, in favour of those 
people who had seized power and were exploiting it to their own advantage 
throughout the strife torn country especially in Katanga, hidia was well aware 
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of the difficulties entailed by such a withdrawal of troops from the Congo, for 
though it was not happy with the United Nations record in the Congo, it felt 
that its presence was perhaps a lesser evil; for the withdrawal of the United 
Nations Force would open the door to civil strife and further foreign 
intervention, and would, in fact be an act of despair and a confession of defeat 
causing serious damage. Moreover there would also be the danger of 'big' 
powers coming in a big way to help their respective coteries, or those whom 
they acknowledge which would ultimately have disastrous effects.^ "Moreover 
such a failure India believed would redound to the great discredit of the United 
Nations and make it difficult for it to function in future in a similar emergency. 
India's Support to strong United Nations actions in Congo:-
India persistently urged the United Nations to take immediate and 
effective action, including the use of force if necessary to accomplish its 
mission in the Congo. This mission included. 
1. The first step to be taken is for the Parliament to meet and it is the duty 
of the United Nations to facilitate this meeting. 
2 Elimination of all Belgian whether civihans, military personnel, or para 
military personnel from all parts of the Congo. India believed that the root 
cause of all the trouble in the Congo was Belgians intervention and the 
continuing presence of its nationals is a source of constant irritation. Moreover 
they were obstructing the work of the United Nations. 
3 The Indians representative in the United Nations criticized 
Hammarskjold's narrow and excessively legalistic interpretation of the Security 
Councils Resolutions of 14 July, 22 July and of 9 August 1960. He called for a 
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liberal interpretation of the mandate contained in these Resolutions and of the 
agreement signed between the United Nations and the Congolese Central 
Q 1 
Government. According to him the mandate was large enough to permit even 
the use of force to achieve the objectives of the ONUC. The use of force on the 
part of the ONUC to prevent a civil war, preserve the integrity of the Republic 
and to eliminate mercenaries and other foreign persoimel not under the United 
Nations Command was not only justified but, was even imperative in view of 
the changed circumstances. 
4. •' India even urged the United Nations to use force to subdue Katanga and 
to check other secessionist movements. It condemned Kasavubu's threat to 
prevent the implementation of the Resolution of 21 February 1961, as an open 
act of hostility towards the United Nations. The United States and the UK 
contended that any United Nations action to prevent the Congolese leaders 
from hiring ' Belgian civilian technicians would result in United Nations 
intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo. India challenged this position 
and called for a "full implementation" of the various United Nations 
Resolutions. 
5. India voiced firm faith in the right of the Congolese people to decide 
things for themselves and was of the opinion that the elected parliament was 
the only proper authority to determine the legality of the claims of the various 
Congolese leaders to governmental authority, as well as to settle the question of 
political leadership. It was convinced that only by establishing an effective and 
lawful goveniment with the consent of the Congolese Parliament could the 
success of the ONUC be ensured. 
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6. Attempt to achieve a military solution of the present crises must be 
checked immediately to avert imminent danger of civil war and possible 
military intervention. 
7. Moreover, Political personalities who are being detained in the Republic 
of Congo should be released so that they may attend Parliament and establish a 
government of national unity. 
8. Effective measures should be immediately taken by the United Nations 
to enforce the Security Council and the General Assembly Resolutions calling 
upon all states to refrain from sending any military assistance to any side in the 
Republic of Congo except through the United Nations. The deliberate violation 
of this injunction is largely responsible for the continuing deterioration and 
disintegration.^ ^ 
Though the first stage of the crises in Congo which started with the 
disintegration of the country into the 4 key fragments i.e. Katanga, South 
Kasai, Congo (Leopoldville) and Congo (Stanleyville) and which had reached 
its climax with the announcement of the assassination of Prime Minister 
Lumumba in February 1961, had came to an end with the concerted admission 
of the Adoula Government in August 1961. His government represented a 
careful balancing of the political groups. The Congo crises thus entered a new 
phase. The constitutional crises, which had started on Sept 5, 1960, had been 
over. There remained another task of ehminating the Katanga secession, which 
was a more difficult obstruction to overcome. The failure of the Adoule 
Tshombe talks had convinced that there was no possibility of an agreed 
reintegration of Katanga. The United Nations had suffered humiliating reverses 
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in Katanga. To withdraw from the Congo without achieving reunification of the 
country would have been to concede complete failure. On August 10, 1962, U 
Thant Plan was announced. The Plan provided a federal constitution with 
equitable distribution between the center and the provinces of taxes, revenues 
and foreign exchange earnings, integration of armed forces and general 
amnesty. On September 3, U Thant Plan was accepted, by Tshombe and on 
January 14 1963, Tshombe announced that the Katanga secession was 
terminative. Thus Congo again became a single country. But as soon as the 
United Nations forces withdraw the internal cleavage became more difficult to 
bridge. ^ ^ 
After 2 years of self imposed exile, Tshombe appeared on the scene of 
Congo on June 26, 1964. After having some private discussion with the 
President, th? Prime Minister Adoula and other leaders of the country, 
Tshombe was sworn in as the fourth Prime Minister on July 10, his coming up 
on the political scene of the Congo created a new situation in the political life 
of the country as well as in the international field. Russia and China 
condemned the usurpation of Power by Tshombe in the Congo. He was barred 
from participating in the second non-aligned Conference at Cairo in October 
1964, by the United Arab RepubUc (UAR) government. As Tshombe became 
Prime Minister, the Pro-Lumumba group, which was deadly against him, 
became actively hostile. Since these rebels knew that the Belgian and the 
British mercenaries and the Americans were under the garb of the rescue force, 
to give support to Tshombe, they pressed for the evacuation of the white 
hostages. Public opinion in the Congo turned against the Belgians the British 
and the Americans, since they were positively helping Tshombe who disturbed 
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the unity and integrity of the Congo. When Tshome appealed for cooperation 
the people paid him back in his own coin. As a result, the year 1964 produced 
a chain of revolts culminating in the re-establishment of a rebel base in 
Stanleyville from August to November, which shook the fragile structure to its 
foundation. Thus the revolution without revolutionaries of 1960 had been very 
hasty and could not produce any results. But the mutiny of 1960, resulted in 
terrifying display of violence, which led to complete destruction of 
administrative and economic structure. Not only had this but it even destroyed 
the very means for social change. 
It was on November 26, 1966 that General Mobutu, ousted President 
Joseph Kasavubu in a bloodless coup d' etat. A new cabinet headed by Colonel 
Leonard Mulaba was placed on November 20, 1965. A government crises had 
developed on November when both houses of Parliament refused to confirm 
Prime Minister Mulumba and his cabinet, which had assumed office on 
October 18, 1965. Tshombe who had been dismissed by Kasavubu previously 
was involved in bringing about Mulumba's defeat. Kasavubu renominated 
Mulamba as Prime Minister on November 15 and asked him to form a new 
government, while Tshombe was sentenced to death in Absenlia. 
During the period December 1965 to November 1966 President Mobutu 
took various steps, in order to increase his power. On October 26, 1966 Mobutu 
dismissed Premier Leonard Mulumba. On his turning down an alternative post 
of a Defence Minister, General Mobutu took over himself the Premiership in a 
move to put Congo on the path of a pure Presidential system. 
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Due to the increase in foreign interference the prospects of achieving 
peace in Congo became remote. 
Foreign Intervention Opposition in India: 
India considered the critical situation in Congo as directly related to the 
larger problem of world peace. While extending support to the United Nations 
and in making a sizeable contribution of armed personnel to the ONUC, it was 
inspired, primarily by its concern for the success of the United Nations in the 
maintenance of the Congo territorial integrity and political unity and the 
restoration of law and order in the Republic. According to the Indian view it 
was of immense importance to insulate the newborn Republic from the Cold 
War in order to prevent the return of the colonial power under the garb of neo -
coloniahsm. 
The great powers took advantage of the troubled situation in Congo to 
serve their own political ends. The Soviet Union condemned Belgium as an 
aggressor and demanded that the United Nations to take such enforcement 
measures as to secure an immediate elimination of all Belgium from the whole 
of the Congo, it even charged the Western powers with complicity in the 
misadventures of the NATO ally.*^  
The real cause of the trouble in the Congo was that the Westerners 
wanted to keep their economic interest intact. Moreover, the Communist 
wanted to gain a foothold in Africa for fiirther expansion. The Asian African 
nations, generally wanted to give Africa back to the Africans. Mao, watching 
from a distance, wondered if he could take Africa for himself ^ ^ 
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Moreover the great powers like the Soviet Union and the United States 
took advantage of the troubled situation in Congo to serve their own political 
ends. The Soviet Union at the request of Lumumba sent him technician and 
equipments unilaterally. Its real motive behind it was to establish die authority 
of the leftist Prime Minister throughout the Congo. This led to increase in the 
struggle for power between the Prime Minister and the President of the 
Republic. It was also not unconnected with tribal power politics. Further, 
Congo's constitutional crises were internationalized when Soviet and Africans 
radicals supported Lumumba and Gizenga and the conservative Africans of 
Brazzaville and the Western bloc supported Kasavuba and Tshombe. The 
United States, under John F. Kennedy, supported the United Nations and thus 
saved itself from the antipathy of being a colonialist power. It further prevented 
the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in Africa. 
Thus, the Congo problem because of foreign interference became 
difficult and could not be easily solved. Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal's experience in 
Congo and ultimately his resignation were all due to such kind of pressure 
being brought upon the United Nations by great powers. Even the air accident 
in which the Secretary General was on a peace mission to Congo was due to 
the conspiracy of the Western powers. There was also a strong behef in Indian 
minds that the great powers were, not iimocent even in the Secretary General 
death. 'The Hindu' of 20* September, 1961 reported a strong suspicion that 
Mr. Hammarskjold's aircraft was deliberately shot down by a Katanga plane 
and said if this were proved to be true then it is Britain who is to be held 
responsible for the crime. The death of the Secretary General further increased 
anti-British feelings in India. Some of the Indian press noted that never even 
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during Suez crises the Britain's had been so blood stained as they are now. 
Consequently the Hindu added: "If Britain is really interested in bringing about 
a peaceful settlement of the Katanga problem it is up to her to persuade Sir Roy 
to stop supplying arms to Mr. Tshombe.^ ^ This went so far as to lead to 
demands in Indian press that if this "calculated political pantomime".. .were not 
stopped India should withdraw from the Commonwealth.*^ 
India being a non-aligned country did not support either of the two 
Super Power's indiscriminately. The Indians could not understand how great 
powers. Like the United States could do nothing to discourage the Belgians. 
'The Hindu' on 20*'' September 1961 said "if the United Nations has not been 
able to restore normality and unity in the Congo, it is because the great powers 
have been active below the surface in fostering the forces of separatism and in 
the creation of puppets". It was also noted that this failure of the great powers 
in the Security Council had resulted in the incapacitation of the council in the 
Congo. 
India, as always tried to be objective in its appraisal of every issue 
pertaining to the ONUC, and to ensure that it did not become a part of the Cold 
War between the twoSuper Power, when Khruschev sought the support of 
Nehru for his efforts to bring about a structural re-Organization of the United 
Nations with special reference to Secretariat Nehru refused to obligate. 
Though he also wanted certain structural changes, he told Khruschev that a re-
Organization of the United Nations at this stage was likely to hinder the 
working of ONUC. The Soviet Union condemned Hammarskjold for his failure 
in preventing the murder of Lumumba. But Nehru felt that since the Secretary 
General was handling a difficult job, so it was not proper to hold him alone 
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responsible for the failure of ONUC. According to Nehru many of the tragedies 
in Congo, could be attributed to the Cold War mentality of the various 
countries and to the inadequacy or delayed decisions taken by the Security 
Council and the General Assembly. 
India also urged the United Nations to prevent foreign powers from 
giving direct military assistance to the various groups in the Congo as such 
assistance was likely to weaken the authority of the United Nations in the 
Congo and leads to the disintegration of the Republic. It further held that all 
assistance to the Congo should be charmelized through the United Nations. On 
the contrary the Soviet Union tried to give military assistance directly to 
Lumumba's Government. 
Krishna Menon, even, arranged a private talk between Nehru's and 
Khrushchev. But before that, Nehru had a meeting with President Eisenhower 
and Prime Minister Mac Millan. He discussed with them the crises faced by 
the United Nations Thus, Nehru and Mac Millan assumed the role of mediators 
between USA and USSR. However, "Mac Millan did it press hard in his role 
for the fear of American displeasure. Hence Nehru used his good offices to 
both sides to bring about a fresh East-West detente". '^ Thus it was Nehru, 
Marshal Tito, Abdul Nasser, Nkrumah and Sukarno, who tried to bring about 
reconciliation between the Russian delegation and the United Nations Secretary 
General, on the controversy about the role of the United Nations and the 
Secretary General in the Congo crises. Nehru did not agree to the opinions 
shared by Khrushchev about the role of the Secretary General in the Congo 
Crises. In fact, he was the one to persuade Khruschev that Hammarskjold was 
"acting impartially in major crises among big powers". ^^  Even Nasser shared 
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the same view. Everyone looked for the mediatory role played by Nehru the 
Indian Prime Minister. Eisenhower and Mac Millan met Nehru separately. He 
remained in the Center of the world stage and "this is about the most difficult 
role ever played by Nehru his habitual modesty appears to be standing him in 
good stead". As a result Eisenhower adopted a conciliatory attitude as is 
evident from the White House communique calling for calm voice, issued after 
the Nehru-Eisenhower meeting. According to the Westerners "if any one could 
succeed in persuading Mr. Khrushchev to hold his horses at the present time it 
would be Nehru.'^ '' While Reuter reported "Nehru arrived in what may 
diplomats regard as the most important international peace mission of his 
career". ^^  No doubt, the ground for Nehru's efforts to ease East-West tensions 
that threatened to destroy the effectiveness .of the United Nations was 
undoubtedly laid down behind the scene talks of Krishna Menon with top 
leaders. He was supported by Nasser and Tito in his efforts. 
Nehru thus held joint discussions with Tito, Nasser, Nkrumah and 
Sukarno on 29^*" September as a result, the big five neutral countries i.e. India, 
UAR, Indonesia, Ghana and Yugoslavia sponsored the Five Power Resolution. 
Nehru introduced the Resolution in the General Assembly "to bring together 
President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev for 'renewed contacts'. The 
session turned out to be "the most stormy and critical in the United Nations 
history". 
While addressing to the General Assembly four days later. Prime 
Minister Nehru said: 
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I presented on behalf of Ghana, the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, 
Yugoslavia and India, a Resolution to the General Assembly...The main 
purpose of the Resolution is to help avoid a deadlock in the international 
situation...we are deeply concerned with the recent deterioration in 
international relation which threatens the world with grave 
consequence...responsibility for this deadlock has to be shared by all of us. 
But in the circumstances as they exist today, a great deal depends upon two 
mighty nations the USA and the Soviet Union and if even a small step can be 
taken by them, the world will have a sign of relief.^ ^ 
Thus the Five Power Resolution did not seek to pre-judge any issue or to 
bring pressure to bear on any country or individual. Later on, it led to renewed 
contacts between Keimedy and Khrushchev. Khrushchev and Nehru even 
exchanged letters on the Congo-United Nations crises and Nehru while 
exercising a moderating influence on Khrushchev sought his support in 
dismissing Hammarskjold. While agreeing with the Soviet Premier that 
Belgians should completely withdraw from the Congo Nehru told Khrushchev 
that the withdrawal of the United Nations from Congo would have disastrous 
consequences.^ ^ Nehru was also against the dismissal of the United Nations 
Secretary General, although the United Nations had failed in Congo. Thus on 
various occasions Nehru opposed the Resolution put forward by the General 
Assembly, by the United States and its allies, and at times came forward with 
counter proposals. Thus the "greatest peace mission" of Nehru ultimately 
helped to resolve the United Nations crises. The United Nations actually 
received a new lease of life. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this changing international scenario and the existing clash of opinion 
within the world Organization, it is very difficult to define the position and 
activities of a particular nation. Especially when that country happens to be 
'non-committed' and it does not move within the prescribed limits of a known 
ideological group but at the same time tries to judge each issue on its merits 
irrespective of the attitude followed by the other two blocs. India in 'ploughing 
a lonely furrow' has been on the one hand blamed for 'sitting on the fence' but 
also praised as an 'interpreter' between the East and the West. This blame and 
praise at the same time has made the confusion worse confoimded. 
However India played a very significant role at the United Nations 
during Nehru era. Indian delegates, under Nehru's instructions, often exerted 
influence and leadership in the United Nations. The role-played by Nehru as a 
reconciliator and the stance he took in "judging issues on merit" enhanced her 
prestige and position among the member nations. For India, the United Nations 
was not merely an international Organization whose sole purpose was to 
prevent war and promote peace but it was something more. It was also 
conceived as a forum to bring about the ideal of one world. Nehru's 
philosophy and thought found full expression at the United Nations. 
Consequently, India is counted as "one of the nations that has enabled the 
General Assembly to render decisions on controversial issues". 
Nehru was anxious that the United Nations should not meet the fate of 
the League of Nations. He had witnessed the destruction brought about by the 
two World Wars. Thus the terrible experiences of wars, and his close 
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observation and clear understanding of international affairs, casted him in the 
mould of an uncompromising champion of international peace. He wanted the 
United Nations to succeed. But if it is to avoid the fate of its predecessor, the 
world must change. Nehru would often complain that our minds are forever 
static the attitude that "today is the same as yesterday and tomorrow will not 
differ greatly" must be given up, he exhorted all the time. He thus stood for a 
change in psychological atmosphere in international relations. His ideal was a 
peaceful world and his life's mission was to save the succeeding generation 
from the scourge of war. He thus devoted his life and energy for the 
establishment of a world free from war and fear of war. He was ready to pay 
every price for peace for without peace all our dreams of prosperous world 
would die out. 
Nehru agreed with other peace loving statesmen that in the present 
scenario, which involved the danger of war, every country should direct its 
efforts to the easing of International tensions. He was against the arm race and 
warned the bigger nations of the world that mere glory of wealth and show of 
arms would not take them anywhere. In order to achieve prosperity in the real 
sense we should develop our character and personality. He mainly emphasized 
on the proper cultivation of mind in the right direction because he believed that 
war arises in the minds of men and it was mind that required proper training so 
as to rule out the possibility of malice, rancor and jealousy in individual, 
national and international spheres. 
Nehru believed in this space age, states based on nationality are out of 
time with the contemporary world. His argument was that "systems Uke 
individuals have their own life span and they cannot go beyond it", nations, 
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like individuals, must try to think of their independence and freedom in terms 
of the global cooperation, because "the days of isolated national existence were 
past beyond recall" and the only alternative to world cooperation was world 
disruption, war and continuous conflicts between nations till they were all 
involved in common ruin. It was difficult for him to conceive of an effective 
world Organization at that time, but he felt it desirable to lay the foundation of 
such cooperation and understanding. He even admired President Wilson for his 
statesmanship towards realizing a world order, but to his dismay war treaties 
and the statesmen of that generation scotched the idea, and the great pile of the 
League of Nations "rises mournfully today in Geneva like a mausoleum 
enshrining the dead body of great hope. Its cry for peace meant the 
continuation of unjust status quo all over the world; its democracy was a cloak 
for the subjection of many peoples and nations. It had to die because it was not 
brave enough to live. There can be no resurrection of the idea that the League 
enshrined, not in the limited, twisted and perverse way that took shape in Paris 
and Geneva, but in manner fuller, more powerful and organic and based on 
collective peace, freedom and democracy". 
Nehru believed that the League of Nations failed because it was an 
attempt to stabilize something which could not endure, to protect the 
miperialist and special interests of the victor nations. 
According to Nehru "The choice before the world is a choice which has 
never been posed before, it is a choice of self extinction or survival". He further 
says, "There really seems to be no alternative between world conquest and 
world association; there is no choice of a middle course. The old divisions and 
the quest of power politics have little meaning today and do not fit in with our 
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environment...The interests and activities of states overflow their boundaries 
and are world wide ... If there is no cooperation there is bound to be friction 
with its inevitable results". 
Nehru believed that the worldwide cooperation should be based on 
equality and mutual welfare. Racial domination should cease. Moreover no 
nation shall tolerate the exploitation by one another. Nor will the people in the 
backward nations remain indifferent to their abject poverty when other parts of 
the. world are rich and prosperous. It is in its own enlightened self-interest that 
every nation would be driven to this worldwide cooperation. Nehru even 
opposed the idea of European federation where countries like India can only be 
a hanger on of semi colonial status. But it was in favour of Eastern federation, 
which consisted of a powerful combination of free nations, joined together for 
their, own good as well as for the world good. This Eastern federation will be 
intimately connected with Soviet Union and USA. 
According to Nehru "A World union is necessary today. Such a Union 
can have nothing to do with imperialism or Fascism and must be based on the 
fullest democracy and freedom, each nation having autonomy within its 
borders and submitting in international matters to the union legislature to which 
it sends its representatives. Inevitably it will have to work under a planned and 
socialized economy in order to end the conflicts of today. To such a federal 
union India would gladly belong and contribute to her utmost for the peace and 
progress of the world". In other words he wanted sovereign nation states to 
exercise their freedom with constraint and concern for the larger interests of the 
universe. To think of particular interest of a nation, at the expense of other 
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nations, is only to weaken the new world body and to invite the fate of its 
predecessor. 
Nehru was an uncompromising critic of colonialism. Even before India 
attained its independence it had become a "symbol and catalyst of self-
determination" for most of the international movements in Asia and African 
countries. In a speech in the United Nations General Assembly on Nov.3, 
1948, he exhorted: "Great countries like India who have passed out of 
Colonial stages do not conceive it possible that the other countries 
should remain under foreign yoke". Nehru was opposed to the doctrine of self-
determination to every tiny national group. In a letter to H.N. Spalding on 
March 22, 1940 he wrote. 
"It is clear enough that there can be no independent small states in the 
future. There may possibly be huge group of states united together in each 
group and in each group in a state of latent hostility to the other. Though this is 
a possibility, it is obviously a very undesirable possibility and it leads to no 
stability, but to future wars on a tremendous scale. Therefore, we come back to 
the conclusion that the independent sovereign states must be put to an end to, 
and the political and economic Organization of the world must keep pace with 
the technique of science, which has united the whole earth. That is to say that 
there should be a real Commonwealth of interdependent states, each state 
foregoing that part of its independence, which is necessary for the sake of this 
Commonwealth or federation. 
Nehru visualized a United Nations that could bring all nations together 
to sewe as a Commonwealth of Nations, where every member state could give 
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up that part of its freedom, which is necessary for international cooperation. 
For no country could be given complete independence to do whatever it wants. 
The United Nations should serve as "an umpire" to check the misbehaviour or 
interference with other countries and the independence of each country must be 
limited to that extent. 
Since the United Nations represented the world community and a 
mighty cause of preventing future wars and preserving peace and security lies 
on the shoulders of United Nation. Therefore every nation must adhere 
"completely and absolutely to the principles and purposes of the United 
Nations Charter" and India to work with all her ability and strength "for the 
realization of those principles and purposes". 
Since Nehru had a vision to transform the United Nations into world 
government. Therefore he resisted all attempts to reduce the world body into a 
forum to serve the interests of the power blocs. 
Nehru repeatedly stressed that the United Nations in order to be an 
effective world body, should be universal in character and all the countries big 
or small should be represented in it. The League had its demise because it was 
a limited Organization right from the beginning. Some big powers did not join 
it and some were kept out of it whereas the United Nations is based on the 
principle of universality because "it symbolized the longing among all people 
for.the return of peace". If the United Nations does not comply with the 
principle of universality it is likely to suffer the same fate as the League. He 
had very often told the General Assembly that the United Nations should not be 
an exclusive club but should reflect the world as it is. During the Korean 
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Crises an issue that was brought before the Security Council was regarding the 
admission of Communist China into the United Nations by Nehru. But 
unfortunately India's efforts failed because of United States opposition. The 
USA suggested to India to except up permanent seat in the Security Council 
ousting China. But Nehru reacted very sharply against this offer and felt that it 
would do little good and would bring a great deal of trouble in the train. 
According to Nehru it was improper for a great and powerful country 
consisting of over 450 million to remain unrepresented as it had an urgent 
bearing on the major issues of the world such as disarmament etc and without 
which the United Nations is incomplete. He was of the opinion that by adopting 
delaying tactics in this matter we would cause more harm to the United Nations 
and to the consideration of major problems like the Korean crises. He was 
fully convinced that there would have been no Korean war if China had been in 
the United Nations because it would have been easier to deal with China across 
the conference table then on the battlefield. 
India under Nehru has been a passionate and constant advocate of the 
principle of racial equality and there is-perhaps nothing, more which arouses 
the ire of all Indians than racial discrimination. Nehru believed that no solution 
of the African problem could be based on racial discrimination or on the 
suppression of the African people who had suffered terribly for centuries and 
command our sympathy. He even landed a struggle for the independence of 
the former Italian colonies particularly in Libya and opposed South African 
refusal to place South-West Africa under the Trusteeship Council. He also 
insisted upon the principle of self-determination for Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia etc. He even mobilized the world opinion against the policy of 
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apartheid in South Ajfrica and considered discrimination on grounds of race, as 
the violation of United Nations Charter. He provided fixll cooperation to the 
Asian and African countries in removing this evil from different parts of the 
world as it was a menace for world peace and engulfed the world in "racial 
war". 
India under Nehru has been a champion of disarmament and was the 
member of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. She was also a signatory 
to the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of August 1963. Nehru believed that just as 
military pacts undermine the process of peace, militarization only leads to 
tensions and conflicts. Therefore Nehru was of the opinion that general and 
complete disarmament is the sine qua non to prevention of wars and the 
preservation of peace in this world. So he asked all the nations to follow a 
policy of demilitarization and through his speeches and appeals made an 
important contribution to the process of demilitarization According to Nehru 
disarmament was imperative if world is to survive. Therefore one of the 
important tasks for the United Nations according to Nehru was to ensure an 
effective machinery to achieve disarmament, which alone could bring 
confidence and hope for survival among people. 
Nehru greatly emphasized on the specialized agencies of the United 
Nations as they could provide economic and social aid to the under developed 
countries. Hence India participated in the work of specialized agencies of the 
United Nations and finds this international approach to economic and technical 
help preferable to assistance through bilateral relations as it could lead to some 
kind of domination by the advanced countries to an under developed countries. 
Nehru also appreciated and quoted the preamble of the Constitution of 
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UNESCO which stated that war begins in the minds of men and felt that it was 
undoubtedly a step towards changing the mind of the man by providing social, 
economic, educational and cultural relief 
Nevertheless, India has often been suggesting some structural changes in 
the United Nations in view of the emergence of many independent countries of 
Africa and Asia. Nehru while acting in a very reasonable manner on this 
important issue pointed out that the United Nations Charter should be 
inteipreted liberally, keeping in view the social justice so that this body may 
prove a forum for widening areas of freedom and progress. 
Regarding the frequent use of Veto by the USSR compelled the other 
members to find an alternative to the United Nations and it led to the most 
important developments in the form of military pacts, aggression and threat to 
territorial integrity. But Nehru believed that the presence of these Super Power 
i.e. USA and USSR in the United Nations was a matter of prestige which the 
League lacked. Nehru even criticized the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, 
which recognized that the failure of the Security Council to exercise its 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security did not "deprive the 
General Assembly of its rights or relive it of its responsibilities under the 
Charter". Regretting that the United Nations was changing gradually Nehru 
while making a speech on June 12,1962 said "Instead of looking upon it as a 
great Organization for peace, some of its members have gradually begun to 
think of it as an Organization through which war can be waged. The original 
idea behind the formation of the United Nations was vastly different and 
though the Charter remains some how facts began to believe it more and 
more". 
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Regarding the Veto Nehru felt that however undemocratic the Veto 
might be in theory it should not be abolished from the Charter because the 
voting right given to the big powers reflected the reality of international power 
politics though the United Nations was severely criticized for its structure and 
for some of its activities. But Nehru however took into account the broad 
picture and though that the United Nations had amply justified its existence and 
had repeatedly forestalled the recurrent crises from developing into war. 
Though Nehru realized that certain structural defects existed in the 
Organization, but he warned the nations of the world to proceed slowly with 
agreement and should not press for any change, which would involve an 
immediate amendment of the Charter and the raising of heated controversies. 
He felt that if any radical change in the Charter were made without the prior 
consent of all the big powers it would only increase tension and confusion. But 
on the contrary, if the present tendency of Vetoing important matters continued 
the United Nations could hardly face the realities of the world and would come 
closer to the fate of the League of Nations. He believed that merely transferring 
the principle of unanimity from the General Assembly to the Security Council 
would not help in solving the problem. However, Nehru stuck to the presence 
of Veto, but in his view what was needed was not to restrict the area of Veto 
but to regulate its use and that was a matter for the big five to consider 
themselves. 
However India's contribution in the field of political activities within the 
world Organization has been no less significant. 
During the Palestine issue Nehru was equally conscious of imperialist 
designs for maintaining colonialism in the Arab countries. In order to intensify 
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the Indian independence struggle, he became the spokesman for the 
independence of the Arab countries too. The Balfour Declaration was a 
betrayed of Arabs by the British. For Nehru the Arab struggle against British 
imperialism in Palestine was as much a part of this great world conflict as was 
India's struggle for freedom. 
Nehru knew that it was the British who were responsible for the 
Palestine issue and therefore the problem would never be solved by them. 
Nehru at Bandung Conference in 1955 said "Palestinian refugee problem is 
above all a human problem and Afro-Asian community should make fullest 
endeavour to get this solved". However, he believed "Palestine essentially is an 
Arab country and therefore Arabs interest must prevail there. Therefore, it was 
understood that the Arab people could resist any attempt to deprive them of 
their own country. He believed diat the solution of the problem lies in the 
option where the two parties come in agreement with each other and not by 
crushing the Arab people. 
Nehru in 1947 while addressing the Constituent Assembly suggested, 
"A federal state with, naturally an Arab majority in charge of the federal state 
but with autonomy for the other region of the Jewish region," as the solution to 
the problem. For him this was not only a fair and equitable solution of the 
problem, but also the only real solution to the problem. Any other solution 
would have meant fighting and conflict. Though India's proposal was included 
in the Palestine Committee, it did not find favour with most people in the 
United Nations. When partition of Palestine became inevitable, it was realized 
that the Indian solution was probably the best, but it was too late to realize. 
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Partition of Palestine thus brought permanent trouble in the West Asia, 
which at present is extremely explosive with the possibility of a great deal of 
trouble in the future. Had Nehm's plan been accepted, the problem perhaps 
might have been solved much earlier. 
It was the beginning of India's independence when the Korean issue was 
discussed in the United Nations. It was in effect the 'baptism of fire' of the 
World Organization. The United Nations action in Korea comes under two 
heads: 
(a) Attempts for a peaceful adjustment of the solution, (b) By enforcement 
action. 
But India from the very beginning felt that a military solution to Korea 
would not be advisable. India's outstanding contribution towards securing a 
solution of the Korean crises is an example of her unceasing efforts in this 
direction. India desiring to implement the Security Council Resolution through 
some positive aid sends to Korea a medical mission, which earned high praise 
for its work. Secondly his personal appeals to Stalin and Dean Acheson for the 
admission of Peoples Republic of China into the United Nations and for a 
conference between the USA, USSR and China with a view to achieving a 
solution to the Korean crises. Nehru even showed his disapproval of the 
crossing by the United Nations forces of the SS*** parallel in Korea and was 
opposed to the Communist China being branded as an aggressor in Korea, and 
made efforts to get classification of the stand taken by the Peoples Republic of 
China with regard to the negotiation of cease-fire in Korea and a compromise 
plan to solve the deadlocked prisoners of war issue and her chairmanship of the 
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Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for Korea in 1953-1954 are worth 
mentioning. Thus India under Nehru undoubtedly played an important role 
during the Korean crises. In the words of Nehru "Whatever may happen today 
or in near future with regards to Korea, we may feel in all humility that we 
used our endeavour in helping to bring hostilities to an end. 
Peace in Asia was of paramount importance to India. Asian peace during 
this period was generally threatened by the rise of internal Communist forces, 
which in turn drew the American and the Russian on to the Asian stage. 
As normal the Indian policy during this phase of Vietnamese crises was 
also the same i.e. her concern for peace and stability in Indo-China, appeal for 
political solution through a Geneva type Conference to end the crises for good 
and to ensure peace and security of the Vietnamese. 
In this Asian drama Nehru played many roles but mainly those of 
mitigator of fear of Communism among the Asian nations, a peacemaker 
between the two power blocks and a proud and sensitive nationalist He 
maintained art incomparable ideological firmness between his different roles 
but in times of conflict, he chooses sometimes reluctantly to act in India's 
national interest for which he had to face a lot of criticism. 
In the very begirming Nehru had been very vocal on the issue of 
Vietnam. He always spoke in favour of the Vietnamese and viewed the 
Vietnam crises from an angle diametrically oppose to that of USA, which even 
had strained relations between the two countries. 
Since India has always been distrustful of the Western powers whose 
main aim is subverting independence and establishing colonial rule? biased by 
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this view India saw American move in Vietnam as a struggle for world 
domination in some form of imperialism. Moreover Nehru was of the opinion 
that American interference in Indo-China would draw Chinese into the arena 
and the Korean story would be repeated. Thus he was prepared to accept the 
Communist rule in North Vietnam in preference to the possibility of a Super 
Power confrontation in the region because that would lead to the possibility of 
a World War III. 
But later on Indian attitude and reaction towards the development in 
Vietnam were conditioned by the imperatives of her relations with the PRC and 
her own domestic problem because during the mid sixties, India was passing 
through an acute food shortage cause by successive failure of crops. As a 
result India had to heavily depend on United States aid (PL-480) to obtain food 
grains. Therefore Nehru was forced by circumstances to slow down his voice 
reluctantly to act in India's national interest. 
Thus for a country like India, which was extremely, anti-colonialist and 
which favoured nationalism rather than Communism, The situation in Vietnam 
looked very complicated. Thus India's policy towards Vietnam from 1945 to 
1960 can be divided into three phases. 
During the first phase (i.e. 1945 to 1949), India strongly opposed French 
colonialism and was sympathetic towards the Communist dominated national 
movement led by Ho Chin Minh, but she did not carry this sympathy to the 
point of actually strengthening this movement materially, morally and 
diplomatically to the advantage of Communism. During the second phase i.e. 
from 1950-1954 India was still showing sentimental preference for Ho Chin 
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Minh, but was strictly neutral politically and diplomatically and during the 
third phase, India progressively moved closer to the nationalist to the 
disadvantage of the Communist. 
India as a Chairman of the International Control Commission made a 
proposal for the development of Afro-Asian force in Vietnam to control the 
demarcation of land between the North and South Vietnam. But this proposal 
was however rejected. Later on July 7, 1986 India again proposed a 6-point 
formula for ending the war in Vietnam. Regarding India's attitude towards 
Vietnam issue Nehru said that it was a positive attitude because we do not want 
to make the situation more difficult for Indo-Chinese fight for Independence. 
Thus India adopted a policy of neutrality in Vietnam in order to help facilitate 
the solution of the problem. Thus India only reacted to developments that were 
circumscribed by the demand of national interest. 
The Congo Crises in 1960 plunged the United Nations into serious 
crises with Soviet Union threatening to withdraw from the United Nations 
system. It raked up East-West tensions, thus giving the Cold War a new twist. 
While Khruschew declaring a war on United Nations, it looked, as though the 
split in the United Nations was inevitable. The efforts made by Nehru to 
defuse the United Nations crises are worth appreciating. As Reuter reported it 
was Nehru who undertook the "greatest peace mission" of his life to save the 
United Nations from disaster. It in reality became a rescue mission. 
India as always tried to be objective in its appraisal of every issue 
pertaining to the ONUC, and to ensure that it did not become a part of the Cold 
War between the two Super Power. When Khruschev sought the support of 
Nehru for his efforts to bring about a structural re-Organization of the United 
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Nations with special reference to Secretariat Nehru refused to obhgate. 
Though he also wanted certain structured changes but he believed that a re-
Organization of the United Nations at this stage would likely to hinder the 
working of ONUC. 
Nevertheless, no student of international relations can dismiss except 
with cheap scepticism the role-played by Nehru on the world stage and his 
contribution to the theory and practice of international relations. The future is 
constantly emerging from the past carrying with it most of the debris of the 
past, but is shaped, in its essential thrust, by statesmen like Nehru. The 
greatness of Nehru lies in the fact that his concepts and ideas have stood the 
test of time. 
And it was under Nehru's leadership that India played an important role 
in world affairs. But we feel sorry seeing the current picture of India's role in 
international affairs, which is completely different to what it was during the 
Nehruvian era. During Nehruvian era India had just attained its independence 
and was facing acute problems from all sides but still Nehru showed the guts of 
taking over the most delicate task in international affairs and often received 
high praise for his work. But now, India avoids even reacting to international 
crises; let it be United Nations operation in Iraq or United States operation in 
Afghanistan. Now our leadership prefers silence to international incidents. But 
this is definitely not a good sign because this kind of attitude would definitely 
blur India's image in the eyes of the world. Today we do not have single 
statesmen like Nehru. So today, if we wish to regain our past legacy of activity 
participating in world affairs with which Nehru lived his whole life. Our 
leaders will have to cultivate the similar vigour and vitality that was exhibited 
by Nehru in resolving the world crises. 
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Appendix A 
The United Nations Organization 
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS A 
NOBLE DOCUMENT 
We have associated ourselves with the United Nations. This association does 
not deprive us of our independence. Of course, it limits our freedom in the 
sense in which it limits the freedom of every member country. That some limit 
should be placed on your field of action is the natural consequence of joining 
an organization of that nature. Our membership of the United Nations is a far 
greater limitation than our association with the Commonwealth of Nations. In 
fact, the latter is almost airy association, because it is not written down on 
paper or in any constitution or anywhere else; so long as we wish to be there, 
we can remain there. 
To come back to the United Nations, we associated ourselves with the 
United Nations because we felt that some such world organization was very 
essential. The League of Nations had failed. The UNO seemed to be a similar 
attempt under wider and perhaps better auspices and so we joined it. I shall 
think that the Charter of the United Nations is a very fine and noble document 
Speeches (1949-53), pp.22-3: from speech in 
Parliament, New Delhi, June 12, 1952 
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THE UNITED NATIONS SERVES AN 
ESSENTIAL PURPOSE 
Inspite of its faults, the United Nations serves an essential purpose. If it did not 
exist today, undoubtedly, all the countries would come together to build up 
something like it again. I do not want that to happen. I attach the greatest 
importance to the United Nations but I must repeat that the United Nations has 
swerved from its original moorings and gradually become a protector of 
colonialism in an indirect way. This is a dangerous deviation. Instead of 
looking upon it as a great organization for peace, some of its members have 
gradually begun to think of it as an organization through which war can be 
waged. 
Speeches ('1945-53), p. 223: from speech in 
Parliament, New Delhi, June 12, 1952. 
FAITH IN UNO TO SOLVE WORLD PROBLEMS 
I have no doubt that this Assembly is going to solve our problems We do 
not think that the problems of the world or of India can be solved by thinking in 
terms of aggression or war or violence. We are frail mortals and we cannot 
always live up to the teaching of the great man who led our nation to freedom. 
But that lesson has sunk deep into our souls and, so long as we remember it, I 
am sure we shall be on the right path. And if I may venture to suggest this to 
the General Assembly, I think that if the essentials of that lesson are kept in 
mind, perhaps our approach to the problems of today will be different; perhaps 
the conflicts that always hang over us will appear a little less deep than they are 
and actually will gradually fade away... 
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No one can be optimistic enough to think that all problems will fade 
away simply df we feel good; that is not what I mean to say. The problems are 
difficult and intricate and they will take a lot of solving. But 1 do feel that our 
approach to those problems should not be the approach of anger and passion 
and fear. Then, perhaps, the problems will gradually appear in a different light. 
Perhaps, we shall understand the other side better; perhaps, the fear of one 
another will grow less in our minds, and then a solution may come. 
Independce and After, pp. 322-4; from 
Address the United Nations General 
Assembly, Paris, November 3, 1948. 
THE UNITED NATIONS THE BASIS OF A 
WORLD GOVERNMENT 
This United Nations, inspite of its failings and weaknesses, is something that is 
good. It should be encouraged and supported in every way, and should be 
allowed to develop into some kind of world government or world order. 
Independence and After, p.214: from speech 
In Constituent Assembly, New Delhi, March 
8, 1948. 
THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION 
This great organization built for peace is itself engaged in sponsoring war 
today. I am not blaming anybody but only trying to analyse the situation as 
objectively as I can. Is it possible that the world has not grown up and is 
incapable of having an international organization for peace? I do not know. 
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People talk about a united world; many wise, intelligent and ardent people 
advocate the ideal of world federalism but we again and again prove ourselves 
unable to give effect to it. Is it possible for countries entirely different from 
one another in their political, economic and other policies to co-operate or must 
they remain apart? There was a time, centuries ago, when it did not much 
matter whether they did or not because there was no natural contact. Today, 
there is continuous contact, which can be friendly or hostile. I find myself 
wondering again and again whether an international organization, containing 
within its core countries with entirely different aims, can exist. I feel sure it 
can and, what is more see non reason why it should not function efficiently. 
After all when the United Nations was started countries like the United States 
of America and the U.S.S.R. did co-operate and come together before they 
drifted appear. For my part, I do not see why they should not be able to 
function together in an organization, provided, of course, they did not interfere 
with one another and so long as each was fi:ee to carry on the policy it chose for 
itself. 
Speeches (1949-53), pp.246-7: fi^om speech in 
Parliament,NewDelhi, February 18, 1953 Delhi, 
INDIA CONTINUES IN THE UNO DESPITE 
DISAPPOINTMENTS 
We respect the United Nations and are all for a world organization dealing with 
such matters. It is right that we should remain a member of the United Nations, 
even though things do not always happen according to our wishes. We have 
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made it perfectly clear that we are not willing to jeopardize the interests of the 
people of Kashmir or those of our own people. Nobody will be allowed to 
impose anything dishonourable upon us. We have decided to await the verdict 
of the Security Council, however long it may be in coming. The way of peace 
is always the better and, in the longer. The way of peace is always the better 
and, in the longer run, the shorter way. The way of war is no way at all, for it 
solves nothing. 
Speeches ^945-53), p. 207: from in 
ParUament, New Delhi, February 12, 1952. 
GREATER CONSERVATISM APPARENT IN 
THE UNO 
As the war has developed and the danger of a possible victory of the Fascist 
Powers has receded, has been a progressive hardening and a greater 
conservatism in the leaders of the United Nations. The Four Freedoms and the 
Atlantic Charter, vague as they were and limited in scope, have faded into the 
background, and the future has been envisaged more and more as a retention of 
the past. The struggle force, and has ceased to be an attack on the philosophy 
of the Nazis and the Fascists. 
The Discovery of India, p.655. 
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DISAPPEARANCE OF UNO A WORLD 
TRAGEDY 
I have ventured, in all humility, sometimes to criticize those developments at 
the United Nations which seemed to me to be out of keeping with its Charter 
and its past record and professions. Nevertheless, I have believed and I do 
believe that the United Nations, inspite of its many faults, inspite of its having 
deviated from its aims somewhat, is, nevertheless, a basic and fundamental 
thing in the structure of the world today. Not to have it or to do away with it 
would be a tragedy for the world. Therefore, I do not wish this country of ours 
to do anything which weakens the gradual development of some kind of a 
world structure. It may be that the real world structure will not come in our 
lifetime but unless that world structure comes, there is not hope for this world, 
because the only alternative is world conflict on a prodigious and tremendous 
scale. Therefore, it would wrong for us to do anything that weakens the 
beginnings of a world structure, even though we may disagree with this 
particular organization and even though we may sometimes criticize it, as we 
have done. 
Speeches (1949-53), p.349: from speech in 
Parliament, New Delhi, August 7, 1952. 
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UNO 
Some Honourable Members have suggested, in a fit of frustration,that we 
should withdraw from the United Nations. That, if I may say so, with all 
respect, is immaturity. One cannot run away like this from a problem. The 
United Nations, inspite of all its failings-and there are many-is a great world 
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organization. It does contain within it the seeds of hope and peace, and it 
would be rather perverse for any country to try to destroy this structure because 
it is not to its entire liking. If a country does that, I have no doubt that it is that 
country which will suffer more than the organization. We cannot remain 
isolated in the world, cut off from everything and living a life of our own in our 
limited sphere. Most of us in India are so situated as to be normally isolated in 
our minds, in our social habits like eating, drinking and marrying. We isolate 
habits like eating drinking and marrying. We isolate ourselves in castes, with 
the result that it is a unique Indian habit which does not prevail anywhere else 
in the world. We live in compartments, and therefore, perhaps, we easily think 
in terms of isolation as a country too. But the fact is that isolation in the past 
has weakened us very greatly and left us rather in the lurch when the world had 
advanced in terms of science or other developments. We caimot isolated, in 
fact, no country can be. Therefore, to talk of getting out of the United Nations 
or of otherwise keeping apart from all these problems is not to take cognizance 
of the realities of the situation. 
Speeches (1953-57), pp. 243-4 from speech in 
Parhament, New Delhi, September 17, 1953. 
Man does not live by politics alone, nor, indeed, wholly by economics. And so 
UNESCO came into being to represent something that was vital to human 
existence and progress. Even as the United Nations General Assembly 
represented the political will of the world community, UNESCO tried to 
represent the finer and the deeper sides of human life, and, indeed, might be 
said to represent the conscience of the world community... 
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I have called this great assembly the conscience of the world 
community. The problems we have to face, many complicated as they are, will 
never be solved except on the basis of good morals conscience. It is for this 
reason that I beg of you, distinguished delegates from the nations of the world, 
to pay heed to this collapse of conscience and good morals that we see around 
us, for unless we do so our fine ideals and the good work you have done will be 
shattered into'nothingness. 
May I also point out to you that a world organization like this cannot be 
properly constituted or function adequately if a large section of the world 
remains umepresented here? 1 hope that three countries which have recently 
attained their independence-the Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco-will find a place 
soon in this organization to share the burdens and responsibilities of its labours. 
But I would specially refer to the People's Government of China and the six 
hundred million people who live in that great country who have so far not been 
represented here... 
Our country is the large one and our population is considerable. But we 
have no desire to interfere with any country. We have no hatreds and we have 
been nurtured under the inspiring guidance of our great leaders, Mahatma 
Gandhi, in the ways of peace. We want to be fiiends with all the world. We 
know our failing and seek to overcome them, so that we might be of service to 
our own people and to the world. 
Speeches (1953-57), pp. 500, 503: from speech 
at the inauguration of the Tenth Aimual Session 
of UNESCO, New Delhi, November 5, 1956. 
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THE UNO A POWER FOR PEACE 
1 have no doubt that the United Nations Organization - with all its weakness in 
enforcing decision- has been a power for peace in the world; and it may grow 
that way, That depends really on widespread public opinion. 
Conversation with Mr. Nehru, p.87 
INDIA NOT AFRAID OF THE FUTURE 
1 am not afraid of the future, I have no fear in my mind, and I have no fear, 
even though India, from a military point of view, is of no great consequence. 1 
am not afraid of the bigness of great powers, and their armies, their fleets and 
their atom bombs. That is the lesson which my Master taught me. We stood as 
an unarmed people against a great country and a powerful empire. We were 
supported and strengthened, because throughout all this period we decided not 
to submit to evil, and I think that is the lesson which I have before me and 
which is before us today. I do not know if it is possible to apply this to the 
problems which face the world today. It is a terrible problem, but I think if we 
banish fear, if we have confidence, even though we may take risks of trust 
rather than risk violent language, violent actions and in the end war, I think 
those risk are worth taking. 
Independence and After, p.322: from Address 
to the United Nations General Assembly at 
Paris, on November 3, 1948. 
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APARTHEID AND THE UNO 
Apartheid is opposed to the whole spirit of modem thought, opposed to the 
U.N. Charter and contrary to the United Nations. The effect of racial relations 
is obviously a problem that fills people's minds in the Commonwealth 
Conference and outside. Apart from the morality of it, it is a danger to world 
peace; also from that point of view it has to be considered. 
The Hindu, May 3,1960: from press interview to world 
Correspondents at India House, London, during the 
Commonwealth Premiers' Conference. 
The Role of the United Nations 
I am grateful for the opportunity that has been given to me to address this great 
Assembly. I feel little embarrassed and a little overwhelmed by this occasion 
because this Assembly represents the world community, and, whether we who 
are present here are big men and women or small, we represent a mighty cause, 
and something of the greatness of that cause falls upon us too and makes us, for 
the moment, greater perhaps that we are. 
Therefore, in venturing to address this Assembly, I feel embarrassed. 
You have been dealing with intricate and difficult problems, and 1 do not, and 1 
would not, venture on this occasion to say anything about those problems that 
confront you. You carry the burdens and the sorrows of the world. But I have 
often wondered whether, in dealing with those problems, the approach that is 
normally made to them is a right one or not. The Charter of the United 
Nations, in noble language, has laid down the principles and the purposes of 
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this great organization. I do not think it would be possible to upon that 
language. The objective are clear; your aims is clear: and yet, in looking at that 
aim, we loose ourselves often, if I am venture to say so, in small matters and 
forget main objective that we are looking at. Sometimes it seems that the 
objective itself gets a httle clouded and lesser objectives are before us. 
I come from a country which, after a long struggle, though that struggle 
was a peacefiil struggle, attained her freedom and her independence. In these 
long years of struggle we were taught by our great leader never to forget not 
only the objectives we had but also the methods whereby we should achieve 
those objectives. Always he laid stress on this, that it was not good enough to 
have good objective, that it was equally important that the means of attaining 
those objectives were good: means were always as important as ends. You will 
permit me to repeat this hear, because I am convinced that, however good the 
ends, the larger ends of the United Nation, or the lesser objectives which we 
may from time to time have before us, either as individual nations or as groups 
of nations, it is important that we should remember that the best of objectives 
may not be reached if our eyes are blood-shot and our minds clouded with 
passion. 
Therefore, it becomes essential for us, for a while, to think more of how 
we are doing things than what we are aiming at, even though we should never 
forget what we are aiming at. It becomes necessary for us always to remember 
the principles and the purposes for which this great assembly was formed. 
Now, a mere repetition of those principles and purposes would perhaps 
indicate to us how sometimes, with passion and prejudice, swerve always from 
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that path. This assembly took shape after to mighty Wars and as a consequence 
of those wars. In the Preamble of your Charter you recount these. What has 
been the lessons of those Wars? Surely the lesson of those Wars has been that 
out of hatred and violence you will not build peace. It is a contradiction in 
terms. The lesson of history, the long course of history, and more specially the 
lesson of the last two great Wars which have devasted humanity, has been that 
out of hatred and violence only hatred and violence will come. We have got 
into a cycle of hatred and violence, and not be the most brilliant debate will get 
you out of it, unless you look some other way and find some other means. It is 
obvious that if you continue in this cycle and have wars which this Assembly 
was specially meant to avoid and prevent, the result will not only be 
tremendous devastation all over the world but the non achievement by any 
individual power or group oiiXs objective. 
How, then, are we to proceed? It may be that it is difficult to get and 
prejudice and out of her minds. Nevertheless, unless we try to proceed this 
way, to cast out this fear, we shall never succeed. Of that I am quite convinced. 
You meet here representatives of all the nations of the world, or nearly 
all. Inevitably, you have before you the immediate great problems that 
confront more specially Europe, which has suffered so much. 
May I say, as a representative &om Asia that we honour Europe for its 
culture and for the great advance in human civilization which it represents. 
May I say that we are equally interested in the solution of European problems: 
but may I also say that the world is something bigger than Europe, and you will 
not solve your problems by thinking that the problems of the world are mainly 
278 
Appendix 
European problem. There are vast tracks of the world which may not in the 
past, for a few generations, have taken much part in world affairs. But they are 
awake; their people are moving, and they have no intention whatever of being 
ignored or of being passed by. 
It is a simple fact that I think we have to remember, because unless you 
have the full picture of the world before you, you will not even understand the 
problem, and if you isolate any single problem in the world from the rest you 
do not understand the world problem. Today, 1 do venture to submit that Asia 
counts in world affairs. Tomorrow it will count much more than today. Asia 
till recently, was largely a prey to imperial domination and colonialism: a great 
part of it is free today; part of it still remains unfree: and it is an astonishing 
thing that any country should venture to hold and to said for this doctrine of 
colonialism, whether it is under direct rule or whether it is indirectly maintain 
in some form or other. After all that has happened, there is going to be no mere 
objection to that, but active objection, an active struggle against any and every 
form of colonialism in any part of the world. That is the first thing to 
remember. 
We in Asia, who have ourselves suffered all these evils of coloniaUsm 
and of imperial domination, have committed ourselves inevitably to the 
freedom of every other colonial country. There are neighbouring countries of 
ours in Asia with whom we are intimately allied. We look to them with 
sympathy; we look at their struggle with sympathy. Any power, great or small, 
which in that way prevents the attaiimient of the freedom of those peoples does 
an ill turn to world peace. Great countries like India, who have passed out of 
that colonial stage do not conceive it possible that other countries should 
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remain under the yoke of colonial rule. We in Asia regard it as a vital problem, 
because it has been a vital problem for us. 
There is another question to which I want to draw attention -that is the 
question of racial equality, which is something which is laid down in the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter. It is well to repeat that, the because 
after all this question of racial equahty has frequently been spoken about in the 
Assembly of the United Nations. 
I do not think 1 need dwell on any particular aspect of that question, but 
I would reiilind this Assembly of the world-wide aspects of this question. 
Obviously there are large regions of the world which have suffered from this 
racial inequality. We also feel that there is not part of the world where it can be 
tolerated in the future, except perhaps because of a superior force. If racial 
inequality is practiced, if it is a menace to world peace and if it violates the 
principles of United Nations Charter, to tolerate it is obviously to sow seeds of 
conflicts. 
The effects of this inequality in the past have made themselves felt in 
Asia, Africa and other parts of the world much more than in Europe, leading 
towards conflicts in the future, because it is a problem which if it is not 
properly understood will not be solved. 
It is a strange thing, when the world lacks so many things, food and 
other necessities, in many parts of the world and people are dying from hunger 
that the attention of this Assembly of Nations is concentrated on a number of 
political problems. There are economic problems also. I wonder if it would be 
possible for this Assembly for a while to take a holiday from some of the acute 
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political problems which face it, and allow men's minds to settle down and 
look at the vital and urgent economic problem, and look at places in the world 
where food is lacking. 
I feel that today the world is so tied up in fears, apprehensions, some of 
them justified not doubt, but where a person feels fear, evil consequences 
follow. Fear is not a good companion. It is surprising to see that this sense of 
fear is pervading great countries - fear, and grave fear of war, and fear of many 
things. Well, I think that is admitted, or it will be admitted, that no aggression 
of any kind can be tolerated, because the very idea of aggression must upset the 
balance and lead to conflict. Aggression of every type must be resisted. 
There are other forms of fear; there is the fear of war. In existing 
circumstances it is difficult for people to say that they will not defend 
themselves, because if there is a fear of aggression one has to defend one's self 
against aggression. We have to defend ourselves, but even in defending 
ourselves, we must not submit ourselves to this Assembly without clean hands. 
It is easy to condemn people. Let us not do so, for who is without blame, who 
cannot themselves be condemned? In a sense, of us all who are gathered here 
today in this continent of Europe- are there any amongst us who have not been 
guilty in many ways? WE are guilty men and women. While we are seeking 
points where error occurs, we should not forget that there are none of us who is 
exempt from blame. 
If we proceed to this problem, and discuss in peace the psychology of 
fear, if we realize the consequences of what is happening, it is possible that this 
atmosphere of fear may be dissipated. Why should there be this fear of war? 
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Let us prepare ourselves against any possible aggression, let no one think that 
any nation, any community can misbehave. The United Nations is here to 
prevent any fear or hurt; but at the same time let us banish all thought of an 
aggressive attitude whether by word or deed. However, I feel that few of us 
can altogether avoid this attitude, whether it is in the course of discussions 
before this Assembly or elsewhere. One tries to make one's points by this sort 
of language. It is always easy to make one's points in the course of a 
discussion but there always rests a bitterness which complicates the problem 
still further. As I have already said, I ask this Assembly to remember that such 
great problems cannot be solved if our eyes are blood-shot and our minds are 
obscured by passion. 
I have no doubt that this Assembly is going to solve our problems. I am 
not afraid of the future. I have no fear in my mind, and I have no fear, even 
though India, from a military point of view, is of no great consequence. Still I 
am not afraid of the bigness of the great powers, and their armies, their fleets 
and their atom bombs. That is the lesson which my Master taught me. We 
stood as an unarmed people against a great country and powerful empire. We 
were supported and strengthened because throughout all this period we decided 
not to submit to evil, and I think is the lesson which I have before me and 
which is before us today. I do not know if it is possible to apply this to the 
problems which face the world today. It is terrible problem, but I think if we 
banish this fear, if we have confidence, even though we may take risks of trust 
rather than to risk violent language, violent actions and in the end war, I think 
those risks are worth taking. 
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In any event, there are risks- and great risks. If it is a question of taking 
risks, why take risks which inevitably lead to greater conflict? Take the other 
risks, while always preparing yourself to meet any possible contingency that 
may arise. 
It is perhaps not very proper for me to address this great Assembly in 
such matters, because I have not been associated with it or with all these 
different problems in any intimate degree. However, there would have been no 
point in my addressing you merely to repeat certain pious phrases. I feel 
strongly about this matter, and that is why I should like to present the views 
and wishes of the Indian people. And the Indian people happen to be tiiree 
hundred and thirty millions in number; it is well to remember that. We have 
had a year of freedom and a year of difficulty. We have overcome many of 
those difficulties and we shall overcome the others. We propose to go ahead at 
a rapid pace. We propose to build and construct and be a power for peace and 
for the good of the world. We propose to meet every aggression, from 
whatever quarter it comes, in every possible way open to us. 
However, we do not think that the problems of the world or of India can 
be solved by thinking in terms of aggression or war or violence. We are frail 
mortals, and we cannot always live up to the teaching of the great man who led 
our nation to freedom. But that lesson has sunk deep into our souls and, so 
long as we remember it, I am sure we shall be on the right path. And, if I may 
venture to suggest this to the General Assembly, I think that if the essentials of 
that lesson- which is not alone a lesson of today, but the lesson of history- are 
kept in mind, perhaps our approach to the problems of today will be different; 
283 
Appendix 
perhaps the conflicts that always hang over us will appear a little less deep than 
they are and actually will gradually fade away. 
I should like to state to this General Assembly, on behalf of my people 
and my Government, that we adhere completely and absolutely to the 
principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and that we shall try, to 
the best of our ability, to work for the realization of those principles and 
purposes. 
In conclusion, may I congratulate the General Assembly on the 
Resolution, introduced by the delegation of Mexico, which it has just passed. It 
is certainly a great Resolution. If the General Assembly follows up that 
Resolution, it will go a long way on the road toward peace and the solution of 
the problems that are before us. We may not solve those problems. No one 
can be optimistic enough to think that all the problems will fade away simply if 
we feel good; that is not what I me to say. The problems are difficult and they 
will take a lot of solving. But I do feel that passion and fear. Then, perhaps, 
the problems will gradually appear in a different light. Perhaps we shall 
understand the other side better; perhaps the fear of one another will grow less 
in our minds, and then a solution may come. At any rate, even if a solution 
does not come, this pall of fear that surrounds us will grow less, and that in it 
self will be a partial solution of the world problem. 
I wish to thank the President for this opportunity that he has given me to 
speak to the General Assembly. 
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Membership of the Security Council 
As regards India's standing for the Security Council, I think that we 
should give up that idea completely for the present. It is clear that neither the 
US nor the UK will support us. Apart from that, I feel it is not consonant with 
our dignity to go about asking for support. If India is important, as she 
progressively is, others will have to take the initiative in this matter. 
Apart from this, the membership of the political conference is more 
important a thing now than the Security Council. 
Presidentship of the General Assembly 
You will remember our getting a letter from the Thai Embassy asking 
for our support for their candidate for the Presidentship of the UN Assembly. 
Please send an answer to them telling them frankly that we regret we cannot 
give this support as we intend having oiu" own candidate. 
I have sent you a separate brief note about informing Rajeshwar Dayal 
and others about the clear indication we have got of American support in this 
matter. You should send a special telegram to our High Commissioner in 
London asking him to inform the UK Government of this. In view of this we 
have definitely decided to permit our candidate to stand and we hope that the 
UK Government will in these circumstances also support our candidate. 
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APPENDIX B 
The Palestine Issue 
The Hon'ble Member of External Affairs said that he had only one point 
to add to the summary. Yesterday he had received a telegram from our 
Ambassador in Washington to the effect that the delegates from the Arab 
countries were likely to insist on an immediate decision of the Palestine issue 
and to oppose the appointment of a fact-finding committee. To provide for that 
eventuality he suggested the deletion of the word 'stiongly' from the last 
sentence of the draft telegram which it was proposed to send to our 
Ambassador, and the addition of another sentence at the end of the telegram as 
follows: - "if, however, as you report in your telegram No. 342 dated 20.4.47 
the Arab countries press for an immediate consideration of the substantive 
issues you should not oppose this". 
Recognition of Israel 
The Egyptian Ambassador came to see me this morning. He conveyed to 
me the gratitude of his Govermnent for the attitude that the Govenunent of 
India had taken up in regard to the recognition of Israel. He said that when the 
Palestine issue was being considered by the United Nations and negotiations 
for truce were going on, any recognition was untimely to say the least of it. The 
recognition by a number of countries of Israel at this stage was obviously 
aimed at exercising some pressure in a certain direction and might almost be 
considered an unfriendly act. 
He seemed to imply that the position would be different after the present 
negotiations are over or after tlie Security Council has come to a decision. 
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He then informed me that he had a long talk with the Dutch Ambassador 
about Indonesia and had impressed upon him the moderation of our attitude in 
regard to Indonesia and the desirability of the Dutch Government falling in line 
with it. 
Korea Resolution 
Thank you for your message about Korea Resolution in General 
Assembly. I have given much thought to this matter and am anxious that 
Resolution should be as uncontroversial as possible. But I feel that an 
indication giving a positive approach to the problem without any commitments 
is desirable. I realise that Geneva Conference on Korea was a failure and there 
need not be a going back to it. But some kind of a hint of continuation would 
probably be helpful. However, since you are unwilling to mention three 
Geneva Presidents, I would be agreeable to leaving out this part. 1 would 
suggest, however, that operative part (b) of your Resolution might be omitted. 
It appears totally unnecessary and would raise needless controversial debate. 
There are some other minor suggestions also which I have conveyed to Krishna 
Menon. 
There,need to no reference in Resolution to the report of Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission. Some minor matters which are still pending with us 
might be mentioned in course of debate. But I hope this subject will not be 
closed. Necessity might arise later for it to be referred to. 
I would welcome some Resolution on agreed basis, but if United States 
puts forward some other Resolution with which we are unable to agree, then it 
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might be desirable for us to express our viewpoint clearly about positive 
approach to Korean question. 
Statement by the Government of India, 29* June, 1950 
The Government of India have viewed with grave concern the 
developments in Korea involving as they do not evil war but also a threat to 
world peace. There have been a number of border incidents between North and 
South Korea in the past, but whatever the nature of these might have been it 
appears clear from the informations available to the Government of India that a 
large scale invasion of South Korea took place by armed forces of the North 
Korea Government. This information was supphed by a variety of sources, the 
most authoritative among them being the United Nations Commission on 
Korea on which India is represented, and which at the time of the invasion was 
in Seoul. In view of this information the Government of India's Permanent 
Delegate to the United Nations and Representative on the Security Council, Sir 
B.N. Rau, supported the first Resolution of the Security Council which 
declared that such aggression had taken place and called for a ceasefire and 
withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38*'' parallel. This direction of the 
Security Council was not acted upon by the North Korean Government and 
their forces, and the invasion continued till it threatened the capital city Seoul 
itself. The Security Council met again to consider this rapidly changing 
situation and passed the second Resolution on Korea on the night of 27* June 
(New York Times). The Govenunent of India's representative in the Security 
Council was unable to participate in the voting on this second Resolution on 
Korea because he could not communicate it in time to his Government and 
obtain their instiuction. The operative part of this Resolution recommends that 
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the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of 
Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore 
international peace and security in the area. The Government of India have 
given the most careful consideration to this Resolution of the Security Council 
in the context of the events in Korea and also of their general foreign policy. 
They are opposed to any attempt to settle international disputes by resort to 
aggression. For this reason Sir B.N. Rau, on behalf of the Government of 
India, voted in favour of the first Resolution of the Security Council. The 
halting of aggression and the quick restoration of peaceful conditions are 
essential preludes to a satisfactory settlement. The Government of India, 
therefore, also accept the second Resolution of the Security Council. This 
decision of the Government of India does not, however, involved any 
modification of their foreign policy. This policy is based on the promotion of 
world peace and the development of friendly relations with all countries, it 
remains an independent policy which will continue to be determined solely by 
India's ideals and objectives. The Government of India earnestly hope then 
even at this stage it may be possible to put an end to the fighting and to settle 
the dispute by mediation. 
Prime Minister Nehru's Message of July 13,1950, to 
Secretary Acheson^ 
In interviews which your Ambassador has had with officials of the 
Ministry of External Affairs, we have explained India's position in the Korean 
dispute. 
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India's purpose is to localize the conflict and to facilitate an early 
peaceful settlement by breaking the present deadlock in the Security Council so 
that representatives of the People's Government of China can take a seat in the 
Council, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can return to it, and, whether 
within or through informal confacts outside the Council, the United States of 
America, the Union of Soviet SociaUst Republics, and China, with help and co-
operation of other peace-loving nations, can find a basis for terminating the 
conflict and for a permanent solution of the Korean problem. 
In full confidence of Your Excellency's determination to maintain peace 
and thus to preserve the solidarity of the United Nations, I venture to address 
this personal appeal to you to exert your great authority and influence in the 
achievement of this common purpose on which the well being of mankind 
depends. 
INDOCHINA 
Appeal for Ceasefire 
Now, I just mentioned that in Korea, whatever difficulties there might 
remain, the fact that war has stopped. It is a very big thing. Unfortunately, in 
Indo-China war has not stopped and is being continued in a very terrible way. 
It is six years now since this Indo-China war began and for the present I do not 
propose to say anything more about it, because of this that anyhow all of us 
here - and many others, I have no doubt - would obviously welcome some 
kind of ending of this actual war, but more especially when it has been 
proposed to discuss this matter two months hence by the great powers 
concerned. It seems a tremendous pity that this war should continue when a 
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serious attempt is going to be made to find a way out. Now, it is not for me to 
suggest anything, and certainly it is with no desire to intervene in any way or 
intrude or involve ourselves or anything like that, but 1 do venture to suggest to 
all the parties and the powers concerned that in view of the fact that this matter 
of Indo-China is going to be discussed at the Geneva Conference two months 
later, it might be desirable - it is desirable, 1 think - to have some kind of 
ceasefire without any party giving up its own position, whatever they might 
consider their right etc., because, once one starts arguing about rights, then 
there will be no end to that argument. So, I would make this very earnest 
appeal in all humility - and 1 am sure this House will join with me - to the 
powers to strive to have a ceasefire there. Then they can discuss it in their own 
way. 1 repeat that so far as we are concerned, we have no desire to interfere or 
to shoulder any burden or responsibility in this connection. 
Relations with South Africa 
No reference is made in this Aide Memoire on racial discrimination. 1 
think a paragraph should be added. This would be the penultimate paragraph. 
This might run thus:-
The Government of the UK are aware of the deep feeling in India in 
regard to racial discrimination. The laws passed by the Government of the 
Union of South Africa and the general practice of that Government in regard to 
racial discrimination have led to strained relations between South 
Africa and India. Not only the people of India but the people of Asia generally 
as well as of Africa have resented this treatment of the non-white peoples in 
South Africa and this question has been raised repeatedly before the United 
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Nations Assembly. That Assembly has expressed its displeasure at he attitude 
of the Government of the South African Union. This has had no effect on the 
policies of the Union Government, which has defied or ignored the decisions of 
the UN Assembly. In a lesser degree, racial discrimination exists in other parts 
of Africa and is the cause of increasing bitterness. The Government of the 
United Kingdom will appreciate that people who are subjected or who may be 
subjected to this insulting and humiliating treatment can never accept it 
willingly. It can, therefore, only result in continuing conflict and increasing 
bitterness. For people in Asia and Africa, this question of racial discrimination 
is of vital importance. 
I have read this Aide Memoire and have suggested above an additional 
paragraph. 
I agree with Secretary General that this should only be given to the High 
Commissioner of the UK in Delhi. Copies of it should be sent to our High 
Commissioner in London, Shri K.M. Panikkar, and Shri Apa Pant and some of 
our other important Missions. 
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